teacher sets but an ill example, the pupil can hardly learn to do the thing aright.[19] And if the master's conduct is suggestive of laxity, how hardly shall his followers attain to carefulness! Or to put the matter concisely, 'like master like man.' I do not think I ever knew or heard tell of a bad master blessed with good servants. The converse I certainly have seen ere now, a good master and bad servants; but they were the sufferers, not he.[20] No, he who would create a spirit of carefulness in others[21] must have the skill himself to supervise the field of labour; to test, examine, scrutinise.[22] He must be ready to requite where due the favour of a service well performed, nor hesitate to visit the penalty of their deserts upon those neglectful of their duty.[23] Indeed (he added), the answer of the barbarian to the king seems aposite. You know the story,[24] how the king had met with a good horse, but wished to give the creature flesh and that without delay, and so asked some one reputed to be clever about horses: 'What will give him flesh most quickly?' To which the other: 'The master's eye.' So, too, it strikes me, Socrates, there is nothing like 'the master's eye' to call forth latent qualities, and turn the same to beautiful and good effect.[25]
[18] Or, 'to give others skill in 'music.'' See Plat. 'Rep.' 455 E; 'Laws,' 802 B. Al. 'a man devoid of letters to make others scholarly.' See Plat. 'Phaedr.' 248 D.
[19] Lit. 'when the teacher traces the outline of the thing to copy badly.' For {upodeiknuontos} see 'Mem.' IV. iii. 13; 'Horsem.' ii. 2. Cf. Aristot. 'Oecon.' i. 6; 'Ath. Pol.' 41. 17; and Dr. Sandys' note ad loc.
[20] Or, 'but they did not go scot-free'; 'punishments then were rife.'
[21] Cf. Plat. 'Polit.' 275 E: 'If we say either tending the herds, or managing the herds, or having the care of them, that will include all, and then we may wrap up the statesman with the rest, as the argument seems to require.'--Jowett.
[22] Or, 'he must have skill to over-eye the field of labour, and be scrutinous.'
[23] 'For every boon of service well performed he must be eager to make requital to the author of it, nor hesitate to visit on the heads of those neglectful of their duty a just recompense.' (The language is poetical.)
[24] See Aristot. 'Oecon.' i. 6; Aesch. 'Pers.' 165; Cato ap. Plin. 'H. N.' xviii. 5. Cic. ap. Colum. iv. 18; ib. vi. 21; La Fontaine, 'L'Oeil du Maitre.'
[25] Or, 'so, too, in general it seems to me 'the master's eye' is aptest to elicit energy to issue beautiful and good.'
XIII
But now (I ventured), suppose you have presented strongly to the mind of some one[1] the need of carefulness to execute your wishes, is a person so qualified to be regarded as fit at once to be your bailiff? or is there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an efficient bailiff?
[1] Breit. cf. 'Pol. Lac.' xv. 8. Holden cf. Plat. 'Rep.' 600 C.
Most certainly there is (he answered): it still remains for him to learn particulars--to know, that is, what things he has to do, and when and how to do them; or else, if ignorant of these details, the profit of this bailiff in the abstract may prove no greater than the doctor's who pays a most precise attention to a sick man, visiting him late and early, but what will serve to ease his patient's pains[2] he knows not.
[2] Lit. 'what it is to the advantage of his patient to do, is beyond his ken.'
Soc. But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute?[3]
[3] Cf. Plat. 'Rep.' 566 D. Or, 'the perfect and consummate type of bailiff.'
Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.
What! (I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?
At any rate I try to do so (he replied).
And how, in Heaven's name (I asked), do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?
Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I daresay, you will simply laugh at me.
Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is grander still, a kingly being.[4] Once more, therefore, I protest: A man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far from it, but of the highest praise.
[4] i.e. {arkhikos} includes (1) {despotikos}, i.e. an arbitrary head of any sort, from the master of one's own family to the {turannos kai despotes} (Plat. 'Laws,' 859 A), despotic lord or owner; (2) {basilikos}, the king or monarch gifted with regal qualities.
Thus, then, I reason,[5] Socrates (he answered): The lower animals are taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another instance: Young dogs,[6] however far inferior to man in thought and language,[7] can still be taught to run on errands and turn somersaults,[8] and do a host of other clever things, precisely on this same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason;[9] only make it plain to him 'it is his interest to obey.' Or if they happen to be slaves,[10] the more ignoble training of wild animals tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much from them.[11] But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise,[12] since some natures hunger after praise no less than others crave for meats and drinks. My practice then is to instruct those whom I desire to appoint as my bailiffs in the various methods which I have found myself to be successful in gaining the obedience of my fellows. To take an instance: There are clothes and shows and so forth, with which I must provide my workfolk.[13] Well, then, I see to it that these are not all alike in make; [14] but some will be of better, some of less good quality: my object being that these articles for use shall vary with the service of the wearer; the worse man will receive the worse things as a gift, the better man the better as a mark of honour. For I ask you, Socrates, how can the good avoid despondency seeing that the work is wrought by their own hands alone, in spite of which these villains who will neither labour nor face danger when occasion calls are to receive an equal guerdon with themselves? And just as I cannot bring myself in any sort of way to look upon the better sort as worthy to receive no greater honour than the baser, so, too, I praise my bailiffs when I know they have apportioned the best things among the most deserving. And if I see that some one is receiving preference by dint of flatteries or like unworthy means, I do not let the matter pass; I reprimand my bailiff roundly, and so teach him that such conduct is not even to his interest.
[5] {oukoun}. 'This, then, is my major premiss: the dumb animal . . .' (lit. 'the rest of animals').
[6] {ta kunidia} possibly implies 'performing poodles.'
[7] {te gnome . . . te glotte}, i.e. mental impression and expression, 'mind and tongue.'
[8] Or, 'to run round and round and turn heels over head.' Al. 'dive for objects.'
[9] 'Logic, argument.' Or, 'a creature more compliant; merely by a word demonstrate to him . . .'
[10] Cf. Plat. 'Rep.' 591 C.
[11] See Pater, 'Plato and Platonism,' 'Lacedaemon,' p. 196 foll.
[12] See 'Cyrop.' passim.
[13] {ergastersi}, Xenophontic for the common Attic {ergatais}. See Hold. ad loc. for similar forms, and cf. Rutherford, 'New Phrynichus,' 59.
[14] Cf. Aristot. 'Oecon.' i. 5 (where the thesis is developed further).
XIV
Soc. Well, then, Ischomachus, supposing the man is now so fit to rule that he can compel obedience,[1] is he, I ask once more, your bailiff absolute? or even though possessed of all the qualifications you have named, does he still lack something?[2]
[1] Or, 'that discipline flows from him;' al. 'he presents you with obedient servants.'
