this, above all else, lies the resulting trauma of the Korean War.
The far frontier is not defended with citizens, for citizens have better things to do than to die on some forsaken hill, in some forsaken country, for what seems to be the sake of that country.
By July of 1950, the President was forced to authorize the calling of Reserve Forces. MacArthur understood the meaning of American control of sky and sea and was planning that truly American conception of warfare, amphibious assault against the enemy's flank. MacArthur wanted Marines.
The entire Marine Corps stood at less than ninety thousand men, scattered to the seven seas. Asked for a division by the Joint Chiefs, the Corps, with the President's agreement, called its organized reserves.
The Army, Air Force, and Navy quickly saw that all their forces in the Far East, and more, would be involved. There would be nothing left for fresh emergencies. They asked for, and received, permission to induct their own reserves.
The President called four National Guard divisions, hundreds of lesser units, and thousands of individual reservists, at the Pentagon's request. Conscription was immediately necessary to keep the ranks filled.
There was no hope that the men of the fields and of the towns could remain untouched. A modern democracy was not semifeudal Prussia, or Bourbon France, or Whig England, where soldiers could be swept from taverns, pressed from the ranks of the unskilled and unemployed, the disadvantaged put under the rod of iron, to be broken into grenadiers, to voyage and die for the realm, while the stable and fortunate citizenry said good riddance.
The war would touch every metropolis, every town, almost every field. It would touch many hearts, for sons and fathers would suffer mutilation and death. And many, not hearing the angel's trumpet that they had come to associate with the grandeur and horror of war, would never understand.
But suddenly, in late summer, an awareness of war came on the public. There was scare buying. Tires, coffee, sugar were hoarded; there was disruption of economic life.
To this the government could apply restraint. It had no intention of mobilization for a limited war; mobilization was not indeed. It refused to call the war a war, and slowly, gradually, panic failed.
America was rich, and money and munitions were no problem. There had been recession, and this disappeared in the smoke from retooling factories. As in World War II, America, unique in history, could afford both guns and butter. No Congress would refuse a defense budget, and money could be borrowed. There need be no special war appropriation; the fighting could be and was-financed out of 'Miscellaneous.' The guns and trucks and combat boots could be—and were—made in idle manufacturing capacity.
The price of labor, food, and fibers rose, and America enjoyed a new flush of wartime prosperity. At home, things were suddenly better than they had been before. The people might have been content. The slack economy hummed, and all seemed well.
But even in the middle of the twentieth century, men were still required for war. Guns, boots, and butter might be bought, but not men. Except for men, who had to suffer and die, all might have been well.
Men listened for the trumpet, but heard only an uncertain sound. The trumpet had to be sounded, a little, but the government wanted no hysteria, no war enthusiasm that might not be restrained. Men did not understand, and grew confused.
The government could handle the problems of butter and bayonets, but it could never solve the problem of men.
After the commitment of United States troops, American newspaper sever again devoted much attention to the exploits or condition of the ROK Army. Consequently, few Americans have understood the ROK contribution to the Korean War, and. most have tended to deprecate it.
In the first week of fighting, because it had exceedingly poor weaponry and bad training at staff levels, the original ROK Army in the west was largely destroyed. Most of its men and officers died fighting.
In the east, however, the ROK divisions had remained intact, and fought delaying actions down the peninsula.
Beginning in the early part of July, American officers tried to reorganize the ROK's, a difficult job since losses among officers had been ghastly, and because even American equipment was painfully short. By 24 July, however, two ROK corps of five divisions had been organized and outfitted. Their equipment was not equal to and never would equal that of United States divisions throughout the war.
ROK's would remain weak in artillery and without organic tanks for the balance of the conflict. But they would fight.
All during July 1950, ROK units continued in action. Many fought exceedingly well. A comparison of casualties tells the story: in the first six weeks, American losses amounted to 6,000 men; the 'ROK's lost 70,000 killed, wounded, or missing.
While the Republic of Korea would have been utterly defeated without American help, South Koreans for three years continued to bear the man power brunt of the war.
And in the summer of 1950, the ROK losses point up a fact that was decisive—by heavily engaging the victorious Inmun Gun again and again, the ROK Army inflicted deadly losses upon it, losses that at the time were not credited to them by American officers. In some cases ROK units, in dying, destroyed North Korean regiments and even divisions; although until NKPA records were captured later the fact was unknown.
When the United Nations reeled behind the Pusan Perimeter, American officers estimated the NKPA had suffered some 30,000 casualties. The actual figure was nearer 60,000, most of which had been inflicted by the ROK's. On August, many of the Inmun Gun divisions facing the Naktong were at half-strength; the total combat strength of its eleven divisions could not have been more than 70,000.
It had no more than forty tanks by 4 August.
Behind the Perimeter on 4 August 1950, the U.N. had a troop strength of 141,808, of which some 82,000 were ROK's. American combat ground strength was 47,000. By the end of August, when the crucial Perimeter battles began, American strength alone would exceed that of the Inmun Gun. By 19 August there would be 500 American tanks within the perimeter, outnumbering the enemy armor by more than five to one.
The United States Far Eastern Air Force had complete supremacy of the air, and could range over the North Korean supply lines at will. It could concentrate tremendous tactical air power against the ground in front of American troops.
For six weeks, the U.N. forces had been trading space for time. Their space was running out—but time was also running out for the Inmun Gun. In a protracted contest with the potential power of the United States, the North Korean State had no real hope of success.
By August the NKPA was bled white; replacements were fed in, some from the population of South Korea. These new men were hardly soldiers, but they were led by sergeants, officers, and generals who were fanatical veterans of the Chinese Communist Forces. Men who did not obey were shot. This system, with Koreans, had some success. It continued to be a matter of some frustration for American officers serving in Korea that Communist methods often turned out fighting men more quickly than the system employed with the ROK's.
By 4 August 1950, the Inmun Gun had actually lost every advantage but two: it still held the initiative; though it was running out of men, supplies, and time, its attack spirit was still strong; and of its seventy thousand men, almost every man was available for the line. Given ammunition, the North Korean soldier could fight on three rice balls a day.
For more than thirty days this tired, decimated, ill-fed army would push American and ROK forces to the very wall. For thirty days the outcome would hang by a slender thread.
Men are not ciphers, and hearts, even Communist hearts, are not potatoes, and Americans would do well to remember it.
Without complete control of the air and seas during the dark days of mid-summer 1950, the United Nations presence on the Korean Peninsula would have ended. The Far Eastern Air Force, aided strongly by Marine and Navy units, had quickly dominated the skies over both North and South Korea and the waters around them. The relative weak and unmodern air strength of the NKPA was soon brushed aside and by August was no longer a factor in the war. Unprepared for tactical ground-support missions, FEAF at first did almost as much harm as good, shooting up American positions and dealing grievous harm to friendly ROK units on the roads, but these mistakes were quickly corrected.
After gaining air control, FEAF began to interdict the ever-lengthening supply lines of the NKPA, throttling a great deal of its resupply to the front. But air over a country like Korea could never be in itself decisive. The country
