Culture and Identity in Muscovy: 1359-1584, eds. A. M. Kleimola and G. D. Lenhoff. Moscow: ITZ-Garant. Ebbinghaus, Andreas. (1997). “Reception and Ideology in the Literature of Muscovite Rus.” In Culture and Identity in Muscovy: 1359-1584, eds. A. M. Kleimola and G. D. Lenhoff. Moscow: ITZ-Garant. Fennell, John. (1995). A History of the Russian Church to 1448. New York: Longman. Hollingsworth, Paul, tr. and ed. (1992). The Hagiography of Kievan Rus’. Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature II. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lenhoff, Gail D. (1997). Early Russian Hagiography: The Lives of Prince Fedor the Black (Slavistiche Ver?f- fentlichungen 82). Berlin-Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Prestel, David K. (1992). “Biblical Typology in the Kievan Caves Patericon.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Religions
in Russia and the Soviet Union 4:97-102. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.
GAIL LENHOFF
Tsar Nicholas II summoned peace conferences at The Hague in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907. His gestures appealed to pacifist sentiments in the West, but his primary motives were quite pragmatic. He hoped the 1899 conference would ban the rapid-fire artillery being developed by Austria-Hungary, Russia’s rival in the Balkans. Russia could neither develop nor purchase such weapons except at great expense. Finance Minister Serge Witte urged that such money be spent instead on modernizing Russia’s economy. Having called the conference, the Imperial government found itself tied in knots. Its war minister warned that Russia would need more and better arms to achieve its goals in the Far East against Japan and in the Black Sea region against Ottoman Turkey. Russia’s major ally, France, objected to any limitations because it sought new arms to cope with Germany. Before the conference even opened, St. Petersburg assured Paris that no disarmament measures would be adopted.
The 1899 Hague Conference did not limit arms, but it did refine the laws of war, including the rights of neutrals. It also established an international panel of arbiters available to hear cases put before it by disputing nations.
A second Hague conference was planned five years after the first, but did not convene then because Russia was fighting Japan. Nicholas did summon the meeting in 1907, after Russia began to recover from its defeat by Japan and from its own 1905 revolution. It was during the 1905 upheaval that Vladimir Ilich Lenin first articulated his view on disarmament. The revolutionary task, he said, is not to talk about disarmament (razoruzhenie) but to disarm (obezoruzhit’) the ruling classes.
The Russian delegation in 1907 proposed less sweeping limits on armaments than in 1899. However, when some governments proposed a five-year ban on dirigibles, Russia called for a permanent ban. Nothing came of these proposals, and the second Hague conference managed only to add to refinements to the laws of war. See also: LENIN, VLADIMIR ILICH; NICHOLAS II
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Clemens, Walter C., Jr. “Nicholas II to SALT II: Change and Continuity in East-West Diplomacy.” International Affairs 3 (July 1973):385-401. Rosenne, Shabtai, comp. (2001). The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration: Reports and Documents. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser. Van den Dungen, Peter. (1983) The Making of Peace: Jean de Bloch and the First Hague Peace Conference. Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University.
The Hanseatic League was an association of north European towns that dominated trade from London in the west to Flanders, Scandinavia, Germanic Baltic towns, and Novgorod in the east. There is no precise date for the beginning of the Hansa, but during the twelfth century German merchants established a commercial center at Visby on the island of Gotland, and by the early thirteenth century founded Riga, Reval (Tallinn), Danzig (Gdansk), and Dorpat (Tartu).
German and Scandinavian merchants established the Gothic Yard (Gotsky dvor) and the Church of St. Olaf on Novgorod’s Trading Side. Toward the end of the twelfth century, L?beck built the German Yard (Nemestsky dvor, or Peterhof for the Church of St. Peter) near the Gothic Yard. At the same time Novgorodian merchants frequented Visby, Sweden, Denmark, and L?beck.
During the thirteenth century L?beck gradually replaced Visby as the commercial center of the League, and during the fourteenth century the Gothic Yard became attached to Peterhof. In 1265 the north German towns accepted the “law of L?beck” and agreed for the common defense of the towns. The League’s primary concern was to ensure open sea-lanes and the safety of its ships from piracy. In addition to Novgorod, the League founded counters or factories in Bruges, London, and Bergen. At its height between the 1350s and 1370s, the League consisted of seventy or more towns; perhaps thirty additional towns were loosely associated with the Hansa. The cities met irregularly in a diet (or Hansetage) but never developed a central political body or common navy. The League could threaten to exclude recalcitrant towns from its trade.
HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
A Novgorod-Hansa agreement of 1269 laid the basic structure of commercial relations. German and Scandinavian merchants from L?beck, Reval, Riga, and Dorpat traveled twice per year, in summer and winter, to Novgorod. German merchants were under their own jurisdiction within Peterhof, but disputes involving Novgorodians fell to a joint court that included the mayor and chiliarch (military commander). During the thirteenth century the German Yard elected its own aldermen, but during the fourteenth century L?beck and Visby chose the aldermen. During the fifteenth century the Livonian towns selected a permanent official who resided in Novgorod.
Novgorod supplied the Hansa with furs, wax, and honey, and received silver ingots (the source of much of medieval Rus’s silver), as well as Flemish cloth, salt, herring, other manufactured goods, and occasionally grain. In 1369 the League imposed duties on its silver exports to Novgorod; in 1373 it halted silver exports for two years, and in 1388 for four years. Novgorod turned to the Teutonic Order for silver, but exports stopped after 1427. During the 1440s war broke out between Novgorod and the Teutonic Order and the League, closing the German Yard from 1443 to 1448.
Novgorod’s fur trade declined in the second half of the fifteenth century. After conquering Novgorod in 1478, Moscow closed the German Yard in 1494. The Yard reopened in 1514, but Moscow developed alternative trading routes through Ivangorod, Pskov, Narva, Dorpat, and Smolensk. During the sixteenth century Dutch and English traders further undermined the League’s commercial monopolies. In 1555 the English obtained duty-free privileges to trade manufactured goods for Russian furs. See also: FOREIGN TRADE; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; NOVGOROD THE GREAT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dollinger, Philippe. (1970). The German Hansa, tr. D. S. Ault. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. the sales of their product or from other financial sources. In the short term, firms facing hard budget constraints may borrow to cover their operating costs. In the long term, however, if firms cannot cover their costs from their revenues, they fail, which means they must declare that the company is bankrupt or they must sell their assets to another firm. Hard budget constraints coincide with a situation where government authorities do not bail out or subsidize poorly performing or loss-making firms.
Soviet industrial enterprises did not face hard budget constraints. Unlike their counterparts in market economies, Soviet firms’ primary objective was to produce output, not to make a profit. In many respects, planners controlled the financial performance of firms, because planners set the prices of labor, energy, and other material inputs used by the firm and also set the prices on products sold by the firm. Centrally determined prices in the Soviet economy did not facilitate an accurate calculation of costs, because they were not based on considerations of scarcity or efficient resource utilization. Nor did prices reflect demand conditions. Consequently, Soviet firms were not able to accurately calculate their financial condition in terms that would be appropriate in a market economy. More importantly, however, Soviet planners rewarded the fulfillment of output targets with large monetary bonuses and continually pressured Soviet industrial enterprises to produce more. With quantity targets given highest priority, managers of Soviet firms were not concerned with costs, nor were they faced with bankruptcy if they engaged in
