emy was presented in a glowing light with no place for a critical analysis of the underlying philosophy and internal organization of this gigantic institution. In 1991, with the dismemberment of the Soviet union, the name of the Russian Academy of Sciences was again made official. The new Academy brought an end to the monopoly of a single philosophy of science. See also: CENSORSHIP; COMMUNIST ACADEMY; SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY; UNIVERSITIES
Graham, Loren R. (1967). The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vucinich, Alexander. (1984). Empire of Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press. Vucinich, Alexander. (1963-1970). Science in Russian Culture. 2 vols. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
The Administration for Organized Recruitment (Russian acronym, Orgnabor) was a labor recruitment agency that existed in the USSR from 1931. Its essential feature was that the recruiting organization, not the potential employee, initiated the recruitment process. In the 1930s it was mainly concerned with the recruitment of peasants for seasonal and permanent work in nonagricultural jobs.
During the New Economic Policy (NEP) the USSR had high unemployment, and relied on labor exchanges to bring supply and demand for labor into balance. It also had substantial numbers of peasants migrating to the towns in search of work, and substantial numbers of these peasants found seasonal employment away from their villages. With the abolition of unemployment in 1930, it was thought that there would be no further need for market economy instruments such as labor exchanges.
Given the huge demand for labor in industry and construction, and the collectivization of agriculture, it nonetheless became necessary to establish a procedure for recruiting peasants from collective farms. Hence the creation, in 1931, of a new type of recruitment for the rapidly growing construction and industrial sectors: organized recruitment. In this new system, state-owned enterprises or administrative organizations such as the People’s Commissariats recruited a number of workers for regular or seasonal work by entering into an agreement with a collective farm, group of collective farms, or rural area.
The Administration for Organized Recruitment offered a planned, socialist mechanism for placing workers where they were most needed, and was intended to replace the traditional practice of recruitment from among those peasants who happened to turn up at the factory gate. In many cases the new recruits were promised much better employment conditions than actually existed, which was one of the reasons for the high rate at which the newly recruited workers left their jobs.
According to official statistics, 3.6 million people were recruited by Orgnabor in 1932, an average of 2.6 million per year between 1933 and 1937, 1.7 million in 1938, and 2.2 million in 1939. For many of the peasants concerned, the process was essentially an economic conscription. After 1946 the role of organized recruitment declined. In this later period, organized recruitment often concerned urban workers recruited for coal mining, construction, and as lumberjacks. In 1946 organized recruitment recruited 2.2 million people (mainly to coal mining, textiles, industrial and military construction, and forestry). Between 1947 and 1950, an average of about 0.6 million people were recruited per year, mainly to industrial and military construction, coal mining, and forestry. Organized recruitment remained at about 0.6 million per year between 1951 and 1955, but fell to only 0.1 million per year between 1966 and 1970.
The administrative framework for organized recruitment varied. In the 1930s there were commissions for organized recruitment, but between 1953 and 1956, republican administrations (in the RSFSR and Ukraine chief administrations) for organized recruitment. In the late Soviet period organized recruitment was mainly administered by regional or local authorities. The program of organized recruitment experienced numerous problems, however, and was never the predominant form of labor recruitment in the USSR. Decisions by individual workers as to where they wanted to work were always more important. See also: COLLECTIVE FARM; LABOR; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; SOVNARKOM
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Barber, John. (1986). “The Development of Soviet Employment and Labour Policy, 1930-1941.” In Labour and Employment in the USSR, ed. David Lane. Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf. Filtzer, Donald. (2002). Soviet Workers and Late Stalinism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Dyker, David. (1981). “Planning and the Worker.” In The Soviet Worker, ed. Leonard Shapiro and Joseph Godson. London: Macmillan. Stalin, Joseph. (1955). “New Conditions-New Tasks in Economic Construction.” In Works, Vol. 13. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.
The term militiary administration was used to identify both the techniques and system of state agencies involved in the management of the armed forces.
Russian writers long distinguished between the agencies for military command and those for administration (management), and Soviet theorists added a distinction between those providing leadership of the armed forces as such, and those for overall leadership of the country’s defense. Whereas the latter involves participation by the political leadership in decision making, the former deal with the military professionals’ implementing of the resulting policies. And if the lines between command and management, and between the two types of leadership, sometimes blur in modern conditions, this was commonplace in the premodern periods of Russia’s history.
The Kievan Rus druzhina-the warband surrounding a prince-provided an ad hoc administration to the ruler, a core around which a militia of commoners rallied and, in battle, the professional commanders for the commoners. When Rus splintered into local “appanages” in the late 1000s, the druzhina’s primitive administrative functions were absorbed by the puty (offices) of a princeling’s dvor, or “court,” while selected boyars, the descendants of the warband members, joined him in his duma (council) in peacetime and helped provide military leadership in wartime. Thus all command and military administrative functions remained concentrated in the ruler’s person, with no distinction between them or, indeed, between the civil and military spheres of state life. This system served Moscow’s grand dukes during the Mongol period. But as their realm expanded and became increasingly centralized, a reorganization was clearly necessary, especially after Ivan III (1462-1505) began creating an army based on a mounted dvoryane (gentry) militia, whose members served in return for pomestie land grants (or fiefs). The state’s more complex administrative needs were met by the creation of prikazy (chancheries), headed by civil servant dyaki (state secretaries). Of the prikazy, the Razryad most closely approximated a war ministry, but a host of others had specialized military (e.g., armaments, fortifications) or mixed civil-military (e.g., medical, communications) functions. The boyar aristocracy continued to advise their increasingly autocratic masters in the duma and to provide commanders for his armies or “hosts.” But the mestnichestvo (system of places), which aimed at preserving the social status of the boyar clans, also dictated assignment to military posts. Consequently, while Muscovite military administration initially gained in efficiency, wartime appointments to field armies often reflected social rather than military prowess. This problem finally was resolved by the destruction of the boyars’ genealogical records in 1682. Yet by that time the piecemeal reforms introduced by Romanov rulers after 1613 had brought the continuous creation of new, specialized prikazy that left the expanded but fragmented administrative system badly in need of modernization and another radical overhaul.
This was provided by Peter I (r. 1689-1725), who founded both the modern Russian Empire and the Imperial Army. He created a European-style regular or standing army (and navy), based on conscription, to fight Sweden (1700-1721). “Leadership of defense” remained concentrated in the ruler and a series of military-court agencies, but in 1718 Peter assigned “leadership the armed forces” to a ramified central administration headed by the Military and Admiralty Colleges, each headed by a president and board, with provincial governors overseeing the local agencies. Despite bureaucratic inefficiency and constant modification, this system remained in place until Alexander I (r. 1801-1825) replaced it with more streamlined ministries, headed by ministers, in 1802. Those for the army and navy now led the armed forces The two ministers helped lead defense as members of a Council of Ministers, which worked with the State Council and other military-court bodies in peacetime, while an Imperial General Headquarters (Stavka) directed the armies in wartime. This system again
