In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan

maliks, were given special favors by the British in return for maintaining peace, keeping open important roads such as the Khyber Pass, and apprehending criminals. After partition in 1947, Pakistan continued this system of local autonomy and special favors.

FIGURE 6.2 Pakistan’s Tribal Agencies Courtesy of RAND Corporation

Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, laid the foundation for this independence in remarks to a tribal jirga in Peshawar in 1948: “Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurance and declarations we ordered, as you know, the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a concrete and definite gesture on our part…. Pakistan has no desire to unduly interfere with your internal freedom.”⁵² The system of administration remained fairly consistent after Pakistan’s independence, despite demands by the educated and enlightened sections of the tribal population, and Pakistani courts and police had no jurisdiction in the tribal areas.

One of the most significant groups harbored in this region was led by the legendary mujahideen warrior Jalaluddin Haqqani. Born in 1935 into the Jadran tribe, he was educated at a madrassa in Peshawar, Pakistan. With penetrating eyes and a thick black beard that became tinged with gray over time, Haqqani was described by a Soviet intelligence report as a “cruel and uncompromising person.” The report said he had close ties to Saudi Arabia and was a committed Islamist. “Jelaluddin regularly visits Saudi Arabia, where he holds direct talks with representatives of the government of that country…. He wages armed combat on a platform of establishing an Islamic republic on orthodox Islamic principles.”⁵³ Upon returning to Afghanistan, he opened his own madrassa in Afghanistan’s eastern province of Paktia, along the Pakistani border, and became active in the Muslim Brotherhood during the rule of Zahir Shah and Daoud Khan. During the Soviet War, Haqqani operated south of the Parrot’s Beak in Paktia Province, near bin Laden’s territory. He was viewed by some CIA officers in Islamabad as perhaps the most impressive battlefield commander in the war.

As a prominent jihadi leader, Haqqani sponsored some of the first Arab fighters who faced Soviet forces in 1987, and he was in frequent contact with bin Laden and ISI. Pakistan intelligence and the CIA relied on Haqqani to experiment with new weapons systems and tactics. The CIA officers working from Islamabad regarded him as a proven commander who could put a lot of men under arms on short notice.⁵⁴ It was with Haqqani’s militia that U.S. Congressman Charlie Wilson traveled in Afghanistan in May 1987; Wilson was one of the few American government officials to step foot in the country during the Soviet War. He had wanted to fire a Stinger missile at a Soviet aircraft during the trip, but Haqqani’s men couldn’t pull it off. Milton Bearden, then the CIA’s station chief in Pakistan, recalled, “Though he never got to fire his Stinger—Haqqani’s people had actually dragged chains and tires on the dirt roads in a futile attempt to attract enemy fighter aircraft to the clouds of dust—he did manage to have a memorable combat tour at the front.”⁵⁵

After the overthrow of the Taliban, Haqqani’s network regrouped in towns such as Miramshah and Mir Ali in Pakistan’s tribal areas, as well as in a swath of territory in the Afghan provinces of Khowst, Paktia, Ghazni, and Paktika.⁵⁶ Haqqani was loosely allied with the Taliban leadership at this time, but he separately commanded several hundred fighters. Moreover, he had close relations with the Pakistani government, including the ISI.⁵⁷ Given the risks of traveling to Afghanistan, Haqqani spent this period expanding his base in Pakistan’s tribal areas.⁵⁸ His most ambitious son, Sirajuddin, known as “Siraj,” also became involved as the group prepared to fight the Americans in Afghanistan and overthrow the Karzai government. Siraj, the oldest of Haqqani’s sons, had a strong resemblance to his father, with a jet-black beard and similar facial expressions. He bragged that “we are waging jihad against the U.S. forces and our objective is to tire them out.”⁵⁹

Several of al Qa’ida’s key leaders also began to regroup in this area, along with a variety of other foreign groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The foreign jihadist contingent included two major types: those from the Caucasus and Central Asia (such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Tajiks) and Arabs (such as Saudis, Egyptians, Somalis, and Yemenis). Many had settled in North and South Waziristan during the mujahideen wars against the Soviets; others streamed over after the collapse of the Taliban. A number of these foreigners were directly or indirectly affiliated with al Qa’ida, though some were simply inspired by the broader jihadist goal of pushing U.S. and other Western forces out of Afghanistan.⁶⁰

Much of al Qa’ida’s fighting force was located in an area that began around the Bajaur tribal agency in Pakistan. The leaders were mostly Arabs. Ayman al-Zawahiri was an Egyptian. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, bin Laden’s former treasurer, who headed al Qa’ida’s operations in Afghanistan, was also an Egyptian.⁶¹ Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, a senior al Qa’ida operative who was captured in 2006 in Turkey, was born in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. He served in Iraq’s army under Saddam Hussein and rose to the rank of major. He then joined the Afghan muhajideen and fought the Red Army in the 1980s. Finally, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri, who headed al Qa’ida’s external operations from Waziristan and died in 2007 of hepatitis, was yet another Egyptian.

There was some support from local tribes in the region. Academic Mariam Abou Zahab reported that “after the American intervention, foreign militants, Taliban, and others who fled Afghanistan entered the tribal areas and a sizeable number of foreigners settled in Waziristan where they developed deep links with Ahmedzai Wazirs.” Most disturbingly, she wrote, “almost every tribe supported al Qa’ida, actively or passively, as guests.”⁶² Nek Muhammad, a Taliban leader who was killed in June 2004 by a CIA Predator strike, was from the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe. So was Maulana Noor Muhammad, who joined the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and received Arab money and weapons in the 1980s. He was elected to the Pakistani Parliament in 1997 and became a prominent supporter of the Taliban in Waziristan.

Several individuals from the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe based in Wana, Pakistan, helped raise funds and recruited militants to fight in Afghanistan.⁶³ After the March 2003 capture of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, al Qa’ida’s head of external operations, the group received protection and support from local clerics and tribal members of the Mehsud and Wazir tribes. The Ahmadzai Wazirs and local Taliban members of the clans living in the Shakai Valley were the main hosts of the Arabs, while the Yargulkhel subclan of the Ahmadzai Wazirs became the main host of the Uzbeks in South Waziristan.⁶⁴

Finally, the Taliban resettled in Pakistan and began to reestablish political, military, and religious committees in the vicinity of Quetta. This city was critical because it allowed easy access to Afghanistan’s southern provinces, including Kandahar, a key front in the insurgency. The State Department realized the Taliban were attacking on two fronts, and one report said, “Quetta is the hinge, enabling communication between fronts and providing safe haven for Taliban leadership, logistics and information operations (IO). Dislocating this hinge would severely disrupt Taliban strategy, but would require a much greater degree of commitment and activity from Pakistan than we have seen to date.”⁶⁵

The Taliban sited propaganda and media committees in various locations, but most prominently in Peshawar, as well as in North and South Waziristan. They created a variety of Websites, such as www.alemarah.org (now defunct), and they used al Qa’ida’s production company, Al-Sahab Media, to make videos. They also established a radio outlet, Voice of Sharia, with mobile transmitters in several provinces. Some Taliban fighters even took video cameras onto the battlefield to videotape improvised-explosive-device (IED) attacks and offensive operations, which were useful for propaganda.⁶⁶ Indeed, the Taliban’s strategic information campaign significantly improved after September 11, 2001, thanks in part to al Qa’ida. After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban’s videos became notably better in quality and clarity of message, and its use of the Internet dramatically increased to spread propaganda and recruit potential fighters. The Taliban also published several newspapers and magazines, such as Zamir, Tora Bora, and Sirak. Finally, the Taliban began to relocate much of their financial base to Karachi, Pakistan’s financial and commercial center on the Arabian Sea.

Over time, the Taliban began to link up with a number of Pashtun tribes, especially Ghilzais. Special arrangements allowed border tribes freedom of movement between Afghanistan and Pakistan—they were not subjected to any scrutiny and were allowed to cross the border merely on visual recognition or identification. A number of these tribes had lands that had been divided by the Durand Line, such as the Mashwani, Mohmands, Shinwaris, Afridis, Mangals, Wazirs, and Gulbaz. Pashtun military prowess has been renowned since Alexander the Great’s invasion of Pashtun territory in the fourth century BC. When asked about his identity, Abdul Wali Khan, a Pakistani politician, confidently responded: “[I am] a six thousand year old Pashtun, a thousand year old Muslim and a 27 year old Pakistani.”⁶⁷