an important foundation for the relatively smooth emergence of independent national states after the breakup of the USSR in 1991. Of course, it should be noted that the federal structure of the Soviet State had a centrally organized Communist Party opposite it, which, together with the state security organs, was always in a position to limit national autonomy, or, if the party required it, even to eliminate it
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entirely. Thus, in the time after 1935, the blossoming of the nationalities was purely a propaganda backdrop, in front of which the Father of Nations (that is, Stalin) staged his increasingly Great Russia-oriented policy. See also: KOMI; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; SAKHA AND YAKUTS; TURKMENISTAN AND TURKMEN; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS vised version, which, although severely criticized by the Old Believers, remained the official code. The Holy Synod reprinted Nikon’s version in 1787 and reissued it in 1804, 1810, 1816, and 1834. In 1889 Patriarch Joseph’s Kormchaya was reprinted and used by a sect of Old Believers. It was reprinted again in St. Petersburg in 1912 and 1913. See also: NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS; PATRIARCHY; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
Martin, Terry. (2001). The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923- 1939. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Simon, Gerhard. (1991). Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Smith, Jeremy. (1999). The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-1923. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
ROBERT MAIER
The Kormchaya Kniga, also known as the Navigator’s Chart (Map) or The Pilot’s Book, is the Slavic version of the Greek laws known as the Nomocanon. The first Slavic translation of the Greek Nomocanon was probably made by St. Methodius in the second half of the ninth century. It included the canons found in the “Syntagma of Fifty Titles” and the first Slavic manual of laws called the “Court Law of the People” (Zakon sudny lyudem). The Ko- rmchaya usually contained information such as Apostolic canons, decrees of the first four Ecumenical Councils, resolutions of local synods, instructions of the Church Fathers, and imperial edicts on church issues. It became the guide for ecclesiastical courts and church affairs in Rus. Before the seventeenth century, no single copy of the Ko- rmchaya served as the official code of the Russian Church. A copy assumed local authority when a bishop made it the law of his eparchy. Consequently, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the diversity of materials in the many existing copies created confusion. Around 1649 Patriarch Joseph, concerned by this ambiguity, arranged for a correct version of church laws to be published. In 1650, the first printed Kormchaya appeared, but three years later Patriarch Nikon published a reBIBLIOGRAPHY Dewey, H. W., and Kleimola, Ann M., tr. (1977). “Za-kon sudnyi liudem.” Michigan Slavic Studies 14. Zuzek, Ivan. (1964). Kormcaja kniga: Studies on the Chief Code of Russian Canon Law. Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum.
MARTIN DIMNIK
Old Russian term that describes a specific system of remunerating state officials.
Loosely translated as “feeding,” Kormlenieu meant that princes awarded their servitors lands from which tribute could be extracted. Part of what was taken would be passed on to the prince, and the remainder would be kept.
In a situation of general poverty, where there was insufficient money to pay for needed troops, it may have seemed rational to offer kormlenie, but as that system came to form the basis for financing an emerging state bureaucracy, its serious drawbacks became apparent.
One problem was the lack of effective controls over how much was extracted; another, that the subjects would be drawn into complex patterns of personalized relations, where all distinctions between public and private were eroded. Above all, kormlenieu constituted a serious obstacle to the introduction of a money economy.
Under Tsar Peter the Great an attempt was made to replace kormleniei by the payment of wages, but under his successors persistent shortages of money caused a reversal to the old policies of allowing officials to live off the land.
Even in the Soviet era, one might well interpret the positions of local party bosses as similar to those of the holders of old kormlenie, who were alKORNILOV AFFAIR lowed to help themselves to whatever they felt that their fiefdoms could offer. See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Pipes, Richard. (1974). Russia Under the Old Regime. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Following the democratic revolution in Hungary, Kornai argued for fiscal restraint, particularly in the payment of pensions, so that Hungary could invest more for growth. See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET
KORMOVYE KNIGI See FEAST BOOKS.
(b. 1928), economist.
Janos Kornai was educated in Budapest and became professor of economics in the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1967 and at Harvard University in 1986.
In Overcentralization in Economic Administration (1957) Kornai was one of the first in the Soviet bloc to show the defects of central planning and argue for more decentralization and use of financial and market methods in guiding the socialist economy. His Mathematical Planning of Structural Decisions (1967; second edition 1975) developed the idea of two-level planning.
Kornai attempted to apply organizational and information theory, as well as management science, to analyze the advanced socialist economy in his Anti-Equilibrium (1971). He employed non-equilibrium concepts to replace the Walrasian market-clearing of standard neoclassical theory. Along these lines, his Economics of Shortage (2 vols., 1980) pictured an economy, like Hungary’s or Soviet Russia’s, with chronic excess demand and limited price flexibility. Supply would be allocated to meet excess demand by nonprice, quantitative methods. Tautness would show up as queues for consumer goods, indicating inefficiency and underutilization of resources.
During this period, Kornai developed his famous concept of the “soft budget constraint.” Socialized enterprises were not required to cover costs, as ad hoc subsidies and credits would invariably be made available by state institutions so that the firm would not have to close. Loss-making enterprises were a cause of excess demand in the economy.
KORNILOV AFFAIR
The Kornilov Affair was the main counterrevolutionary episode of the Russian Revolution of February 1917. It grew out the general political and socioeconomic crises of the summer, including the failure of the military offensive, government instability, economic disintegration, and, in particular, the emergence in July and August of a more assertive political right demanding a “restoration of order.” Attention increasingly centered on General Lavr Kornilov, who emerged as the potential Napoleon of the Russian Revolution.
After the summer 1917 offensive failed, Ko-rnilov vigorously advocated using harsh measures to restore discipline in the army. This drew the attention of a wide range of people interested in restoration of order, mostly conservatives and liberals but also some socialists, who found him more acceptable than most generals (he had a reputation for being more “democratic” because of his modest background and good relations with his troops). They pressured Alexander Kerensky, now head of government, to appoint Kornilov supreme commander-in-chief of the army, which Kerensky did on July 31. The problems that lay ahead were signaled by Kornilov’s remarkable acceptance conditions, especially that he would be “responsible only to [his] own conscience and to the whole people,” and his insistence on a free hand to restore military discipline. Kerensky did not really trust Kornilov, but hoped to use him both to appease the right and to counterbalance the left. Kornilov in turn disdained the Petrograd
