interconnected with the world, to a degree that their twentieth-century European predecessors never were. Study abroad, frequent travel, business interconnections, shared professional aspirations, and the intimacy of transnational contact through the Internet all contribute to an outlook not immune, to be sure, to nationalistic appeals but nonetheless more conscious of their interdependent self-interest.
Third, the historical contrast between Europe and Asia also deserves recognition. As noted in a remarkable study of China’s emergence, already some centuries ago “the most important states of East Asia—from Japan, Korea, and China to Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Kampuchea . . . had all been linked to one another, directly or through the Chinese center, by trade and diplomatic relations and held together by a shared understanding of the principles, norms, and rules that regulated their mutual interactions.... Long periods of peace among the European powers were the exception rather than the rule.... In sharp contrast . . . the national states of the East Asian system were almost uninterruptedly at peace, not for 100 but 300 years.”[19]
Finally, the motivating impulse of the threats to peace in the Asia of the twenty-first century likewise tends to be different from Europe’s of the twentieth century. In the latter case, much of the impetus for interstate warfare was the product of nationalistically aroused territorial ambitions of nation-states motivated by notions that more territory equals more power equals greater status. In its most extreme rendition, such aspirations were justified by spurious concepts of living space (“lebensraum”) allegedly needed for national survival. In contemporary Asia, internal conflicts derived from ethnic diversity and pre-nation-state tribal loyalties rather than external territorial ambitions are more likely to be the main cause of regional instability. Indeed, with the exception of Pakistan’s fears of India, the preservation of the stability of the existing states rather than concerns over territorial designs from their neighbors may currently be the more serious preoccupation of most of the military commands in the southeast and southwest Asian states.
In the most important case of the very populous India, regional turmoil could ensue from that country’s two potentially disruptive internal contradictions: between the very rich and the extremely poor, with the poverty in India more acute than in China, and from the ethnic-linguistic-religious diversity of Indian society. Unlike China, in which the Han Chinese account for 91.5% of the population, the largest ethnic group in India accounts for about 70%, which means that as many as 300 million people are in effect ethnic minorities. In terms of religion, the Hindus account for around 950 million Indians, with the Muslims numbering approximately 160 million, the Sikhs about 22 million, and others in a larger variety. Less than one-half of the population shares a common language, Hindi. Moreover, literacy levels in India are appallingly low, with the majority of women actually illiterate. Rural unrest is rising and has not been contained in spite of percolating violence for more than a decade.
Moreover, the Indian political system has yet to prove that it can function as “the world’s largest democracy.” That test will take place when its population becomes truly politically awakened and engaged. Given the country’s very high levels of public illiteracy as well as the connection between privilege and wealth at the top of the political establishment, India’s current “democratic” process is rather reminiscent of the British aristocratic “democracy,” prior to the appearance of trade unions, in the second half of the nineteenth century. The operational viability of the existing system will be truly tested when the heterogeneous public at large becomes both politically conscious and assertive. Ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences could then threaten India’s internal cohesion. Should they escalate out of control, the neighboring Pakistan, already challenged by tribal unrest, could also become the geopolitical focus of a broader regional violence.
In that potentially conflicted setting, the stability of Asia will depend in part on how America responds to two overlapping regional triangles centered around China. The first pertains to China, India, and Pakistan. The second pertains to China, Japan, and Korea, with the Southeast Asian states playing a supporting role. In the case of the former, Pakistan could be the major point of contention and the precipitating source of instability. In the case of the latter, Korea (both South and North) and/or possibly also Taiwan could become the foci of insecurity.
In both cases, the United States is still the key player, with the capacity to alter balances and affect outcomes. It therefore needs to be stated at the outset that the United States should be guided by the general principle that any direct US military involvement in conflicts between rival Asian powers should be avoided. No outcome of either a Pakistani-Indian war, or of one also involving China, or even of a strictly Chinese-Indian war is likely to produce consequences more damaging to US interests than a renewed and possibly expanded American military engagement on the Asian mainland. And the latter could even precipitate a wider chain reaction of ethnic and religious instability in Asia.
The above obviously does not apply to existing US treaty obligations to Japan and South Korea, where US forces are actually deployed. Moreover, US noninvolvement in possible conflicts among Asian states themselves should not imply indifference to their potential outcomes. The United States should certainly use its international influence to discourage the outbreak of warfare, to help contain it if it does occur, and to avoid a one-sided outcome as its conclusion. But such efforts should entail the participation of other powers potentially also affected by any major regional instability in Asia. Some of them may even prefer America to become involved while they benefit from remaining on the sidelines. Hence the needed attempts to prevent or to contain the crisis and to impose, if necessary, some costs on the more aggressive party should not be America’s responsibility alone.
The first triangle involves competition for Asian primacy. China and India are already major players on the international scene. India is the world’s most populous country; its economy is on a takeoff; its formal democratic structure and its future viability as a possible alternative to China’s authoritarian model is of special interest to democratic America. China is already the world’s number two economic power, before too long that is likely to be the case (and in some respects it already may be so) with regard to its military capacity, and it is rapidly emerging as an ascending global power. Thus, the Chinese-Indian relationship is inherently competitive and antagonistic, with Pakistan being the regional point of contention.
On India’s side, the existing tensions and reciprocal national animosities are fueled by the relatively uninhibited hostility toward China expressed in India’s uncensored media and in India’s strategic discussions. Invariably, China is presented in them as a threat, most often territorial in nature, and India’s publications frequently make reference to China’s 1962 occupation by force of disputed borderline territories. China’s efforts to establish an economic and political presence in Myanmar’s and in Pakistan’s Indian Ocean ports are presented to the public as a strategic design to encircle India. The Chinese mass media, under official control, are more restrained in their pronouncements but purposefully patronize India as a not-so-serious rival, further inflaming negative Indian sentiments.
To a considerable extent, such Chinese feelings of aloofness toward India are derived from China’s superior societal performance. Its GNP is considerably larger than India’s, its urban modernization and infrastructural innovation are far more advanced, and its population is considerably more literate as well as ethnically and linguistically more homogenous (see Figure 4.3 on pp. 166–167).
In any case, both sides are the strategic captives of their subjective feelings and of their geopolitical contexts. The Indians envy the Chinese economic and infrastructural transformation. The Chinese are contemptuous of India’s relative backwardness (on the social level most dramatically illustrated by asymmetrical levels of literacy of their respective populations) and of its lack of discipline. The Indians fear Chinese-Pakistani collusion; the Chinese feel vulnerable to India’s potential capacity to interfere with Chinese access through the Indian Ocean to the Middle East and Africa. Apart from ritualistic reiteration in diplomatic communiques of a shared commitment to peace, influential private voices are rarely heard advocating a comprehensive mutual accommodation, and so reciprocal disdain lingers and grows.
America’s role in this rivalry should be cautious and detached. A prudent US policy, especially in regard to an alliance with India, should not however be interpreted as indifference to India’s potential role as an alternative to China’s authoritarian political model. India offers such promise for the future, especially if it succeeds in combining sustained development with more pervasive democracy. Hence cordiality in relations with India is justified, though it should not imply support on such contentious issues as Kashmir, given that India’s record in that instance is open to criticism, nor imply that a cooperative relationship with India is aimed at China.
Given that some policy circles in the United States have started to advocate a formal US-India alliance, presumably against China and in effect also against Pakistan, it also needs to be stated explicitly that any such undertaking would be contrary to US national security interests. It would increase the likelihood of US involvement in potentially prolonged and bitter Asian conflicts. The unwise US decision of 2011 to sell advanced weaponry to India, in contrast to the ongoing embargo on arms sales to China, while also enhancing India’s nuclear programs is already earning the United States the hostility of the Chinese by conveying the impression that America sees China
