up in a line facing the assembly with CMF and ZIPRA officers behind.
Lookout Masuku moved forward and gave a short message to his troops. He then said that he would introduce the members of the Ceasefire Committee individually. Lookout gave place of honour to the Rhodesians and for reasons already known to me I was introduced first. I simply took one pace forward, saluted and stepped back into line. General Barnard followed me. Next Lookout introduced General Acland and Brigadier Gurdon before ZANLA.
Rex Nhongo was standing right beside me. As he stepped forward to salute, he was greeted with the menacing metallic sounds of heavy weapons being cocked. Being so close to him I went cold, expecting to be shot at any moment. Rex ignored the deliberate insult, saluted and stepped back. When Tungamirai’s deputy stepped forward, weapons were cocked again. ZIPRA’s hatred of ZANLA had been shown in a very graphic but typically African way!
Formalities over, we were asked to turn around to watch anti-aircraft crews deploy and fire their weapons. In the absence of an air target, a prominent white rock on a large hill about three kilometres away to our left was declared to be the target. Whistles were blown and out of the bush to our right emerged three crews pulling wheeled guns to a position some thirty metres to our front. One 23mm and two 14.7mm guns were set up quickly, and one of the 14.7 pieces commenced firing but jammed after expending about ten rounds. The others then opened fire, creating one hell of a dim. Green and red tracer rounds raced away with the red 23mm rounds travelling noticeably faster than the green ones. The accuracy was impressive.
The senior ZIPRA commander of AP Romeo insisted that I should take a close look at the guns. He boasted that these had shot down some of our aircraft at Kariba. I did not argue with him because he seemed so pleased about something that never happened.
Elections
UNTIL A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS elected into power, management of the country vested with the British Government in the person of Governor Lord Soames, though law and order remained in the hands of NATJOC. In terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, Lord Soames had the responsibility of preparing all polling stations and ensuring voters enjoyed total security and freedom of choice. Of greater importance was his responsibility to ensure that no political party indulged in the intimidation of voters during the lead-up to elections. Any party found guilty of intimidation was to be disqualified wholly or in part by proscribing specific electoral zones.
In this task Lord Soames failed dismally. Mugabe’s ZANU party not only disregarded its undertaking to get all ZANLA into the APs, it kept 90% of its forces in the field with orders to indulge in cruel electioneering methods including murder of important members of black opposition parties. Soames knew this was going on but refused to invalidate Mugabe’s party either wholly or in those areas where intimidation was greatest. The British had neither the courage nor integrity to stand by the very agreement they had brought upon the four contesting parties. Appeasement in the face of threats from the OAU and black Commonwealth leaders was obviously more important to Britain’s long-term objectives than the future of the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesian. When Henry Kissinger met Ian Smith many months later he explained the paradox like this. “The politics of convenience has little to do with truth or logic!”
We had become accustomed to British duplicity but could not abide what we perceived to be total inaction by our NATJOC in forcing Lord Soames to act on British undertakings. The NATJOC’s attention seemed wholly distracted by other matters.
For some weeks a team had been assembled in COMOPS to monitor loads of incoming data to pre- determine the final outcome of elections. Information poured in from all provinces giving voter numbers and their political leanings. As I recall it, the opinion being expressed to NATJOC was that Ian Smith’s RF party would secure all twenty white seats and Joshua Nkomo was sure to get at least twenty N’debele seats. Muzorewa and Sithole only needed to win eleven seats to allow a coalition between these parties to block Mugabe’s ZANU party. The team advising NATJOC was adamant that Muzorewa alone would do better than this.
I was having a drink in the small COMOPS pub one evening when, inevitably, the elections became the topic of conversation. Some time earlier I had come to the firm conclusion that, short of proscribing ZANU, there was absolutely no hope of stopping Mugabe coming to power. I expressed this opinion but had no chance to qualify it because a fiery COMOPS lieutenantcolonel was so put out by my words that he leapt across the bar counter intending to strike me with his fist. Major Peter Burford quickly came between us and told his colleague not to be a bloody fool. “I think the Groupie may be right. Give him an opportunity to tell us why.”
My contention was this. The electorate could be counted on to give Smith and Nkomo a total of forty seats. For a number of reasons I thought this left the remaining sixty seats open to Mugabe. In terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, Mugabe should already have been ruled out of the elections for blatant and widespread intimidation and murder. But, the Brits were obviously not going to do this and, from what we could see, the NATJOC seemed either misinformed or too weak to force the issue, even though the Lancaster House Agreement had placed it in control of all security matters. NATJOC was specifically tasked with ensuring that the entire election process was conducted in a free and fair manner. With intimidation peaking and time running out, this made the NATJOC’s perceived inaction all the more intolerable.
Muzorewa had shown himself to be weak and indecisive, whereas Mugabe had told the people that only he could stop the war. In Harare Township the urban people, who had been on-side throughout the war, were now openly singing Mugabe praise songs. To my way of thinking, the writing was on the wall. Eighty per cent of the black electorate lived outside Matabeleland, and all of these would vote ‘for peace’. They had suffered most and were now thoroughly sick and tired of a war they genuinely believed could only be stopped by Mugabe. That was my contention, but General Walls and the NATJOC obviously saw things differently.
Possibly because he believed the information being fed to him and wished to uphold the morale of his forces, General Walls called a meeting of Army and Air Force officers at the New Sarum Sports Club. As I recall, no member of COMOPS staff was included.
Since I did not attend the meeting addressed by General Walls, I cannot say exactly what was said. I do know, however, that he gave the assembled officers his personal guarantee that he would not allow Mugabe to come to power. I also know that the general’s speech left most officers with a clear understanding that military action would be taken against ZANU in the ‘unlikely event’ that it gained a majority at the polls. This notion, however, was very much at odds with what General Walls had told his own staff. In COMOPS we had been informed, categorically, that no unconstitutional action would be considered. General Walls said, “There is no question of Rhodesians indulging in a military coup.”
The ‘whites only’ election was held on 14 February and went off smoothly with Ian Smith’s RF party gaining all twenty white seats, as expected. On 27, 28 and 29 February the ‘common roll’ voters went to the polling stations where illprepared London Bobbies and other Commonwealth observers watched the long lines of voters ‘to ensure that no intimidation was taking place’. They had no idea that ZANLA had told harassed tribesmen that the reason for three days of voting was simple. Day One was for all people voting for Mugabe; Day Two was for Muzorewa and Day Three for Nkomo. Anyone not voting on Day One would be dealt with very severely.
The observers, most on African soil for the first time, were blissfully unaware of subtle intimidation going on right under their noses or of blatant intimidation against people approaching from beyond their sight; this was
