found some distance from the hull.1

When a search team from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute surveyed the wreckage in the summer of 1993, they reported:

'When our cameras swept across the hold, we got a big surprise-There was no hole.... We found no evidence that U-20's torpedo had detonated an explosion, undermining one theory of why the liner sank.'

It is difficult to share the team's surprise. Photographs show that the wreck is resting on its starboard (right) side. Since that is where the torpedo struck, it is logical that the hole would not be visible. It would be on the side buried in the ocean floor. The team reported that they were able to inspect only part of the hull's underside. That is because most of it—plus the entire starboard side—is buried in the muck. Since the torpedo struck only nine feet below the waterline, the hole would not logically be anywhere near the bottom of the hull but at a point midway between the main deck and the bottom.

In other words, it would be at the midpoint of the side that is now facing down. Failure to see the hole does not undermine the theory of internal explosion. It is exactly what one would expect.

In any event, it should be obvious that the Lusitania would not have gone to the bottom in eighteen minutes without a hole some-ivhere. Even the search team had to acknowledge that fact indirectly when it addressed the question of what might have caused the second explosion. In an obvious effort to avoid giving support to a

'conspiracy theory,' the report concluded that the explosion probably was caused, not by munitions, but by coal dust.

1. Simpson, p. 157.

2. Ballard, 'Riddle of the Lusitania,' pp. 74, 76.

SINK THE LUSITANIA!

255

In the final analysis, it makes little difference whether the explosion was caused by munitions or coal dust. The fact that it could have been caused by munitions is sufficient for the case.

A HURRIED COVER-UP

An official inquiry, under the direction of Lord Mersey, was held to determine the facts of the sinking and to place the blame. It was a rigged affair from the beginning. All evidence and testimony was carefully pre-screened to make sure that nothing was admitted into the record which would reveal duplicity on the part of British or American officials. Among the papers submitted to Lord Mersey prior to the hearings was one from Captain Richard Webb, one of the men chosen by the navy to assist in the cover up. It read: 'I am directed by the board of Admiralty to inform you that it is considered politically expedient that Captain Turner, the master of the Lusitania, be most prominently blamed for the disaster.'1

The final report was a most interesting document. Anyone reading it without knowledge of the facts would conclude that Captain William Turner was to blame for the disaster. Even so, Mersey attempted to soften the blow. He wrote: '...blame ought not to be imputed to the captain.... His omission to follow the advice in all respects cannot fairly be attributed either to negligence or incompetence.' And then he added a final paragraph which, on the surface, appears to be a condemnation of the Germans but which, if read with understanding of the background, was an indictment of Churchill, Wilson, House and Morgan. He wrote:

The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this catastrophe must rest solely with those who plotted and with those who committed the crime.2

Did Lord Mersey know that there could be a dual meaning to his Words? Perhaps not, but, two days after delivering his judgment, he wrote to Prime Minister Asquith and turned down his fee for services. He added: 'I must request that henceforth I be excused from administering His Majesty's Justice.' In later years, his only comment on the event was: 'The Lusitania case was a damn dirty business.'3

1- The Papers of Lord Mersey, Bignor Park, Sussex, as quoted by Simpson, p. 190.

2. Simpson, p. 241.

3. Ibid., p. 241.

256

THE CREATURE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND

THE CRY FOR WAR

The purposes of the Cabal would have been better served had an American ship been sunk by the Germans, but a British ship with 195 Americans drowned was sufficient to do the job. The players wasted no time in whipping up public sentiment. Wilson sent a note of outraged indignation to the Imperial German Government, and this was widely quoted in the press.

By that time, Bryan had become completely disillusioned by the duplicity of his own government. On May 9, he sent a dour note to Wilson:

Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the Allies and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect her from a t t a c k - i t would be like putting women and children in front of an army.

This did not deter Wilson from his commitment. The first note was followed by an even stronger one with threatening overtones which was intensely discussed at the Cabinet meeting on the first of June. McAdoo, who was present at the meeting, says:

I remember that Bryan had little to say at this meeting; he sat throughout the proceedings with his eyes half closed most of the time After the meeting he told the President, as I learned later, that he could not sign the note.... Bryan w e n t on to say that he thought his usefulness as Secretary of State was over, and he proposed to resign 2

At the request of Wilson, McAdoo was dispatched to the Bryans'

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