the Soviet Union as before (with the Palestinians represented by their chosen leaders) to prepare and sign the peace treaties. The unanimity of support for Resolution 242 in 1967 had been thought remarkable. Unanimity on this new Resolution was no less so. In particular the readiness of the Soviet Union to comply with what was so clearly identifiable as a United States’ interest was remarked upon. Reflection, however, reminded observers that sixteen years had elapsed between the two Resolutions without there being much implementation of the first — if in this respect Camp David might be left aside. In any case, it was not at this time the Soviet Union’s intention implacably to antagonize the moderate Arab states under the leadership of Saudi Arabia when the USSR believed that its own proxy Arab states, like Syria and South Yemen, could, when actual negotiations to implement the new Resolution got under way, safeguard Soviet interests under the guise of their being Arab ones. So it turned out to be.
Before we examine how actual negotiation turned into a more dangerous confrontation between the superpowers, it is necessary to say a word or two further about Jerusalem. It had always been clear that there could be no peace in the Middle East without peace in Jerusalem. Yet real peace in Jerusalem was unobtainable through divided domination; it had to be brought about through united freedom. Jerusalem itself had to become a kind of gateway to peace. Concurrently, therefore, with the diplomatic activity in the Security Council during late 1983, European initiatives in the General Assembly, with Great Britain taking a particular lead, had led to the adoption of a Resolution dealing with Jerusalem, the implementation of which was intended to be in parallel with that of the broader Resolution of the Security Council. It’s essential outlines, after the preamble dealing with the Holy City’s future role as a symbol of peace and freedom, recognized and respected by all mankind, were these:
(1) There would be an Israeli Jerusalem and an Arab Jerusalem each exercising full sovereignty within its own territory but with no barriers and no impediment to freedom of movement between them.
(2) The Secretary-General would appoint an impartial boundary commission to hear representations from those concerned and make recommendations to the Security Council as to the boundary between the Israeli Jerusalem and the Arab Jerusalem.
(3) The Holy City would be completely demilitarized.
(4) The Secretary-General would appoint a high commissioner (and deputy) to be stationed in Jerusalem, to represent the United Nations and to work with all concerned to secure and ensure the purposes of the Resolution, and to report appropriately for the information of the General Assembly and the Security Council.
Thus not only had the need for concerted international action to bring permanent peace to Jerusalem and the Middle East been reaffirmed, but both a formula and machinery for its implementation had been established. We need not at present concern ourselves with the detailed working of this machinery during the last months of 1983 and the early part of 1984. It is the end which mattered, rather than the means. But what must now command our attention is what happened in Syria in the summer of 1984, which nearly brought the whole peacemaking procedure to a close and the two superpowers to the brink of war in the Middle East itself one year before actual war on the Central Front of Europe.
It became plain at this time that as well as peacemakers, there were peacebreakers at large. It seemed at first as if a whole series of peacewrecking events was being directed by implacable extremists. Yet so capricious and multitudinous appeared to be the motives and targets, that paradoxically these events might have been the work of a single internationally organized network, such as Black International, or even a combination of Black and Red International. The connection was never firmly established. It was suggested by Western sources that a kind of multinational strike force had been structured round the Palestinian Rejection Front, which had, of course, been armed by the Soviet Union, and was now — so argued these sources — being directed from Moscow. It was hardly surprising that the Soviet Union and its associates took a different stance, and put all the blame squarely on to the CIA. All such views were coloured of course by the political attitudes of those who expressed them. Initially, however, it was not so much the direction behind the terrible events which ensued that mattered. It was the effect of the events themselves.
The bomb explosions in Cairo airport were bad enough, killing or maiming as they did more than 350 people. Then came the assassination of the President’s special envoy in Tel Aviv, which caused some cynics to observe that this was the best blow for peace the PLO had so far struck. The murder of sixteen members of the United States contingent in the UN peacekeeping force in Sinai was similarly attributed to the Palestinian Rejection Front — certainly the bullets found in them had been fired from Soviet-made weapons. All this soured the United States view of the Soviet commitment to peace. Nor was the Soviet Union less sceptical about the USA’s real intentions when the former’s representatives at the peace conference were kidnapped, tortured and executed. There may have been evidence to show that it was the doing of the Italian-Nazi-Maoist group, but this did not prevent the Soviet Union attributing the whole affair to the CIA. These accusations and misunderstandings hardly made for smooth progress at Geneva.
The worst events of all took place in Syria, and the Syrian authorities were not slow to condemn hard-line Israeli groups, who, they claimed, were operating in Syria with the Mossad’s support. In Damascus the President’s office was blown up during a high-level meeting. Again the levity of some political commentary let it be made known that the meeting continued at an even higher level, but the fact was that the President, his brother, other ministers and some senior military officers had been killed. Simultaneously, sabotage at a dozen military bases, together with the destruction of fuel depots, power centres and telecommunications so disturbed the Syrian Government that it declared martial law. If this was a last mad attack on Syria by Israeli clandestine forces, it was certainly effective.
Then two more acts of violence shocked the world. In the Syrian naval base at Tartus two minesweepers and a visiting Soviet frigate were destroyed by limpet mines, killing and wounding many Syrian and Soviet sailors, while at Riyadh an AWACS aircraft which was about to be handed over by the US Air Force to the Royal Saudi Air Force disintegrated in flight. All on board perished.
Fear, increased by uncertainty, gripped the peacemakers. The Soviet Union accused the United States of sabotaging peace efforts in order to maintain a position of strategic dominance in the Middle East through its ally Israel. The United States in reply taxed the Soviet Union with the intention to establish a military base in Syria, from which to spread its influence east and south.
For this last accusation there appeared to be some grounds. Syria, either motivated by panic or manipulated by those determined never to compromise with Israel, had once more appealed to the Soviet Union for instant and substantial demonstration of friendship and fulfilment of their security pact. The appeal was not made in vain.
The Soviet Mediterranean Fifth
So serious did the situation appear to be that NATO commanders called for certain alert measures to be taken in Europe, while Warsaw Pact forces prolonged and reinforced manoeuvres which were under way in Bulgaria. In Britain some reserves were recalled and the House of Commons debated the question of embodying the Territorial Army. France and Italy undertook joint naval exercises in the western Mediterranean.
Worse was to come. There were several sharp sea and air engagements in the eastern Mediterranean between US and Syrian forces and between Soviet and Israeli, all naturally disavowed or hushed up at the time. By good fortune there were no TV cameramen present at any. Both US and Soviet forces were under strict orders to avoid direct engagement with the main antagonist, but it could only be a matter of time before, whether by accident
