increasing Russia’s interests in doing likewise. The desirable historical process of enlarging the West thus has to be strategically guided and solidly grounded. It must be backed by a larger Atlantic alliance within which Poland genuinely partners with a Germany that in turn is linked in friendship closely to France.
The foregoing will require both America’s and Europe’s persistence and strategic scrutiny. And Russia itself will have to evolve in order to meet EU standards. But in the long run, Russia will not want to be left out of this opportunity, especially if Turkey and the EU make progress in resolving current obstacles. Moreover, a significant portion of Russia’s public is ahead of its government regarding EU membership. A poll conducted in Russia in early 2011 by Deutsche Welle, the German international broadcasting service, indicated that 23% of Russians feel that Russia should become a member of the EU in the course of the next two years, 16% in two to five years, 9% in five to ten years, 6% much longer, while 28% were not sure and only 18% were flatly against. But while they favor EU membership, the Russian public is generally unaware of the exacting character of the qualifying standards for EU membership. At best, as is already the case with Turkey, the process of admission is likely to move forward, then stall, and lurch forward again, probably by stages and perhaps through transitional arrangements. At this time, however, it would be premature to attempt to draw a detailed blueprint for the exact political architecture of an eventually enlarged West.
However, if America does not promote the emergence of a more unified West, dire consequences could follow. European historical resentments could reawaken, new conflicts of interest could arise, and shortsighted competitive partnerships could take shape. Russia could divisively exploit its energy assets and, emboldened by Western disunity, seek to absorb Ukraine quickly, reawakening its own imperial ambitions and contributing to greater international disarray. With Europe passive, individual European states, in search of greater commercial opportunities, could then seek accommodation with Russia. One can envisage a scenario in which a special relationship develops between Russia and Germany or Italy because of economic self-interest. The UK would then become closer to the United States in a negative reaction to a crumbling and politically contentious union. France and Britain would also draw closer together while viewing Germany askance, with Poland and the Baltic states desperately pleading for additional US security guarantees. The result would not be a new and more vital West, but rather a progressively splintering West with its vision shrinking.
Moreover, such a disunited West could not compete confidently with China for global systemic relevance. So far, China has not articulated an ideological dogma that claims its recent performance is globally applicable and the United States has been careful not to make ideology the central focus of its relations with key countries, recognizing that compromises on other issues are sometimes unavoidable (as for example, arms control with Russia). Wisely, both the United States and China have explicitly embraced the concept of “a constructive partnership” in global affairs, and the United States—while critical of China’s violations of human rights—has been careful not to stigmatize the Chinese socioeconomic system as a whole. But even in such a less antagonistic setting, a larger and renewed West would be in a much better position to compete peacefully—and without ideological fervor—with China as to which system is a better model for the developing world in its efforts to address the aspirations of its now politically awakened masses.
But if an anxious America and an overconfident China were to slide into increasing political hostility, it is more than likely that both countries would face off in a mutually destructive ideological conflict. America would argue that China’s success is based on tyranny and is damaging to America’s economic well-being. The Chinese would interpret that American message as an attempt to undermine and possibly even to fragment the Chinese system. At the same time, China increasingly would represent itself to the world as a rejection of Western supremacy, connecting it with the era of rapacious exploitation of the weak by the strong, appealing ideologically to those in the third world who already subscribe to a historical narrative highly hostile to the West in general and lately to America in particular. It follows that both America and China, out of intelligent self-interest, would be better served by mutual ideological self-restraint. Both should resist the temptation to universalize the distinctive features of their respective socioeconomic systems and to demonize each other.
In regard to the longer-term issue of Asian stability, the United States must play the role of balancer and conciliator. It should therefore avoid direct military involvement in Asia and it should seek to reconcile the long- standing animosities between key Far Eastern Asian players, most notably between China and Japan. In the new East, the cardinal principle guiding US policy has to be that the United States will engage on the mainland of Asia in response to hostile actions only if directed at states in which treaty-based American deployments are part of the long-standing international context.
In essence, America’s engagement in Asia as the balancer of regional stability should replicate the role played by Great Britain in intra-European politics during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The United States can and should be the key player in helping Asia avoid a struggle for regional domination, by mediating conflicts and offsetting power imbalances among potential rivals. In doing so, it should respect China’s special historical and geopolitical role in maintaining stability on the Far Eastern mainland. Engaging with China in a serious dialogue regarding regional stability would not only help reduce the possibility of American-Chinese conflicts but also diminish the probability of miscalculation between China and Japan, or China and India, and even at some point between China and Russia over the resources and status of the Central Asian states. Thus, America’s balancing engagement in Asia is ultimately in China’s interest as well.
At the same time, the United States must recognize that stability in Asia can no longer be imposed by a non-Asian power, least of all (especially after the inconclusive Korean War, the failed Vietnamese War, the unprovoked attack on Iraq in 2003, and the prolonged Afghan conflict) by the direct application of US military power. Indeed, US efforts to enhance Asian stability could prove self-defeating—propelling the United States into a costly repeat of its recent wars—and even result in a replay of what transpired in Europe during the twentieth century. If America became active in fashioning an anti-Chinese alliance with India (and perhaps with some other mainland states) or in promoting an anti-Chinese militarization of Japan, it could generate dangerous mutual resentment. Geopolitical equilibrium in twenty-first-century Asia has to be based more on a regionally self-sustaining and constructive approach to interstate relations and less on regionally divisive military alliances with non-Asian powers.
Accordingly, the guiding principle of America’s policy as a balancer and conciliator in the East must be the notion that, save for its obligations to Japan and Korea, America should not allow itself to be drawn into a war between Asian powers on the mainland. The reality is that while such wars would be debilitating to the protagonists, vital American interests would not be threatened by them. But in relation to Japan and Korea, the United States has been entrenched in these two countries for more than fifty years as the result of World War II. The independence and the self-confidence of these countries would be shattered—along with America’s role in the Pacific—if any doubts arose regarding the durability of long-standing American treaty-based commitments. Moreover, Japan is an offshore island and in that respect its relationship with America—as America’s principal ally in the Far East—is somewhat reminiscent of America’s ties with Great Britain, particularly during World War II and the uncertain years of the Cold War. South Korea, currently divided, is an extension of that relationship and the United States would place its own long-term interests in the Far East in jeopardy if the seriousness of its commitment to the defense of these two countries became unreliable. However, America can play a constructive role in promoting restraint between the key players—and therefore avoid the cost of a war to protect Japan or Korea—through active political, diplomatic, and economic support for a regional balance of power. Doing so would both enhance America’s political influence and contribute to greater Asian stability.
America’s role as conciliator in the East will be especially critical, particularly in regard to the relationship between Japan and China. The American-Japanese relationship, and through it the promotion of a Chinese- Japanese reconciliation, should be the springboard for a concerted effort to develop an American-Japanese-Chinese cooperative triangle. Such a triangle would provide the structure to deal with strategic concerns resulting from China’s increased regional presence on a constructive basis. Just as stability in Europe would not have developed without progressive expansion of the Franco-German reconciliation to the German-Polish reconciliation, which in turn has facilitated the emergence of a tacit German-French-Polish security coordination, so the deliberate nurturing of a deepening Chinese-Japanese relationship—especially also on a social and cultural level—can likewise be the point of departure for greater stability in the Far East.
In the context of this triangular relationship, Chinese-Japanese reconciliation would help to enhance and to solidify a more comprehensive American-Chinese cooperation. The Chinese know that America’s commitment to Japan is steadfast, that the bond between the two is deep and genuine, and that Japan’s security is directly dependent on America. And the Japanese know that a conflict with China would be reciprocally destructive and
