19 Ibid., p. 295.
20 Bogdanovich cites Alexander’s words: Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, p. 439.
21 Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 402–10. The possibility of treason is raised by Digby Smith (1813 – Leipzig, Napoleon and the Battle of the Nations, London, 2001, p. 69) but no evidence is provided. My own explanation is partly drawn from Ludwig von Wolzogen, Memoires d’un General d’Infanterie au service de la Prusse et de la Russie (1792–1836), Paris, 2002, pp. 179–82.
22 The statistics come from Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 296–300.
23 Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 3, p. 230.
24 J.-N. Noel, With Napoleon’s Guns, London, 2005, pp. 180–81.
25 Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, p. 232; Memoires du General Griois, Paris, n.d., p. 202; Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 3, p. 232. Smith, Leipzig, p. 86, argues that Eugen should have moved his corps out of the line of fire or at least ordered them to lie down. But the prince could not just decamp and leave a hole in the allied line. Moreover, Russian troops (or Prussian and Austrian ones) were not trained to lie down in sight of enemy guns. Even Wellington’s infantry might have hesitated to do so on an open glacis with a mass of enemy cavalry nearby.
26 RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Delo 754, fos. 38 ff.
27 All this information comes from the personnel records (posluzhnye spiski) of the Murom Regiment in RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Ed. Khr. 517: each rank has its separate posluzhnoi spisok, beginning on fo. 2.
28 See for instance a report from Diebitsch to Barclay timed at 8 a.m. on 16 October in which the former urges that the Guards be moved forward immediately: unless this was done ‘the distance to Rotha is so great that they will never arrive in time’: Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 283, Diebitsch to Barclay, 4/16 Oct. 1813, p. 329.
29 As one might expect, the Austrian official history gives most attention to this part of the battle but its account is largely confirmed by Bogdanovich: the Austrians and Russians were not very fond of each other even in 1813 and had become a good deal less so by the time they got round to writing their official histories of the campaign. On the whole, a good rule of thumb is to believe the Russian history when it praises the Austrians, and vice versa. If in doubt, Friederich is often a remarkably fair and neutral arbiter. Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 471–82; Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, pp. 461–4; Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 308–12.
30 Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 300, Diebitsch’s account of the battle of Leipzig, 1813, pp. 360–81, at pp. 363–5.
31 Cathcart, Commentaries, pp. 306–7.
32 Ibid., pp. 307–8.
33 Ibid., p. 308; P. Pototskii, Istoriia gvardeiskoi artillerii, SPB, 1896, pp. 271–2; A. Mikaberidze, The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1795–1815, Staplehurst, 2005, p. 382.
34 Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, p. 460; Pototskii, Istoriia gvardeiskoi artillerii, pp. 270–73. Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 299, Sukhozhanet to Iashvili, 29 Dec. 1813/10 Jan. 1814, pp. 358–60; no. 300, Diebitsch’s account of Leipzig, 1813, pp. 365–7.
35 ‘Vospominaniia Matveia Matveevicha Muromtseva’, RA, 27/3, 1890, pp. 366–94, at p. 378.
36 Dnevnik Pavla Pushchina, Leningrad, 1987, p. 128.
37 S. Gulevich, Istoriia leib gvardii Finliandskago polka 1806–1906, SPB, 1896, pp. 303–13; Istoriia leib-gvardii egerskago polka za sto let 1796–1896, SPB, 1906, pp. 144– 50; Griois, Memoires, pp. 202–3.
38 Gulevich, Istoriia leib gvardii Finliandskago polka, pp. 312–15.
39 ‘Zapiski soldata Pamfila Nazarova’, RS, 9/8, 1878, pp. 536–7.
40 There is a good description of Vasilchikov’s attack in Smith, Leipzig, pp. 166– 8.
41 Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 619–27.
42 D. V. Dushenkovich, ‘Iz moikh vospominanii ot 1812 goda’, in 1812 god v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov, Moscow, 1995, pp. 124–6.
43 Langeron, Memoires, p. 330.
44 Ibid., pp. 326–34; Radozhitskii, Pokhodnyia zapiski, vol. 2, pp. 269–74.
45 Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1813, vol. 2, pp. 550–51.
46 On the 39th Jaegers, see RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Ed. Khr. 1802, passim, but also Sacken’s reports after the fall of Czenstochowa (RGVIA, Fond 846, Opis 16, Delo 3403, fos. 8ii–9i: Sacken to Kutuzov, 25 March 1813 (OS)) and the battle of Leipzig; Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 293, pp. 349–51: Sacken to Barclay, 18/30 Oct. 1813.
47 See RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Delo 1855, fos. 2 ff., for the 45th Jaegers (‘Spisok…45go Egerskago polka’ dated 1 July 1813) and Delo 1794, fos. 2 ff., for the 29th Jaegers (‘29-go egerskago polka…o sluzhbe ikh i po prochim’, dated 1 Jan. 1814). Beskrovnyi (ed.), Pokhod, no. 300, Diebitsch’s account, pp. 379–82; Langeron, Memoires, p. 343.
48 Smith, Leipzig, p. 272, on attempts to shift responsibility.
49 On allied losses, see e.g. Smith, Leipzig, p. 298; on French statistics, see J. Tulard (ed.), Dictionnaire Napoleon, Paris, 1987, p. 354; on lost guns, see Hoen, Feldzug von Leipzig, pp. 652–4.
Chapter 13: The Invasion of France
1 F. Martens (ed.), Sobranie traktatov i konventsii, zakliuchennykh Rossiei s inostrannymi derzhavami, vol. 3: Traktaty s Avstrieiu, SPB, 1876, no. 70, pp. 111–26, and vol. 7: Traktaty s Germeniei 1811–1824, SPB, 1885, no. 259, pp. 96–112, for Russia’s treaties with Austria and Prussia. The Austro-Prussian treaty was identical.
2 See e.g. a letter from Count Munster, the Hanoverian statesman, to the Prince Regent (the future George IV of Britain) about the arguments over military and diplomatic policy towards France in January: ‘The main factor in all these disagreements is that Russia has not stated how far it wishes to extend its borders in Poland.’ A. Fournier, Der Congress von Chatillon: Die Politik im Kriege von 1814, Vienna, 1900, sect. IV, no. 1, Munster to Prince Regent, 30 January 1814, pp. 295–6.
3 There is a large literature even in English about Metternich and his policies. The two great pillars of this literature are Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848, Oxford, 1994, and Henry Kissinger, A World Restored, London, 1957. Schroeder’s book in particular is a splendid piece of scholarship. Alan Sked punctures some of the more elevated interpretations of Metternich’s ‘system’ in Metternich and Austria, London, 2008. As regards this book’s focus, in other words Metternich’s role in Napoleon’s overthrow, I have some sympathy with his scepticism.
4 On Knesebeck’s views, see R. von Friederich, Die Befreiungskriege 1813–1815, vol. 3: Der Feldzug 1814, Berlin, 1913, pp. 81–2.
5 Baron Karl von Muffling, The Memoirs of Baron von Muffling: A Prussian Officer in the Napoleonic Wars, London, 1967, pp. 92–3, 100–101, 418–19.
6 On Frederick William, see Chapter 9, n. 18.
7 Fournier, Congress, p. 10. Paul Schroeder tries to defend Aberdeen, not altogether convincingly, in ‘An Unnatural “Natural Alliance”: Castlereagh, Metternich, and Aberdeen in 1813’, International History Review, 10/4, Nov. 1988, pp. 522–40. VPR, 7, no. 191, Alexander’s instructions to Lieven and Pozzo di Borgo, 6 Dec. 1813, pp. 492–500.
8 N. A. M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean, London, 2004, pp. 572–3, sets out the elements of British power.
