An Artist in Treason: The Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson

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TWO TRAITORS ON TRIAL

THE ONE AREA WHERE JAMES WILKINSON remained vulnerable was his past. It was certain that Jonathan Dayton and Aaron Burr would in their defense revive the Western World’s allegations of his “holding a commission and drawing a pension from the government of Spain.” His first, surprising step, taken while still in New Orleans, was to approach the governor of West Florida, Vizente Folch, to help clear his name. Relying, as he put it, “upon those sympathies which connect military men throughout the civilized world,” he asked Folch to give an assurance that Wilkinson had never been paid by Spain or held a Spanish commission. Since Folch had been living with Miro in 1787 when Wilkinson first appeared in New Orleans and “possessed his confidences in a greater degree” than anyone else, this was tantamount to asking him to lie.

Folch was well prepared, however, because, as he informed Captain General Someruelos, “during the Burr disturbances, the general has by means of a person in his confidence [Thomas Power] constantly maintained a correspondence with me, in which he has laid before me not only the information which he has acquired, but also his intentions for the various exigencies in which he might feel himself.” To give Wilkinson the clearance he wanted, Folch first declared that had the general been guilty, Spanish archives would certainly contain some record of his commission and pension. Then, he announced grandly, “Under my sacred word of honour, no such document, nor any other paper tending to substantiate such assertions, exists in the records in my possession.”

As one critic pointed out, Folch’s declaration was narrow and qualified since he made it in Pensacola while the relevant papers were held in Havana. But at least his Spanish handlers were now prevented from making any embarrassing revelations. In similar fashion, the general persuaded Thomas Power to provide a certificate— to be shown only to the president, Power specified—declaring that Wilkinson had never acted as a Spanish agent. Finally Wilkinson set about insulating himself against the damaging information held by Daniel Clark.

During the summer of 1806, Clark’s loyalties had made another dizzying turn when he at last secured the nomination to be the Orleans Territory’s representative to Congress. In the fall, when rumors of Burr’s movements first reached the city, Claiborne immediately assumed that “the delegate to Congress from this Territory, Daniel Clark, is one of the leaders [of the conspiracy].” But, forced to choose which way to jump, Clark turned against Burr. In mid- October, he advised members of the legislature, including Joseph Bellechasse, commander of the city’s militia, “to forget any personal animosity towards the Governor, and to rally round the government, and die, if necessary, in its defence.” Then he hastily left the city to take up his duties in Washington.

As early as December, Wilkinson had sent Clark a reminder that each of them knew too much about the other’s links to Burr. “Suspicion is afloat! and numbers are implicated,” he wrote, and added with dramatic underlining, “Thank God, your advice to Bellechasse, if your character was not a sufficient guarantee, would vindicate you against any imputation.”

In January 1807, at the height of his dictatorial rule, the general recalled in another letter Clark’s pro- Creole comment about not wanting his children to be part of the United States. “It is a fact,” Wilkinson wrote, “that our fool [Claiborne] has written to his contemptible fabricator [the president] that you had declared if you had children you would teach them to curse the United States as soon as they were able to lisp.” The theme appeared for a third time in March 1807: “Mr. Burr and his accredited agents have made, or endeavour to make, much use of Mr. Clark’s name.” Wilkinson assured him, “General W. has never mentioned it.”

This letter crossed with one sent by Clark from Washington warning Wilkinson, “You are calumniated from all quarters,” with rumors “of your having received 10,000 dollars, at Orleans, of the Spaniards when you went to take possession. I have pointed out the utter impossibility of such a thing.” To this, Wilkinson replied in May, smoothly assuring Clark, “A friendship, founded on almost twenty years acquaintance makes it my peculiar duty, pending the highly important developments which are at issue, to watch over and defend your fame, should it be implicated in the discussion.”

It was a dangerous strategy. As preparations were made for Aaron Burr’s trial, and public excitement mounted about who else had been involved, one or another might conclude more was to be gained from blowing the whistle than keeping such dangerous information secret.

Unnoticed amid the storm of interest stirred up by Burr’s appearance in court was the return to the United States on July 1 of Captain Zebulon Pike and most of his party. An epic of courage and hardiness had taken them close to Santa Fe, where they were, as expected, captured by the Spanish, but not until February 1807. As prisoners, they were then taken down the Camino Real deep into Mexico, ending up, ironically, in Chihuahua, Wilkinson’s ultimate goal. There Salcedo ordered Pike and his men to be released, and they were escorted back through Texas to the border. The expected rescue had never come, the expected war with Spain was not fought, and what was perhaps the real conspiracy with Burr remained hidden.

BY THE TIME JAMES WILKINSON reached Washington, his enemies were waiting for him in force. Chief among them was Aaron Burr. At the time of his arrest, he exclaimed bitterly to Mississippi’s attorney general, “As to any projects or plans which may have been formed between General Wilkinson and myself heretofore, they are now completely frustrated by the perfidious conduct of Wilkinson, and the world must pronounce him a perfidious villain.” With the help of his daughter, Theodosia, and the wealthy Blennerhassett, a powerful legal team under the leadership of Edmund Randolph, George Washington’s attorney general, was assembled to defend Burr, their overt aim being to prove both Burr’s innocence and the general’s guilt.

“Our ground of defence is that Mr. Burr’s expedition was in concurrence with General Wilkinson, against the dominions of the king of Spain, in case of a war,” George Wickham, the most damaging of Burr’s counsel, stated bluntly. “If we prove that, at the time Wilkinson was pretending to favor Burr’s expedition . . . he was receiving a Spanish pension, this will explain his conduct. He defeated the enterprize of Burr by hatching a charge of treason against the United States, on purpose to serve the king whose money he was receiving!”

Others were ready to provide corroborating detail. Even before his arrest, John Adair had pinned the blame for failure on Wilkinson. “Why, something would have been done if Wilkinson had not turned out a damned coward,” he declared on hearing the news from the Sabine River, “for if he had attacked the Spaniards, and the blood of one man had been spilt, the government could not have stopped the western people.” Arrested and shipped north as a prisoner by his former friend, Adair had immediately been released on a writ of habeas corpus and gladly supplied the defense with copies of Wilkinson’s numerous letters encouraging him to “come on” to Mexico.

Luther Martin, the grandstanding, alcoholic, self- appointed guardian of democracy, and best known of Burr’s team, tracked down Major James Bruff and encouraged him to testify. As Bruff excitedly told everyone in the stagecoach carrying him to Richmond, Martin had promised “he would lash General Wilkinson into tortures” with his cross-examination. The major brought not only his own, far from credible, testimony concerning alleged confessions of conspiracy that Wilkinson had chosen to reveal privately to him behind locked doors and convenient bushes, but affidavits to the same effect from Wilkinson’s other enemies in St. Louis, inlcuding Samuel Hammond, “with whom General Wilkinson had a conversation nearly similar to the one held with me.” Bruff was joined by Swartwout, and a reluctant Thomas Power, who had been subpoenaed in New Orleans. All contributed to the impression that, as Luther Martin put it, “General Wilkinson is the alpha and the omega of the present prosecution.”

Quite apart from his personal hostility to Burr, Jefferson’s tactics left them little option but to pursue the general. When the president first told Congress about the conspiracy on January 22, 1807, he dated the moment at which the administration realized what was being planned not to William Eaton’s information in October, but to Wilkinson’s letter on November 25 This conveniently obscured the nightmare period when the cabinet lost control of events, but it portrayed the general as solely responsible for detecting the conspiracy, and deserving most of the credit for defeating it. By destroying Wilkinson, Burr’s team undermined the very existence of a plot. And behind him was a larger target.

In his address to Congress, Jefferson had declared that Burr “contemplated two distinct objects, which might be carried on either jointly or separately . . . One of these was the severance of the Union of these States by the Alleghany mountains; the other, an attack on Mexico.” His public statements hammered at the theme of Burr’s undoubted guilt in seeking to destroy the Union. In private he went further, referring to “treason stalking through the land,” and accusing the Federalists of “making Burr’s cause their own, mortified only that he did not separate the Union or overturn the government.”

Burr’s defense team responded by issuing subpoenas for the presidential papers, and especially for his letters