Russia Against Napoleon

opposition to Barclay, which came as no surprise to the emperor. Far more shocking was his generals’ request that he rid himself of Rumiantsev or, as Wilson put it, if his generals ‘were but assured that His Majesty would no longer give his confidence to advisers whose policy they mistrusted, they would testify their allegiance by exertions and sacrifices which would add splendour to the crown, and security to the throne under every adversity’.⁴⁹

Fine rhetoric aside, this was a demand by his generals to impose their will on the monarch. It was certainly not made more palatable to Alexander by being conveyed through the agent of a foreign power. Wilson recorded that ‘during this exposition the Emperor’s colour occasionally visited and left his cheek’. Alexander took some time to regain his composure, though he handled Wilson’s demarche with skill and patience. Calling Wilson ‘the rebels’ ambassador’, he reacted calmly to his generals’ request, saying that he knew and trusted these officers: ‘I have no fears of their having any unavowed designs against my authority.’⁵⁰

Alexander insisted, however, that his generals were wrong to believe that Rumiantsev had ever advised submission to Napoleon. He could not dump a loyal servant ‘without cause’, especially as ‘I have a great respect for him, since he is almost the only one who never asked me in his life for anything on his own account, whereas everyone else has always been seeking honours, wealth, or some private object for himself and connections’. Above all, there was a vital principle involved. The emperor must not be seen to give way to such pressure, which would set a very dangerous precedent. Meanwhile, however, Wilson must ‘carry back to the army pledges of my determination to continue the war against Napoleon whilst a Frenchman is in arms on this side of the frontier. I will not desert my engagements, come what may. I will abide the worst. I am ready to remove my family into the interior, and undergo every sacrifice; but I must not give way on the point of choosing my own ministers.’⁵¹

During the summer Alexander lived in the small palace – really little more than a villa – on Kamennyi Ostrov, a small island in one of the branches of the river Neva in Petersburg’s northern suburbs. There were no guards in sight and Alexander lived in great simplicity. It was here that he learned the news of Moscow’s fall, all the more shocking because of Kutuzov’s previous claims to have held the French at Borodino. His wife’s lady-in-waiting, Roxandra Stourdzha, recalled that rumours flew round Petersburg. Riots among the plebs were feared and widely expected. ‘The nobility loudly blamed Alexander for the state’s misfortunes, and in conversations it was a rare person who tried to defend and justify him.’ September the twenty-seventh was the anniversary of the emperor’s coronation. For once Alexander bowed to his advisers’ fears for his safety and travelled to the Kazan cathedral in a carriage, rather than on horseback as usual. When the imperial party went up the stairs into the cathedral they were greeted by absolute silence. Roxandra Stourdzha was no faint-heart but she remembered that she heard the echo of every step and her knees trembled.⁵²

A foolish letter from his sister Catherine attacking his performance drove Alexander over the edge, his reply illustrating just how strained his feelings were at this critical time. After pointing out to Catherine that it hardly made sense to criticize him both for undermining his generals by his presence with the army and for not taking over command and saving Moscow, he wrote that if his abilities were not sufficient for the role which fate had given him, that was not his fault. Nor was the poor quality of so many of his military and civilian lieutenants.

With such poor backing as I have, lacking adequate means in all areas, and guiding such a vast machinery in a time of terrible crisis and against an infernal opponent who combines the most awful evil with the most transcendent talent, and is backed by the whole power of Europe and by a group of talented lieutenants who have been honed by twenty years of war and revolution – in common justice is it surprising if I meet with reverses?

But the sting of Alexander’s letter was in the tail, where he wrote that he had been warned that enemy agents would even seek to turn his family against him, with Catherine herself as their first choice. Even the very self-confident grand duchess was shocked by this response and Alexander subsequently relented by adding, ‘If you find me too touchy, begin by putting yourself in the cruel position where I am.’⁵³

At a time when his own blood relations were proving worse than useless, Alexander did get loyal support from his wife, the sensitive and beautiful Empress Elizabeth. She remained calm and confident throughout these weeks, writing to her mother that ‘in truth we are prepared for everything except negotiations. The further Napoleon advances the less he should believe that any peace is possible. That is the unanimous view of the emperor and all classes of the population…each step he advances in this immense Russia brings him closer to the abyss. Let us see how he copes with the winter.’ She added that peace would be the beginning of Russia’s destruction but fortunately it was impossible: ‘The emperor does not even conceive of the idea and even if he did want to do this, he would not be able to.’⁵⁴

If Alexander drew comfort from his wife and from walking in the groves on Kamennyi Ostrov, his main solace was religion. The emperor had been brought up in Catherine II’s court on a combination of Enlightenment rationalism and aristocratic hedonism. The Orthodox clergy who tutored him in their religion left little mark. But the sensitive and idealistic sides of his personality increasingly inclined him towards seeking answers to life’s problems in Christianity. He had in fact been reading the Bible for some time before Napoleon’s invasion but amidst the tremendous strains of 1812 his religious sense grew much stronger. Alexander would read the Bible every day, underlining in pencil the parts he found most relevant. To his old friend and fellow-convert to Christian belief, Prince Aleksandr Golitsyn, he wrote even in early July 1812 that ‘in moments such as those in which we find ourselves, I believe that even the most hardened person feels a return towards his creator…I surrender myself to this feeling, which is so habitual for me and I do so with a warmth, an abandon, much greater than in the past! I find there my only consolation, my sole support. It is this sentiment alone that sustains me.’⁵⁵

It was in this mood that Alexander heard the news of Moscow’s loss and the city’s subsequent destruction by fire. By the time Kutuzov’s own messenger, Colonel Alexandre Michaud de Beauretour, came with this news, the emperor was well prepared to meet him and send a firm message back to his army. Amidst much emotion on both sides, Alexander and Michaud reassured themselves on the points that concerned them most. The emperor was promised by Michaud that the abandonment of Moscow had not undermined the army’s morale or its total commitment to victory. Michaud, and through him the army, in return received the pledge they wanted to hear. Far from undermining the emperor’s confidence or will, the loss of Moscow had hardened his determination to achieve total victory. Alexander ended the conversation with the words:

‘I will make use of every last resource of my empire; it possesses even more than my enemies yet think. But even if Divine Providence decrees that my dynasty should cease to reign on the throne of my ancestors, then after having exhausted all the means in my power I will grow my beard down to here’ (he pointed his hand to his chest) ‘and will go off and eat potatoes with the very last of my peasants rather than sign a peace which would shame my fatherland and that dear nation whose sacrifices for me I know how to appreciate…Napoleon or me, I or him, we cannot both rule at the same time; I have learned to understand him and he will not deceive me.’⁵⁶

This was fine theatre and fighting words, which in the circumstances was just what was required. But there is no reason to doubt Alexander’s sincerity or commitment when he said them. They spelled the ruin of Napoleon’s strategy and pointed to the destruction of his army.

The Advance from Moscow

Even as Kutuzov was preparing to fight Napoleon at Borodino, Alexander I was concocting a plan for a counter-offensive which would drive the French out of Russia and destroy the Grande Armee. Kutuzov’s initial report to the emperor on the battle of Borodino had stated that ‘despite their superior forces, nowhere had the enemy gained a single yard of land’. Immediately after receiving this report, Alexander dispatched Aleksandr Chernyshev to the field-marshal’s headquarters with detailed plans for a coordinated counter-offensive by all the Russian armies. Alexander wrote to Kutuzov that he hoped that the field- marshal’s skill and his troops’ courage at Borodino had now put a final stop to the French advance into Russia. He also encouraged Kutuzov to discuss all details about the operation with Chernyshev, who was fully informed about Alexander’s aims and in whom he had full confidence. The emperor was careful to state that it was up to the commander-in-chief whether to accept the plan or to make alternative proposals of his own but no Russian general was likely openly to flout the monarch’s wishes.¹

The gist of Alexander’s plan was that the Russian armies in the north (Wittgenstein and Steinhel) and the south (Chichagov) should simultaneously advance deep into Napoleon’s rear in Belorussia. They must defeat and