World Trade Center in New York occurred on September 11, 2001, he was the first foreign leader to call President Bush and express his condolences. He also stood by the United States during the subsequent war in Afghanistan. Most surprising, however, was his ability to remain a close friend and ally of the United States even though he opposed the American invasion of Iraq. In contrast to the Washington- Paris relationship, Washington and Moscow remained close allies despite their differences over Iraq.
Putin also demonstrated that he knew how to make use of events. For example, he used the September 11 attacks to force Russia’s anti-American general staff to change its approach to dealing with the United States. On September 24, 2001, just prior to his visit to the United States, he met with the country’s generals and admirals, and made it clear that cooperation was the order of the day. The military quickly fell into line and cooperation between the two sides was as close as it had ever been.
Many observers wondered whether Putin’s partial but determined approach would provide the political, military, social, and economic stability Russia needed to reenter the ranks of the world’s major powers. When his presidency began, Putin was unknown, and few believed he could do anything other than be a KGB thug. Within a short time, without taking the repressive actions that many expected, he had begun to reestablish the Russian state and to restore its status as an important player in the international arena. The economy had begun to turn around, even if it continued to be too heavily based on oil. See also: SOBCHAK, ANATOLY ALEXANDROVICH; STATE SECURITY, ORGANS OF; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Herspring, Dale R., ed. (2003). Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain. Boulder, CO: Rowman amp; Littlefield. Putin, Vladimir. (2000). First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait of Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, tr. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. New York: Public Affairs. Shevtsova, Lilia. (2003). Putin’s Russia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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(1890-1937), a leading Bolshevik in Ukraine who opposed Vladimir Lenin’s policy on a nation’s right to self- determination.
An extraordinary economic administrator, Georgy Pytatakov held numerous important political positions including deputy chairman of Gos-plan (1922); deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) (1923); chairman of the State Bank (1929); deputy chairman of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry (1930); and member of the Supreme Economic Council (1930).
In the 1920s Pytatkov allied with Leon Trotsky and ultimately became a leading figure in the Left Opposition (the so-called Trotskyite opposition). From 1922 to 1926 Pytatakov advocated rapid industrialization and supported Yevgeny Pre-obrazhensky’s theory of “primitive socialist accumulation.” In a public bid for rank-and-file support for the Left’s position, Pytatakov took part in a demonstration at a Moscow factory Party meeting in 1926. He was subsequently removed from his position at VSNKh for being an oppositionist and sent abroad. The following year he was expelled from the Party.
In 1928 Pytatkov recanted his position and applied for readmission into the Party. It was granted the following year, along with an appointment to head the State Bank. Beginning in 1929 he published articles hailing Josef Stalin’s genius and condemning oppositionists. However, this could not erase the stigma of his association with the Left Opposition. In 1936 he was arrested as a Trotskyite and, along with Karl Radek, was a central figure in the second Moscow Show Trial in 1937. Under torture and drugs, he confessed, was found guilty, and shot immediately after the trial. See also: LEFT OPPOSITION; TROTSKY, LEON DAVIDOVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Conquest, Robert. (1990). The Great Terror: A Reassessment. New York: Oxford University Press. Khlevniuk, Oleg. (1995). In Stalin’s Shadow: The Career of “Sergo” Ordzhonikidze. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
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The Quadruple Alliance was signed in November 1815 by Russia, Britain, Austria, and Prussia, following the long series of wars that began in the aftermath of the French Revolution and concluded with the defeat of Napoleon. It was essentially a continuation of the Treaty of Chaumont of 1814, in which the four powers vowed to defeat France and remain allied for twenty years to keep France in check. At the time Russia was the preeminent military power in Europe. From 1813 to 1814, Europeans had watched with a mixture of amazement and horror as Russian soldiers drove Napoleon’s Grand Army out of their country and, joined by Prussia, Britain, and finally Austria, all the way to Paris. Britain ruled the seas, but no army rivaled Russia’s, and fear of this new power was keen in Austria and Britain until its disastrous defeat in the Crimean War.
The individual most responsible for the complete destruction of Napoleon’s power was Emperor Alexander I (r. 1801-1825). The other continental powers had been willing to negotiate a settlement with Napoleon, but Alexander had insisted on total victory. Since at least 1805 he had been convinced that only Russia and Britain had the resources to vanquish Napoleon and reestablish order in Europe based on a new treaty system.
With the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the victorious powers faced two related problems: how to contain France, and how to prevent revolution. In November, the British foreign secretary, Viscount Castlereagh, proposed a continuation of the alliance system, bolstered by a system of great-power congresses to deal with crises as they arose. Alexander’s vague response was a “Holy Alliance” of Christian monarchs who would treat one another with Christian brotherhood and charity. This proposal had no practical effect.
Castlereagh had his way, and in the Quadruple Alliance the victorious powers pledged to maintain the political system established at the Congress of Vienna for the next twenty years, by force if necessary, and to meet periodically to consult on the maintenance of order and stability. The foreign secretary declared that Britain would never intervene militarily in the internal affairs of another state. When Alexander pressed him to promise support for the restored Bourbon monarchy in France,
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Castlereagh refused. This did much to fuel Alexander’s suspicions of British policy.
As Alexander’s anti-British feelings grew, he came to regard France in a more favorable light. Prodded by his advisers, particularly Corfiote Capodistrias, he concluded that if France were admitted into the Quadruple Alliance, it could become a counterweight to Britain and, to a lesser extent, Austria, especially if Prussia continued to follow Russia’s diplomatic lead.
The result was the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Ostensibly convened to end the military occupation of France, it really had the goal of restoring France into the great-power system. Its outcome was twofold: France joined the alliance, which became the Quintuple Alliance, but the Quadruple Alliance was reconfirmed because the victors, despite their mutual distrust, were still fearful of a resurgent France. Over the next few decades, however, fear of Russian power and expansionism would seize all the great powers except Prussia, until they united to defeat Russia in the Crimean War. See also: CRIMEAN WAR; HOLY ALLIANCE; NAPOLEON I; VIENNA, CONGRESS OF
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Albrecht-Carrie, Rene. (1958). A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna. New York: Harper. Bridge, F.R., and Bullen, Roger. (1980). The Great Powers and the European States System: 1815-1914. New York: Longman. Jelavich, Barbara. (1974). St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy: 1814 -1974. Bloom-ington: Indiana University Press.
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