In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan

As far back as 2004, Afghanistan’s National Threat Assessment warned that the drug trade, among other factors, was making “Afghanistan an attractive haven for international terrorist groups, organized crime and other extremists while also funding the continued, destabilizing presence of non-statutory armed forces.”¹⁹ The 2005 National Threat Assessment was even less rosy, finding that the security environment was declining and that “the primary source of political subversion comes from internal actors, non-statutory armed forces and their commanders…. [The] window of opportunity that the Government and International Community have to deliver security and improvements to the quality of life of ordinary Afghans is limited, before people become impatient.”²⁰ And Afghanistan’s 2006 National Security Policy noted: “Non-statutory armed forces and their commanders pose a direct threat to the national security of Afghanistan. They are a major obstacle to the expansion of the rule of law into the provinces.”²¹

U.S. intelligence assessments expressed similar alarm. In November 2006, the CIA reported that “the Taliban has built momentum this year. The level of violence associated with the insurgency has increased significantly and the group has become more aggressive than in years past.” It warned that the “Taliban almost certainly refocused its attacks in an attempt to stymie NATO’s efforts in southern Afghanistan.”²² Defense Intelligence Agency analysts reached a similar conclusion, deducing that levels of violence had hit an all-time high. One report, titled The Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, was ominous: “If a substantial international military and Afghan security presence throughout the volatile Pashtun south and east is not established alongside credible civil administrations, central government control over these areas will be substantially restricted.”²³

United Nations assessments were similarly alarming: “The security situation in Afghanistan is assessed by most analysts as having deteriorated at a constant rate…. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a primary target of insurgents and intimidation of all kinds has increased against the civilian population, especially those perceived to be in support of the government, international military forces as well as the humanitarian and development community.”²⁴

In February 2006, Ambassador Neumann sent a cable to Secretary of State Rice offering the unfortunate news that “2006 was likely to be a bloody year in Afghanistan.” He warned that the Taliban had successfully regrouped in Pakistan, and neither the United States nor Pakistan had effectively targeted them in their border sanctuaries. The United States had also largely left alone Afghanistan’s lawless south, the Taliban’s traditional heartland. The United States military had some Special Operations Forces in Helmand and other provinces, but most of its resources were focused on counterterrorist operations in the east.²⁵ Unit commanders had been told not to use the word counterinsurgency in describing their operations, since they were only supposed to be conducting “counterterrorist” operations, in keeping with the national strategic guidance and an operational focus on fighting al Qa’ida.²⁶ The same thing was true for CIA personnel.²⁷

Alarmed at the violence, Neumann argued that the U.S. Congress should at least double the current aid to Afghanistan since, “if we take our hand off too early, it can still come apart on us.”²⁸ Neumann asked for approximately $600 million for the fiscal year 2006 supplemental budget, but he received only $43 million, of which $11 million was for debt reduction for Afghanistan.²⁹ He was outraged. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which vehemently opposed increased aid levels for Afghanistan, proved a major hindrance to funding. In his outbrief with President George W. Bush, Ambassador Neumann was blunt: “I would use a JDAM on OMB if I could,” referring to the joint direct attack munition, a guidance kit placed on the tail of a bomb that converted it from an unguided, or “dumb,” free-fall bomb into an accurately guided “smart” weapon. President Bush reportedly chuckled.³⁰

Frustrations with OMB were not limited to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. U.S. policymakers in Iraq were also frustrated with what L. Paul Bremer, administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, referred to as the petty “small-change struggle” with OMB bureaucrats.³¹ In a memo to Secretary Rumsfeld, for example, Bremer contended that the “assertion by OMB that it has authority over how Iraqi monies are used is an overreach of U.S. government authority.” OMB, he said, is “making efforts to speed up rehabilitation of the Iraqi economy more difficult and time consuming,” and he pleaded with Rumsfeld to “change this.”³² Rumsfeld had asked John Hamre, a former deputy secretary of defense under President Clinton, to go to Iraq with a team to assess the situation on the ground. In a private note to Rumsfeld, Hamre argued: “I was astounded to hear the constraints your low level folks live with to get money and contracts. It is taking up to 10 days for OMB to approve fund requests after you approve them.” He urged Rumsfeld to “take this opportunity to get OMB off your back now when the White House knows that we have problems in Iraq and need to give the CPA Administrator all the flexibility he needs.”³³

Epic Battles

The years 2006 and 2007 witnessed some of the most intense battles since the Taliban was overthrown in 2001. Fighting became so fierce that British soldiers had to fix bayonets for hand-to-hand combat in Helmand Province against well-equipped Taliban militants. Beginning in January 2006, troops from NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) started to replace U.S. troops in southern Afghanistan. The British 16th Air Assault Brigade, later reinforced by Royal Marines, formed the core of the force in southern Afghanistan, along with troops and helicopters from Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands. The initial force consisted of roughly 3,300 British soldiers, 2,500 Canadians, 1,963 Dutch, and forces from Denmark, Australia, and Estonia. Air support was provided by U.S., British, Dutch, Norwegian, and French combat aircraft and helicopters.

The British recognized the Taliban threat. “We underestimate, at our peril the resilience of the Taliban and its capacity to regenerate,” a British assessment acknowledged. “The Taliban gain influence and control of the population through coercion, intimidation, and their extensive tribal ties across Helmand.”³⁴

In early February 2006, Afghan forces, backed by U.S. warplanes, engaged in intense fighting in the Sangin district of Helmand Province. The battle began the evening of February 2, when approximately 200 Taliban fighters targeted an Afghan police convoy. American A-10 ground-attack aircraft and B-52 bombers and British Harrier jets supported Afghan ground forces over two days of fighting, which resulted in about twenty Taliban deaths and seven Afghan police and soldiers killed. On February 13, four U.S. soldiers were killed when their Humvee was hit by a remote-controlled bomb while they were patrolling with Afghan National Army forces in the southern province of Oruzgan. The patrol then came under attack from small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades, forcing it to call in U.S. Apache helicopter and B-52 bomber support. On March 1, one U.S. soldier was killed and two were wounded in a clash with Taliban insurgents in Oruzgan, after a roadside bomb destroyed a U.S. vehicle and U.S. forces engaged the insurgents. A week later, another roadside bomb killed four U.S. soldiers in eastern Afghanistan.

In response to Taliban penetration of the east, U.S. and ANA forces launched Operation Mountain Lion on March 25, 2006, in Kunar Province, east of Kabul.³⁵ On June 15, 2006, more than 11,000 U.S., British, Canadian, and Afghan troops engaged insurgents in southern Oruzgan and northern Helmand Provinces during Operation Mountain Thrust. The mission was designed to eradicate Taliban penetration in these provinces and establish a secure environment in which reconstruction could begin. Prior to the operations, these provinces had seen little military presence. During June and July, there was heavy fighting between NATO and Taliban forces, with the Taliban exhibiting a high degree of coordination in their combat operations. Despite the reported killing of more than 1,000 Taliban insurgents and the capture of almost 400 more, the Taliban continued to exert a presence in these areas. In early August, the Taliban mounted a number of ambushes against NATO forces.

As in many other operations, the insurgent response to Operation Mountain Thrust was to flee from the area and prepare to fight another day.³⁶ This classic guerrilla tactic—especially against a more capable conventional adversary—was regularly used by mujahideen fighters during the Soviet War.

By the summer of 2006, the Taliban began to concentrate their efforts on southern Afghanistan—including Kandahar Province—in what would become one of the largest and most important battles of the war. “Truthfully, I was surprised by the resistance they put up,” said Canadian Major Geoff Abthorpe, commander of Bravo Company. “We came at them with what I perceived to be a pretty heavy fist.”³⁷ The southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand represented the Taliban center of gravity. Since several key Taliban leaders came from Kandahar, they had one of their greatest support networks there. The Canadian military, which had just deployed to Kandahar, had not engaged in serious ground combat since the Korean War; their focus had been on peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and other locations. But they were eager to fight.

“I know about all this cultural sensitivity stuff,” said Canadian Sergeant John May. “But I am here to fight. If