my fame and fortune without much hesitation to precipitate an event which is to happen.” In reality, he could not afford to risk Gayoso’s enmity, and there was never the slightest chance that he would undertake any action against Spanish forces.
Suspicious about Wilkinson’s real motives, Clark may have asked whether the general was still being paid by Gayoso, because it is equally clear that Wilkinson informed Clark, truthfully, that since the western settlers had achieved their goal with the opening of the Mississippi, the Spanish Conspiracy was at an end. From Fort Adams, Clark wrote his uncle that he believed this “assurance that the disgraceful connexion should be broken off.”
On November 4, the young man left the fort having failed to achieve his object. The meeting might have been utterly inconsequential, except that out of it grew a campaign to expose Wilkinson that proved so damaging, his past as a paid agent of Spain came in the end to haunt him like Banquo’s ghost.
THE FIRST STEP WAS TAKEN, inadvertently, by the guileless Andrew Ellicott. On November 8, Ellicott reached Darling’s Creek, a tributary of the Pearl River, and was preparing a map of the area that Wilkinson had requested. Then, as he put it in his journal, “by a very extraordinary accident, a letter from the Governor General [Gayoso] on its way to a confidential officer in the Spanish service [Power] fell into my hands for a few hours.” In fact what he had was Power’s copy of the letter. Ellicott’s refusal to explain how it came into his hands suggests it was stolen and had to be returned before the loss was discovered. Only Clark could have engineered the theft of the letter, and its swift conveyance to Ellicott. His motives can be deduced from its contents.
Gayoso’s letter was written in response to the news of Wilkinson’s visit to the commissioners’ camp. This, the governor suggested, had to be seen in relation to the Spanish Conspiracy, and the fears of those involved that their participation might be exposed by publication of their letters. “I wonder you could not see the design of General Wilkinson’s visit to Mr Ellicott’s and Mr Minor’s camp,” Gayoso explained to Power. “It was to fall upon some measures to obtain his papers. They are all safe and never will be made use of against him if he conducts himself with propriety. In fact the originals are at the court [in Madrid], the copies only are here.”
To Clark, the most important item was the evidence of blackmail— it explained Wilkinson’s refusal to participate in his projected attack on New Orleans— but the implications were different for Ellicott. He saw in the letter “unequivocal proof” of the conspiracy, and as he later explained, this document more than any other evidence convinced him that Wilkinson must have been involved in a plot “calculated to injure the United States.” He promptly sent Pickering another long and deeply ciphered dispatch with this fresh indication of the general’s treachery. Yet even then, he felt compelled to discover whether there might not be some other, more innocent explanation.
With the folly of the truly innocent, he wrote Wilkinson on December 16, 1798, “I have seen a letter of Mr. Power’s, in his own hand writing, dated the 23d ultimo, in which your name is mentioned in a manner, that astonished me; I dare not commit any part of it to paper, but if I should ever have the pleasure of another interview with you, I will communicate the substance of it under the injunction of secresy. If the design of it, has been to injure you in my opinion, it has failed in its effect, for in the most material point I am confident it is false.”
However friendly the tone of the Quaker’s letter, the general could not afford to let someone with Ellicott’s moral authority possess such damning knowledge. Since denial was impossible, Wilkinson set about destroying Ellicott’s reputation. From friends in Natchez, the astronomer learned that Wilkinson and Thomas Freeman had become companions and were intent on smearing his name. The least harmful allegation they circulated was that he had been in the pay of Spain, but what almost broke Ellicott’s heart was the story that he and his son, Andy, a surveyor on the boundary-marking team, had, as Freeman put it, “a beastly, criminal, and disgraceful intercourse” with their washerwoman, Betsy. “It was said, and generally believed,” Freeman declared, “that that extraordinary trio, father, son, and washerwoman, slept in the same bed, at the same time—I did not see, but I believed it. I was even pressed myself by the old sinner, Ellicott, to take part of his bed with his washerwoman and himself, for the night.”
A more wounding charge could hardly have been made against someone with Ellicott’s grave, Quaker background, undeviating scientific integrity, and utter devotion to his wife, Sally, who bore him thirteen children and all her life moved him to such endearments as “My darling,” “My love,” and “Dearest of all earthly beings.”
The episode showed how dangerous it was to be a threat, however inadvertent, to Wilkinson. It also demonstrated how armored against exposure the general had become. In his next message, Pickering sharply reprimanded Ellicott for passing on malicious allegations and refused to hear any more. Consequently the boundary commissioner said nothing about his encounter some months later with Captain Tomas Portell, the former commandant of New Madrid. Having supervised the packing of $9,640 into sugar and coffee barrels for Wilkinson, Portell was able to give the shaken commissioner firsthand testimony that the money was earned by spying, and not, as the general insisted, by trade.
Another year passed before Andrew Ellicott returned from the wilderness. By the time he reached his home in Philadelphia, he was a changed man, physically run-down, as he admitted, and psychologically scarred. But he was no less determined to see General Wilkinson uncovered as a Spanish spy.
18
THE FEDERALIST FAVORITE
BY THE END OF 1798, it seemed that no one, whether Federalist or Republican, American or Spaniard, wanted to hear anything bad against Wilkinson. Even the French were prepared to think well of him as they began to exert pressure on Spain to hand over Louisiana. In Paris, Joseph de Pontalba, former citizen of New Orleans and self- appointed expert on the Spanish colony, recommended the general’s immediate recruitment. “Four times from 1786 to 1792, preparations were made in Kentucky and Cumberland to attack Louisiana,” Pontalba recklessly declared in his memorandum to Napoleon, “and every time this same individual caused them to fail through his influence over his countrymen. I make these facts known to show that France must not neglect to enlist this individual in her service.”
Had Napoleon’s plans to land an army of forty thousand troops in Louisiana been realized, Wilkinson might have received such an approach. But the threat of French hostilities produced for him an offer that flattered his vanity beyond anything that Napoleon might have offered.
In April 1798, the growing arrogance of France’s military government provoked a crisis in its dealings with the United States. The flashpoint was the diplomatic insult, known as the XYZ affair, when three representatives of Foreign Secretary Talleyrand demanded a bribe of fifty thousand pounds sterling, approximately $150,000, before the U.S. ambassadors could present their credentials. The news provoked an outraged Congress to authorize a dramatic increase in the army. In a first installment, twelve regiments, each of one thousand men, were to be raised to create what was called the New Army, and this was followed by further increases until Congress had approved a force of more than forty thousand men. In overall command was George Washington, newly promoted to lieutenant general, with two major generals, Alexander Hamilton and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, as operational commanders, all superseding Wilkinson in seniority. Yet astonishingly he did not appear to resent his demotion.
That George Washington had been placed in supreme command of the New Army made the loss easier to bear, but it was Alexander Hamilton, Washington’s deputy, who found the key to Wilkinson’s volatile loyalties.
As early as February 1799, when the recruits began to come in, Hamilton had promised Wilkinson that he wanted their relationship to result in “great mutual satisfaction.” When Wilkinson replied offering his full support, Hamilton suggested to Washington, “It strikes me forcibly that it be right and expedient to advance this gentlemen to the grade of major general.” Hamilton had only sporadically met Wilkinson since the Conway cabal, but he clearly understood Wilkinson’s temperament. “I am aware that some doubts have been entertained of him,” Hamilton acknowledged, “and that his character, on certain sides, gives room for doubt. Yet he is at present in the service; is a man of more than ordinary talent, of courage and enterprise . . . and will naturally find his interest as an ambitious man in deserving the favour of the government; while he will be apt to become disgusted if neglected, and through disgust may be rendered really what he is now only suspected to be.” On June 25, George Washington agreed to recommend to the president “promoting Brigadier Wilkinson to the Rank of Maj[o]r General.” Conspicuously he said nothing about the brigadier’s abilities, only that “it would feed his ambition, soothe his vanity, and by arresting
