incorporated in the USSR. Estonia and Latvia were forced to sign mutual assistance treaties with the USSR and to accept the establishment of Soviet military bases in September and October of 1939. Finnish resistance to Soviet proposals to improve the security of Leningrad through a mutual assistance treaty led to the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940). Lithuania was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influence in a supplementary agreement signed on September 28, 1939, and signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the USSR in October. Romania ceded Bessarabia following a Soviet ultimatum in June 1940. It is often argued that, in signing the treaty, Stalin, who always believed that Hitler would attack the USSR for lebensraum, was seeking time to prepare the Soviet Union for war, and hoped for a considerably longer period than he received, for Germany invaded during June of 1941. Considerable efforts were made to maintain friendly relations with Germany between 1939 and 1941, including a November 1940 visit by Molotov to Berlin for talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop.
The Secret Protocol undermined the socialist foundations of Soviet foreign policy. It called for the USSR to embark upon territorial expansion, even if this was to meet the threat to its security presented by Germany’s conquest of Poland. This may explain why, for a long period, the Secret Protocol was known only from the German copy of the document: The Soviet Union denied its existence, a position that Molotov maintained until his
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death in 1986. The Soviet originals were published for the first time in 1993.
In all Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, during August 1987, during the glastnost era, demonstrations on the anniversary of the pact were evidence of resurgent nationalism. In early 1990 the states declared their independence, the first real challenge to the continued existence of the USSR. See also: GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; MOLOTOV, VY-ACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH; WORLD WAR II
Read, Anthony, and Fisher, David. (1988) The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939 -1941. New York: Norton. Roberts, Geoffrey. (1989) The Unholy Alliance: Stalin’s Pact with Hitler. London: I.B. Tauris.
The term near abroad is used by the Russian Federation to refer to the fourteen Soviet successor states other than Russia. During the Yeltsin era Russia had to cope with the collapse of Communism and the transition to a market economy, and the end of the Cold War and the loss of superpower status. This caused a national identity crisis that engendered key shifts in Russian foreign policy toward what it designates the near abroad. (The fourteen republics do not call themselves “near abroad.”) Should Russia assert itself as the dominant power throughout the territories of the ex-USSR in its desire to protect Russians living abroad? Or alternatively, now that the Cold War was over, should Russia adopt a position enabling reduced prospects of nuclear war and the possibility of the expansion of NATO to include the near abroad countries? This uncertainty, compounded by widespread economic, social, and political instability, affected Russian objectives toward the near abroad. Three different approaches emerged. First, the in-tegrationalists and reformers (such as Andrei Kozyrev) argued that Russia’s expansionist days were over and that it must therefore identify more closely with the West, promote Russia’s integration into world economy, and ensure that the European security system includes Russia. This means taking a soft, noninterventionist stance on the near abroad. Second, Centrists and Eurasianists (including Victor Chernomyrdin and Yevgeny Primakov) stressed the need to take into account Russia’s history, culture, and geography and to ensure that Russia’s national interest is protected. They sought to gain access to the military resources of the successor states, seal unprotected borders, and contain external threats, namely Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. For these reasons Centrists and Eurasianists wanted to forge links or build bridges between Russia and Asia (namely Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and China). Finally, the traditionalists and nationalists (such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov) are anti-Western and pro-Russian/Slavophile. They advocate a neo-imperialist Russian policy that seeks to restore the old USSR (Zyuganov) or at least build stronger links between Russia and other Slavic nations (Zhirinovsky). Such politicians have frequently made reference to alleged abuses of the rights of ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking populations in near abroad countries to justify such a stance.
Throughout the 1990s, reactions to key issues relating to the near abroad varied considerably. Thus nationalists tended to oppose NATO enlargement, criticize Western policy toward the Balkans and Iraq, and be concerned about the fate of Russians abroad, whereas liberals favored growing Western involvement in the ex- USSR and a moderate stance on the near abroad. Russians in general were concerned about the nuclear weapons left in successor states (i.e., Ukraine), with the role of ex-USSR armed forces, and with the possibility that conflicts in successor states (including Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan) may spread to Russia. Despite the West’s initial fears and Russian criticism of NATO’s Eastern enlargement, it still went ahead, because Yeltsin preferred to mend fences with Ukraine and improve relations with China and Japan. Also some of his government colleagues (e.g., Primakov) preferred closer relations with Belarus, while others such as Anatoly Chubais wanted closer relations with the West (via IMF, etc.). Furthermore, Yeltsin wanted to retain Western support for Russia’s drive toward market and liberal democracy, so he was willing to sacrifice old “spheres of influence” and adopt a less aggressive stance on the near abroad. Yeltsin realized that Russia, weakened by the loss of its superpower status, was no longer able to police the ex-USSR. As a consequence, Yeltsin largely ignored the near abroad in favor of alliances with other powers resentful of American supremacy (e.g., China, India). Through1031
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out the 1990s, Yeltsin pursued a Gorbachev-style policy concerning the West and continued to cut ties with the East while maintaining a watchful eye over the near abroad, a new area of concern, given the presence of up to 30 million ethnic Russians in these countries. Wherever possible Yeltsin sought to maximize Russian influence over the other former Soviet republics. Vladimir Putin has continued to walk the tightrope between assertiveness and integration, taking into account the nature of the new world order of the twenty-first century. See also: CHERNOMYRDIN, VIKTOR STEPANOVICH; KOZYREV, ANDREI VLADIMIROVICH; PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAX- IMOVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH
Kolsto, Pal. (1995). Russians in the Former Soviet Republics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Trofimenko, Henry. (1999). Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia. Aldershot, UK: Ash-gate. Williams, Christopher. (2000). “The New Russia: From Cold War Strength to Post-Communist Weakness and Beyond.” In New Europe in Transition, ed. Peter J. Anderson, Georg Wiessala, and Christopher Williams. London: Continuum. Williams, Christopher, and Sfikas, Thanasis D. (1999). Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS, and the Baltic States. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS
(1847-1882), Russian revolutionary terrorist.
Sergei Nechayev epitomizes the notion of using any means, however ruthless, to further revolution. He is perhaps best known for his coau-thorship of what is commonly known as the Catechism of a Revolutionary (1869). From its initial sentence, “The revolutionary is a doomed man,” to its twenty-sixth clause, calling for an “invincible, all-shattering force” for revolution, the Catechism has inspired generations of revolutionary terrorists. A public reading of the brief tract and the investigation of the murder of a member of his own organization at the trial of his followers in 1871 gave Nechayev instant notoriety. The notion that the end justified any means repelled most Russian revolutionaries, but others, then and later, admired Nechayev’s total commitment to revolution. One of his admirers was Vladimir Lenin. Fyodor Dos-toyevsky demonized Nechayev in the guise of Peter Verkhovensky in The Possessed (1873), but Rodion Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment (1866) has more psychological features in common with the real person.
Born in Ivanovo, a Russian textile center, the gifted Nechayev had little hope of realizing his ambitions there. In 1866 he moved to St. Petersburg, where he obtained a teaching certificate. He quickly involved himself in the lively student movement in the city’s institutions of higher education, and he joined radical circles. The regime’s policies had driven the most committed revolutionaries underground, where they formed conspiracies to assassinate Alexander II and to incite the peasants to revolt. In 1868 and 1869 Nechayev began to show his ruth-lessness in his
