parochial power politics and the uniqueness of Italian culture (Germany had no such handicap, as we will see). The Catholic Church understood what Mussolini was up to. In its 1931 encyclical
The idea of priests and leaders representing the spirit or general will of the people is modern to the extent that it dethrones traditional religion. But the impulse to endow certain classes of people or individual rulers with religious authority is very ancient and may even be hardwired into human nature. Louis XIV's (probably fictional) declaration '
Thus tumbles both the glorious myth of the left and the central indictment of the right: that the French Revolution was a wellspring of rationalism. In fact it was no such thing. The Revolution was a romantic spiritual revolt, an attempt to replace the Christian God with a Jacobin one. Invocations to Reason were thinly veiled appeals to a new personalized God of the Revolution. Robespierre despised atheism and atheists as signs of the moral decay of monarchy, believing instead in an 'Eternal Being who intimately affects the destinies of nations and who seems to me personally to watch over the French Revolution in a very special way.'32 For the Revolution to be successful, Robespierre had to force the people to recognize this God who spoke through him and the general will.
Only in this way could Robespierre realize the dream that would later transfix Nazis, communists, and progressives alike: the creation of 'New Men.' 'I am convinced,' he proclaimed in a typical statement, 'of the necessity of bringing about a complete regeneration, and, if I may express myself so, of creating a new people.' (To this end, he pushed through a law requiring that children be taken from their parents and indoctrinated in boarding schools.) The action-priests of the Revolution, wrote Tocqueville, 'had a fanatical faith in their vocation — that of transforming the social system, root and branch, and regenerating the whole human race.' He later recognized that the French Revolution had become a 'religious revival' and the ideology that spewed from it a 'species of religion' which 'like Islam [has] overrun the whole world with apostles, militants, and martyrs.'33
Fascism is indebted to the French Revolution in other ways as well. Robespierre appreciated, as did Sorel and his heirs, that violence was a linchpin that kept the masses committed to the ideals of the Revolution: 'If the spring of popular government in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, without which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue; it is not so much a special principle as it is a consequence of the general principle of democracy applied to our country's most urgent needs.'34
'For the first time in history,' writes the historian Marisa Linton, 'terror became an official government policy, with the stated aim to use violence in order to achieve a higher political goal.' The irony seemed lost on the Bolsheviks — self-proclaimed descendants of the French Revolution — who defined fascism, rather than their own system, as an 'openly terroristic dictatorship.'35
The utility of terror was multifaceted, but among its chief benefits was its tendency to maintain a permanent sense of crisis. Crisis is routinely identified as a core mechanism of fascism because it short-circuits debate and democratic deliberation. Hence all fascistic movements commit considerable energy to prolonging a heightened state of emergency. Across the West, this was the most glorious boon of World War I.
WAR: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
Both Mussolini and Lenin are reported to have had the exact same response to the news of the war. 'The Socialist International is dead.' And they were right. Across Europe (and later America) socialist and other left- leaning parties voted for war, turning their backs on doctrines of international solidarity and the dogma that this was a war for capitalism and imperialism. After a reflexive two-month period of following this party line, Mussolini started moving into what was known as the interventionist camp. In October 1914 he penned an editorial in
David Ramsay Steele suggests that Mussolini's switch in favor of war 'was as scandalous as though, 50 years later, [Che] Guevara had announced that he was off to Vietnam, to help defend the South against North Vietnamese aggression.'37 It's a good line, but it obscures the fact that socialists throughout Europe and America were rallying to the cause of war, largely because that's where the masses wanted to go. The most shocking example came when the socialists in the German parliament voted in favor of granting credits to fund the war. Even in the United States the vast majority of socialists and progressives supported American intervention with a bloodlust that would embarrass their heirs today — if their heirs actually took the time to learn the history of their own movement.
This is a vital point because, while it is most certainly true that World War I gave birth to Fascism, it also gave birth to anti-Fascist propaganda. From the moment Mussolini declared himself in favor of the war, Italian Socialists smeared him for his heresy. '
Mussolini on occasion acknowledged that fascism was perceived as a movement of the 'right,' but he never failed to make it clear that his inspiration and spiritual home was the socialist left. 'You hate me today because you love me still,' he told Italian Socialists. 'Whatever happens, you won't lose me. Twelve years of my life in the party ought to be sufficient guarantee of my socialist faith. Socialism is in my blood.' Mussolini resigned his editorship of
Nevertheless, Mussolini was forced to quit the party organization. He joined up with a group of pro-war radicals called the Fascio Autonomo d'Azione Rivoluzionaria and quickly became their leader. Again, Mussolini had not moved to the right. His arguments for entering the war were made entirely in the context of the left and mirrored to no small extent the liberal and leftist arguments of American interventionists such as Woodrow Wilson, John Dewey, and Walter Lippmann. The war, he and his fellow apostates insisted, was against the reactionary Germans and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a war to liberate foreign peoples from the yoke of imperialism and advance the cause of socialist revolution in Italy, a true 'proletarian nation.'
Mussolini founded a new newspaper,