A Rifleman Went to War

jealousies, animosities — and I don’t know what fancy ideas — and they had resulted, largely, in destroying the very basis on which a fine army is built.

I suppose I rubbed the apostles and supporters of these theories the wrong way; but my regret is that I did not have the power to rub hard enough. I should have liked to rub them out. There is no place for factionalism and petty jealousies in an army, particularly when it is being hastily enlarged to meet an emergency. There must have been some aim which, in its fine-spun, roundabout intention, was good, but I don’t know what it was. If it was to eliminate factionalism (such as might be supposed to develop between Marine Corps, Regular Army, National Guard, etc.,), it will not bear much examination. This sort of factionalism is of the very stuff out of which armies are made — if the general officers are equal to their jobs. A good officer does not mistake uniformity for unity any more than he depends upon gazetted authority for his right to command. Unity belongs to the regiment, not the uniform; and the right to command is a quality of the officer. If he is a general officer he welcomes individuality in the various units of his command. Whether this individuality is marked by differences in uniform, doesn’t matter a snap to him — just so he has the individuality. That’s the stuff fighting spirit is made of. It’s up to him and his subordinates to use it. That’s why I wished for the power to rub harder. If they can’t use it, let’s get them out of the way, not sacrifice the makings of a fine army (and later literally sacrifice the resulting mob) to a few little notions and petty jealousies. I can put up with these things in politics, but in war, lives depend on them.

That’s one big lesson I learned with the British. England was full of all sorts of obstructionists, strikers and long-winded members of the opposition. Adequate supplies of munitions were long delayed, partly because of them. But no one found it necessary — and crack-brains were not given a free hand — to reorganize the army, turn the Scots Guards into a battalion of pioneers, put the Royal Marines to driving lorries, and scramble the remainder together in conformity to impractical, or insincere, notions of a fond and fatuous national unity.

Once again: the unit on which morale, and fighting efficiency, depend is small. Esprit de corps begins with the pride of the individual soldier in himself and as one of a small uniton all of whom he knows he can depend, each one of whom challenges and supports the best that is in him. If you will provide officers to command regiments and brigades built of this sort of stuff you will be in a fairway to having an army that is a United States Army.

And you certainly can’t get it by mixing raw recruits representing all strains of a widely diverse people — except with unlimited time and the best of leadership. With these it would be possible to do things the wrong way. But if we had plenty of brains and leadership in the right places there would be no inclination to do things the wrong way.

Well, the war is over. I should like, graciously, to refrain from speculating upon what would have happened if the United States had not had a full year — after the declaration of war — in which to get into action. Another time, it may be that we shall have to fight, instanter, with no foreign power to shield our befuddled preparations. If this should happen, I hope that the armchair Napoleons and the jealous little minions of uniformity will have mastered their technique of producing armies presto! out of the hat, and that their assortment of East-siders and cowpunchers, Boston Irish and hot-headed Southerners, Wops, Poles and hillbillies, will each feel proud of his tent-mates, glad to have them on his right and left, and that they stick together and carry on as well as did the “Limeys”.

Chapter 16. Notes on Sniping

IN THIS chapter I propose to give some of my own personal opinions and experiences relative to sniping in the trenches, or from a fixed position while on the defensive; and will follow this with a chapter devoted to the individual rifleman who uses his rifle while advancing over the modem battlefield. There is a vast difference between the two situations and in the equipment, methods, and what might be termed the individual qualities which must necessarily be employed.

I do not make any pretense as to this being a text-book, but it might not be amiss in this chapter to give my readers an idea or two as to just how we went about what turned out to be the very first efforts made by the British Army at anything like organized sniping. Well, anyway — I am going to take the role of “Old Man Experience” and tell you some of the details. In various other chapters of this story I have had occasion to say a great deal about our experiences, and I fear I shall be accused of repeating a great many things simply to fill space. However, I shall try and minimize these repetitions as much as possible.

It is a common but erroneous belief that the only necessary qualification for a sniper is to be able to shoot accurately. As a matter of fact that is only half of it — perhaps less than half. I have known, and know now, many expert riflemen who would be of little or no use in war — at least not without a lot of additional training and experience.

Before the sniper can “snipe,” he must be able to get into position within range of the enemy, and as this game works both ways, he must be able to do so without allowing said enemy to locate him, and perhaps get in the first shot, for if this should happen it is quite likely that our sniper would be through before he started — in other words, a washout Since we no longer have an open season on Indians, about the best way to acquire the skill to advance over varied ground without being detected is by stalking wild game. And by stalking, I mean to get right up close to the animal before taking the shot, and not merely to crawl into some position at long range from which it is possible to take a shot over open ground. Crawl, roll or push yourself forward until you are within relatively close range of the target, and learn just what sort of Indian-cunning and patience the art of proper stalking calls for. The practice may be gotten on anything from a moose to a goose, both of which take a lot of stalking at times.

I suppose that in this day and age, the most readily available live animal upon which to practice will be the common woodchuck or ground-hog. From personal experience I can testify that excellent stalking practice may be gotten by anyone who will really stalk woodchuck, and not merely use them as a long- range rifle target. In recent years I have talked with a great many woodchuck hunters, many of whom told me what excellent “hunters” they were and what splendid shots and kills they had made, mostly at the longer ranges running up to three hundred yards. I never bothered to explain to them that it was rifle practice they had been getting and not hunting practice at all. Those of you who wish to learn the art of stalking under such conditions must hold your fire until you have stalked forward to within thirty or forty yards; which may readily be done in any hilly or rolling country, or where the grass or other cover is of any height. Too easy a shot, do you say? Well then: use a light .22 rifle and hold for the eye, or else take a running shot offered in the few yards distance our ’chuck will be from his den. The idea I am trying to put over is that you must get your rifle practice on the paper target and your stalking practice on the woodchuck or other available live game.

When the British finally did get around to organizing anything like a real Sniping Corps (in 1916) they made good use of the game-keepers, guides and men from the Scottish deer forests. They called ’em “Lovat Scouts” possibly because Lord Lovat may have been instrumental in the organization or equipment of the force — I don’t really know. But I do know that Major H. Hesketh-Prichard was the man who really boosted and built up the game. Further along I shall have something to say about his organization and methods.

Another odd slant which many expert riflemen have about this sniping game, is the belief that their superior ability as a rifle-shot will gain for them such special privileges as relief from disagreeable duties or hard work, and added security through being given care or protection by higher authorities, or in the language of the trenches, being put on a “bomb proof” job. As to the first of these suppositions, I can only say that in both the Canadian and United States services it takes a lot of “rank” to get any pick-and-shovel work out of the men for anyone but themselves, and even then they are very apt to shirk much such necessary labor. My personal experience during the first few weeks of sniping was that the operation called for much additional hard labor on my part, and that often the only way to have that special work done right, let alone done at all, was to do it myself. As to the job of sniping offering additional safeguards to the sniper — why hell’s bells man, it calls for far more exposure and chance-taking than ever falls the lot of the average soldier. It’s just a lot of extra work and misery for the sniper, that’s what. So, if you are looking for a soft job in the dugouts, take up something besides sniping.

When we started our first serious sniping, in November 1915, up in the Ypres salient, we were within close, easy range of the Germans and they already had many expert snipers in their line and at work. They beat us to it at the start, but I am personally satisfied that we overtook and surpassed them in the end. As far as I know, there