In theory, the collective farm was a cooperative (the kolkhoz charter was introduced in 1935) based upon what was termed “kolkhoz-cooperative” property, ideologically inferior to state property used in the sovkhoz. Entry into and exit from a kolkhoz was theoretically voluntary, though in fact the process of collectivization was forcible, and departure all but impossible. Decision making (notably election of the chair) was to be conducted through participation of the collective farm members. Participants (peasants) were to be rewarded with a residual share of net income rather than a contractual wage. In practice, the collective farm differed significantly from these principles. The dominant framework for decision making was a party-approved chair, and discussion in collective farm meetings was perfunctory. Party control was sustained by the local party organization through the nomenklatura (appointment) system and also through the discipline of the Machine Tractors Stations (MTS). Payment to peasants on the collective farm was made according to the labor day unit (tru-doden), which was divided into the residual after the state extracted compulsory deliveries of product at low fixed prices. As collective farm members were not entitled to internal passports, their geographical mobility was limited. Unlike the sovkhoz, the kolkhoz was not a budget-financed organization. Accordingly, the state exercised significant power over living levels in the countryside by requiring compulsory deliveries of product. Peasants on collective farms were entitled to hold a limited number of animals and cultivate a small plot of land.
By the early 1940s there were roughly 235,000 collective farms in existence averaging 3,500 acres
COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE
per farm, accounting for some 80 percent of total sown area in agriculture. After World War II a program of amalgamation and also of conversion to state farms was implemented along with a continuing program of agroindustrial integration. As a result, the number of collective farms declined to approximately 27,000 by 1988, with an average size of 22,000 acres, together accounting for 44 percent of sown area. By the end of the 1980s, the differences between kolkhozes and sovkhozes were minimal.
During the transition era of the 1990s, change in Russian agriculture has been very slow. Collective farms have for the most part been converted to a corporate structure, but operational changes have been few, and a significant land market remains to be achieved. See also: AGRICULTURE; COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE; PEASANT ECONOMY; SOVKHOZ
Davies, R. W. (1980). The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929-1930. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Stuart, R. C. (1972). The Collective Farm in Soviet Agriculture. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
ROBERT C. STUART
contracts. Although the state moved away from the pervasive application of the principle of collective responsibility in the eighteenth century, it was still used in certain situations such as military conscription and collection of delinquent taxes. Even after the Great Reforms, local police officials retained the right to hold large peasant communes collectively responsible for major tax arrears as a measure of last resort. Although theoretically state officials could inventory and sell individual holdings to cover communal arrears, in practice this occurred infrequently. In Soviet legal procedures collectives could be called upon to monitor and vouch for their members, and individuals accused of committing minor legal infractions could be handed over to a collective for corrective measures as an alternative to incarceration. See also: GREAT REFORMS
Dewey, Horace W., and Kleimola, Ann M. (1970). “Suretyship and Collective Responsibility in Pre-Petrine Russia.” Jahrb?cher f?r Geschichte Osteuropas 18: 337-354.
BRIAN BOECK
Collective or mutual responsibility (krugovaia poruka), often reinforced through legal guarantees or surety bonds.
It is first documented in the medieval period in an expanded version of the Russkaya Pravda that mandated that certain communities would be collectively responsible for apprehending murderers or paying fines to the prince. In the Muscovite period collective responsibility was frequently invoked to make communities collectively responsible for the actions and financial obligations of their members. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, state officials shifted much of the responsibility for apprehending criminals and preempting misdeeds to groups that could monitor and discipline their members. Surety in the form of financial and legal accountability was frequently demanded by the state from groups to insure that their individual members would not shirk legal obligations or responsibilities such as appearing in court, performing services for the state, or meeting the terms of
COLLECTIVIZATION OF AGRICULTURE
The introduction of the collective farm (kolkhoz) into the Soviet countryside began in the late 1920s and was substantially completed by the mid-1930s. The collectivization of Soviet agriculture, along with the introduction of state ownership (nationalization) and national economic planning (replacing markets as a mechanism of resource allocation), formed the dominant framework of the Soviet economic system, a set of institutions and related policies that remained in place until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Lenin attempted to introduce change in the Soviet agricultural sector, and especially to exert state control, through methods such as the extraction of grain from the rural economy by force (the pro-drazverstka). This was the first attempt under Soviet rule to change both the institutional arrangements governing interaction between the agrarian and industrial sectors (the market) and the terms of trade between the state and the rural economy. The impact of these arrangements resulted in a significant
COLONIAL EXPANSION
decline in agricultural output during the period of war communism.
Following the collapse of war communism, the peasant economy predominated during the New Economic Policy (NEP). The relationship between the rural economy and the urban industrial economy was characterized by alliance (smytchka), although the issue of the rural economy and its role in socialist industrialization remained controversial. Events such as the Scissors Crisis brought these issues to the fore. In addition, the potential contribution of agriculture to the process of economic development was a major issue in the great industrialization debate.
In 1929 Josef Stalin initiated the process of collectivization, arguing that a “grain crisis” (peasant withholding of grain) could effectively limit the pace of Soviet industrialization. Collectivization was intended to introduce socialist organizational arrangements into the countryside, and to change fundamentally the nature of the relationship between the rural and urban (industrial) sectors of the Soviet economy. Markets were to be eliminated, and state control was to prevail.
The organizational arrangements in the countryside were fundamentally changed, the relations between the state and the rural economy were altered, and the socialist ideology served as the framework for the decision to collectivize. The process and outcome of collectivization remain controversial to the present time.
Why has collectivization been so controversial? First, the process of collectivization was forcible and violent, resulting in substantial destruction of physical capital (e.g., animal herds) and the reduction of peasant morale, as peasants resisted the state-driven creation of collective farms. Second, the kolkhoz as an organization incorporated socialist elements into the rural economy. It was also viewed as a mechanism through which state and party power could be used to change the terms of trade in favor of the city, to eliminate markets, and, specifically, to extract grain from the countryside on terms favorable to the state. The collective farm was, in theory, a cooperative form of organization through which the state could extract grain, leaving a residual for peasant consumption. The mechanism of payment for labor, the labor day (trudoden), facilitated this process. Third, peasant resistance to the creation of the collective farms was cast largely within an ideological framework. Thus resistance to collectivization, in whatever form, was blamed largely upon the wealthy peasants (kulaks). Fourth, the institutions and policies resulting from the collectivization process, even with significant modifications over time, have been blamed for the poor record of agricultural performance in the Soviet Union. In addition to the costs associated with the initial means of implementation, the collective farms lacked sufficient means of finance and were unable to provide
