persuaded Grig-ory to become a strannik (wanderer, religious pilgrim). Rasputin also met the khlysty (flagellants, Pentecostalists); though not a member (as often charged), he embraced some of their ideas.
Rasputin’s captivating personality, his eyes, and a memory for biblical passages made him a local religious authority. Grigory never held a formal position in the Church, but people recognized him as a starets (elder, wise counselor). His spiritual gifts apparently included healing. Although of medium height and build, and not handsome, Rasputin’s sensitive, discerning manner attracted women and brought him followers and sexual conquests. His pilgrimages included Kiev, Jerusalem, and Mt. Athos. Charges of being a khlyst forced Rasputin to leave Pokrovskoye for Kazan in 1902. By then, his common-law wife Praskovya had borne him three children.
Rasputin impressed important clergy and lay-people in Kazan, and they made possible his first trip to St. Petersburg in 1903. He captivated church and social leaders, and on a second visit, he met Nicholas II. For a year, his friendship with the royal family was based upon their interest in peasants with religious interests and messages. Rasputin first alleviated the sufferings of their hemophiliac son Alexei in late 1906. For the next ten years, Rasputin served the tsarevich unfailingly in this capacity. Joseph Fuhrmann’s biography reviews the theories offered to explain this success, concluding that Rasputin exercised healing gifts through prayer. Robert Massie explores hypnosis, rejecting the suggestion that hypnosis alone could suddenly stop severe hemorrhages.
Rasputin exercised some influence over church-state appointments before World War I. The high point of his power came when Nicholas assumed command at headquarters away from St. Petersburg, in August 1915. This elevated his wife’s importance in government. Alexandra, in turn, relied
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upon Rasputin’s advice in appointments, though neither controlled policies. As difficulties and defeats mounted, Russians became convinced that Rasputin and Alexandra were German agents, and that Nicholas was their puppet. Fearing this would topple the dynasty, Felix Yusupov organized a conspiracy resulting in Rasputin’s murder in Petrograd on December 17, 1916. Rasputin was poisoned, severely beaten, and shot three times, and yet autopsy reports disclosed that he died by drowning in the Neva River. Rasputin was buried at Tsarskoye Selo until revolutionary soldiers dug up the body to desecrate and burn it on March 9, 1917.
Rasputin favored Jews, prostitutes, homosexuals, and the poor and disadvantaged, including and, in particular, members of religious sects. He understood the danger of war, and did what he could to preserve peace. But Rasputin was selfish and shortsighted. He took bribes and was party to corruption and profiteering during the war. Rasputin ended as a womanizer and hopeless drunk, who undermined the regime of Nicholas II and hastened its collapse. See also: ALEXANDRA FEDOROVNA; FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; NICHOLAS II
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fuhrmann, Joseph T. (1990). Rasputin: A Life. New York: Praeger. King, Greg. (1995). The Man Who Killed Rasputin: Prince Felix Youssoupov and the Murder That Helped Bring Down the Russian Empire. Secaucus, NJ: Carol Publishing Group. Massie, Robert K. (1967). Nicholas and Alexandra. New York: Atheneum. Radzinsky, Edvard. (2000). The Rasputin File. New York: Nan A. Talese/Doubleday.
(1700-1771), Italian architect who defined the high baroque style in Russia under the reigns of Anne and Elizabeth Petrovna.
Bartolomeo Francesco Rastrelli spent his youth in France, where his father, the Florentine sculptor and architect Carlo Bartolomeo Rastrelli, served at the court of Louis XIV. After the death of the Sun King in 1715, the elder Rastrelli left Paris with his son and arrived the following year in St. Petersburg. Recent research suggests that the young architect did not return to Italy for study but remained in Petersburg, where he worked on a number of palaces during the years between the death of Peter (1725) and the accession of Anne (1730). Ras-trelli’s rise in importance occurred during the reign of Anne, who commissioned him to build a number of palaces in both Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Despite the treacherous court politics of the period, Rastrelli not only remained in favor after the death of Anne (1740), but gained still greater power during the reign of Elizabeth Petrovna (1741-1761), for whom he built some of the most lavish palaces in Europe. Rastrelli’s major projects for Elizabeth included a new Summer Palace (1741-1743; not extant), the Stroganov Palace (1752-1754), the final version of the Winter Palace (1754-1764), and the Smolny Convent with its Resurrection Cathedral (1748-1764). In addition, Rastrelli greatly enlarged the existing imperial palaces at Peterhof (1746-1752) and Tsarskoe Selo (1748-1756).
With the accession of Catherine II, who disliked the baroque style, Rastrelli’s career suffered an irreversible decline. He had received the Order of St. Anne from Peter III and promotion to major general at the beginning of 1762, but after the death of Peter in July, Ivan Betskoi replaced Rastrelli as director of imperial construction and granted him extended leave to visit Italy with his family. Although Rastrelli returned the following year, he had in effect been given a polite dismissal with the grant of a generous pension. He died in 1771 in St. Petersburg. See also: ANNA IVANOVNA; ARCHITECTURE; CATHERINE II; ELIZABETH; WINTER PALACE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brumfield, William Craft. (1993). A History of Russian Architecture. New York: Cambridge University Press. Orloff, Alexander, and Shvidkovsky, Dmitri. (1996). St. Petersburg: Architecture of the Tsars. New York: Abbeville Press.
The ratchet effect in the Soviet economy meant that planners based current year enterprise output plan
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targets on last year’s plan overfulfillment. Fulfilling output targets specified in the annual enterprise plan, the techpromfinplan, was required for Soviet enterprise managers to receive their bonus, a monetary payment equaling from 40 to 60 percent of their monthly salary. Typically, output plan targets were high relative to the resources allocated to the enterprise, as well as to the productive capacity of the firm. If managers directed the operations of the enterprise so that the output targets were overfulfilled in any given plan period (monthly or quarterly), the bonus payment was even larger. However, planners practiced a policy of “planning from the achieved level,” the ratchet effect, so that in subsequent annual plans, output targets would be higher. Higher plan targets for output were not matched by a corresponding increase in the allocation of materials to the firm. Consequently, overfulfilling output plan targets in one period reduced the likelihood of fulfilling output targets and receiving the bonus in subsequent periods.
Planners estimated enterprise capacity as a direct function of past performance plus an allowance for productivity increases specified in the plan. Knowing that output targets would be increased, that is, knowing that the ratchet effect would take effect, Soviet enterprise managers responded by over-ordering inputs during the planning process and by continually demanding additional investment resources to expand productive capacity. For Soviet enterprises, cost conditions were not constrained by the need to cover expenses from sales revenues. In other words, Soviet managers faced a “soft budget constraint.” The primary risk associated with excess demand for investment was the increase in output targets when the investment project was completed. However, the new capacity could not be included as part of the firm until it was officially certified by a state committee. By the time this occurred, the manager typically had another investment project underway.
In response to the ratchet effect, Soviet enterprise managers also tended to avoid overfulfilling output targets even if it were possible to produce more than the planned quantity. Several options were pursued instead. Managers would save the materials for future use in fulfilling output targets, or unofficially trade the materials for cash or favors to other firms. Managers would produce additional output, but not report it to planning authorities, and then either hold or unofficially sell the output. Due to persistent and pervasive shortages in the Soviet economy, and the uncertainty associated with timely delivery of both the quantity and quality of requisite material and technical supplies, the incentive to unofficially exchange materials or goods between firms was very high, and the risk of detection and punishment was very low. Despite the comprehensive nature of the annual enterprise plan,
