would soon be missed.82
An official observer who visited Capt Gilbert Ellmann’s men of B/701st on 31 January near Pichon noted that the unit had received no break since the landings in November. The company had earned a high reputation, but it had already lost twenty-five men killed in action, and the strain of continual fighting and repeated air attacks by both German and Allied aircraft was beginning to tell.83
Some new blood, if not relief for the tank destroyer units already in action, was arriving. The 1st Tank Destroyer Group landed in Algeria on 17 January and took up the task of overseeing TD battalions when they were not directly attached to divisions. The 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion disembarked at Algiers and the 813th at Oran on 17 January, and the 894th shipped in about the same time. The 805th and 894th were transported to the II Corps area of the front by mid-February, but the 813th would not arrive until March. The 899th, meanwhile, arrived at Casablanca but did not rush to the line. Instead, the battalion was delighted to be issued the newest weapon in the TD arsenal, the M10. The men would have to learn to maintain and operate the new hardware before the unit would be ready for combat. The battalion CO, LtCol Maxwell Tichnor, had shown the foresight while still in the States of sending drivers for several weeks of training with a medium tank battalion, which made the conversion far easier than it might have been.84
By January 1943, a few tentative conclusions regarding the tank destroyers suggested themselves.
On the plus side, the idea of light, fast, hard-hitting tank destroyers worked, at least under certain circumstances. The Tunisian Task Force would have had no mobile antitank capability when it first encountered Axis armor had it not been for the ability of the TDs to cover long distances at high speeds beyond the capabilities of tanks. Moreover, as of January, the cheap and easily produced tank destroyers were well ahead of the enemy tanks in terms of their kill/loss ratio in combat. Later critics would seemingly forget this stage of the campaign. The tank destroyer had also demonstrated its potential utility as highly mobile field artillery.
On the negative side, the tank destroyer battalions had never been able to operate according to key prescriptions in the force’s doctrine. The companies were dispersed and generally at the front line, not held back ready to deal with armored penetrations. The TDs’ obvious tactical utility despite this fact suggested that the doctrine was, at least, incomplete. Fortunately, TD, infantry, and armor officers in the field were working out practical solutions as they went. Of course, some were better than others.
The Germans, moreover, did not usually behave as the doctrine assumed they would. U.S. Army observers noted that typically, small groups of German tanks preceded attacking infantry. Well-concealed high-velocity 88mm guns were placed to provide a defensive base of fire if necessary in practically every tank movement. Indeed, German tanks often towed the 88s into position. The German gunners often waited to fire until American tanks passed them in pursuit of the German tanks, catching the Americans from the rear. German air-ground cooperation was excellent, and artillery fire was adjusted accurately.85 When the Germans had not acted thusly—as during the armored probe at Medjez el Bab on 10 December 1942—the tank destroyers had proved lethal in a scenario that at least approximated some aspects of doctrine.
Finally, combat experience had demonstrated that the M6 was not effective as a tank destroyer. Troops complained that its rounds bounced off German tanks.86 In addition, the silhouette was too high, and there was insufficient space in the vehicle for the crew to properly serve the weapon.87 The ineffectiveness of the 37mm gun, which was the infantry’s standard-issue antitank weapon, presaged continual pressure from line units to parcel out TD battalions in order to provide the GI at the front with adequate protection against tank attack.
Chapter 3
“Probably the worst performance of U.S. Army Troops in their whole proud history.”
Ike knew his front was not all it should be. After canceling offensive operations on 24 December 1942, he ordered II Corps Headquarters under MajGen Lloyd Fredendall to move from Oran to Tebessa and assume responsibility from the small Tunisian Task Force for guarding the flank of the main forces to the north. Second Corps’ initial component was the 1st Armored Division, which had been extricated from its support to British formations. The 1st Infantry Division, elements of which were scattered along the front, received orders to concentrate in the II Corps sector. The 34th and 9th Infantry divisions were to gradually move forward into the area, the former turning over security responsibilities along the lines of communication to the French. By early February, the 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, and the 168th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division, were established in Fredendall’s sector.
Eisenhower’s deputy and forward representative, MajGen Lucian Truscott Jr., later offered this description of Fredendall: “Small in stature, loud and rough in speech, he was outspoken in his opinions and critical of superiors and subordinates alike. He was inclined to jump at conclusions that were not always well founded. He rarely left his command post for personal reconnaissance and visits, yet he was impatient with the recommendations of subordinates more familiar with the terrain and other conditions than he was.”1
Eisenhower visited Fredendall’s CP on 13 February and was appalled to find that he had hundreds of engineers digging tunnels into the walls of a ravine for him and his staff. Ike noted that it was the only time during the war that he saw a commander at that level so concerned over his own safety that he dug underground shelters.2 Omar Bradley, then a major general just arriving in North Africa, judged that Fredendall lacked personal courage.3
German successes against the poorly equipped French troops in the center during January had necessitated the deployment into the area of British units as well as elements of the 1st Armored Division. By Eisenhower’s own admission, his front by late that month was “a long tenuous line stretching from Bizerte to Gafsa, with units badly mixed and no local reserves.” On 26 January, Eisenhower gave British LtGen Kenneth Anderson command of the entire battle line in order to bring order to the chaos.4
Hundreds of miles to the east, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel was nearing the end of his skillfully executed sixteen hundred-mile withdrawal through Libya, cautiously pursued by Monty and his Eighth Army. Hitler had lost faith in Rommel’s winning magic. On the same day that Anderson took command of the Allied battle line in Tunisia, Rommel was ordered to consolidate his forces in the modest French-built fortifications of the Mareth Line along the Tunisian frontier, turn his command over to an Italian general, and return to Germany “for health reasons.” The successes achieved by the German commander in Tunisia—Generaloberst Jurgen von Arnim— against the French during January, however, inspired Rommel to press again an idea he had formulated as he foresaw the merging of the two North African fronts.
The Mareth Line, Rommel reasoned, would be in grave peril with American troops only some one hundred thirty miles to the rear at Gafsa. Rommel proposed leaving a holding force at the Mareth Line, shifting his remaining strike force westward, and in cooperation with von Arnim, launching a surprise attack deep into the Allies’ rear area in Tunisia. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, who was responsible for coordinating the two German forces in Tunisia, and the Axis Comando Supremo approved the idea. On 9 February, the three German commanders met at Gabes to discuss the offensive. Von Arnim would attack at Sidi bou Zid with the 10th and 21st Panzer divisions, and Rommel would strike at Gafsa with elements of his Panzerarmee, the remnants of the Italian Centauro Division, and any forces that could be spared from the 21st Panzer Division after its initial operations. Fortunately for the Allies, command arrangements were left rather vague.5
Two clusters of passes pierced the mountain chain—called the Eastern Dorsale—running north to south
