dared to make real use of this hitherto only theoretical right.
During the Soviet period administrative Russi-fication was nearly total; all official documents from stamps to passports to postal forms were printed in Russian or, in union republics, in Russian and the republic language, say, Latvian. Communications within the enormous bureaucracy took place in Russian, and even a Central Asian factory director or Armenian professor needed to know Russian fluently. The material and prestige value of Russian within the USSR meant that a considerable amount of unplanned Russification or simple cultural assimilation took place. Mixed marriages between Russians and members of other nationalities, for instance, most often produced Russian-speaking offspring. Many smaller nationalities, in particular within the Russian Republic (RSFSR), witnessed considerable rates of Russifica-tion, prompting national leaders in the post-Soviet period, for example in Tatarstan, to complain of the widespread de-nationalization of their people during Soviet rule.
Culturally, matters were more complicated. While non-Russian republics did have their own schools using local languages, everyone from Tallinn to Vladivostok studied Russian in school from an early age. Radio and television programs appeared in various languages but, to give only one example, even Estonian television broadcast the Russian-language Moscow news program “Vremia” every evening. Publications appeared in dozens and even hundreds of so-called Soviet languages, and students could study even at the university level in their union republic’s language. However, all dissertations at the kandidat (roughly, Ph.D.) or doktor level were written in Russian, even by students in Vilnius, Baku, or Kiev. In the Belarusian and Ukrainian republics, even obtaining an elementary education in the local language was not always simple, and parents who insisted too much ran the risk of being branded as nationalist or anti-Soviet.
The legacy of Soviet Russification in the twenty-first century remains strong but highly differentiated. When Central Asian or Belarusian leaders speak at international fora, it is nearly always in Russian. Arguably, Russian will remain the lingua franca in that region for some time. In the Baltic region, however, one hears little Russian (except by native speakers) and the bilingual street signs of the Soviet era have entirely vanished. For the future, Russification will remain a problem for the Russian Federation, where 20 percent of the total population is not ethnically Russian. Some of these national groups, in particular Tatars and Chechens, seem particularly resistant to further measures of Russification. For its part, the Russian Federation has officially disavowed any desire to Russify its citizens; the future will tell just how seriously one should take this official stance. See also: NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALISM IN THE TSARIST EMPIRE; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, TSARIST; SLAVOPHILES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Carr?re d’Encausse, H?l?ne. (1979). Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, tr. Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. La Farge. New York: Newsweek Books. Haltzel, Michael H., et al. (1981). Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hosking, Geoffrey. (1997). Russia: People and Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kappeler, Andreas. (2001). The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, tr. Alfred Clayton. New York: Pearson Education. Martin, Terry. (2001). The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Pipes, Richard. (1964). The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Riasanovsky, Nicholas. (1967). Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855. Berkeley: University of California Press. Slezkine, Yuri. (1994). Arctic Mirrors: Russia and the Small Peoples of the North. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Weeks, Theodore R. (1996). Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.
After brokering the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia placed itself on a collision course with Japan over the issue of spheres of influence in Manchuria. Relations between the two countries further deteriorated in 1898, when Russia occupied the Chinese fortress of Port Arthur (now Lu- shun), and again in 1903, when Russian economic interest focused on Korea. Japan’s response to Russia’s aggressive eastern policy became apparent on February 8, 1904 when Admiral Heihachiro Togo launched a surprise attack on Port Arthur. Having won control of the sea, the Japanese began landing land troops at Chemulpo (now Inchon), as far north as possible on the Korean Peninsula to avoid the bad roads. Nonetheless, the weather did not cooperate, and it was six weeks before General Tamemoto Kuroki’s First Army was ready to march around the northern tip of the Bay of Korea and invade the Liao Tung Peninsula.
Russia, meanwhile, had entered the war unprepared for conflict in Asia. Its military planners had given priority to the empire’s European frontiers and had not dedicated sufficient resources to the defense of its Asian interests. While the Japanese considered mainland northeastern Asia vital to their national security, the Russians viewed the region merely as a colonial interest for potential economic development and wealth. No one understood Russia’s predicament as clearly as War Minister Alexei N. Kuropatkin, who, upon the outbreak of war, resigned his ministerial portfolio, assumed command of the Russian army, and proceeded to Manchuria, where he arrived in March 1904. Since his forces were being transferred from one end of the empire to the other on the single-track and still incomplete Trans-Siberian Railroad, Kuropatkin set up defenses that he hoped would give Russia at least three months to build up its military presence in the Far East.
Kuropatkin began concentrating troops between Harbin and Liao Yang, but the Japanese thwarted his plan by beginning operations in the middle of March. The Japanese movements unnerved the commander of Port Arthur, General A. M. Stoessel, who immediately appealed to Nicholas II’s personally appointed viceroy for the Far East, Admiral E. I. Alexiev, for help. Alexiev ordered Kuropatkin to attack the Japanese, but the commander-in-chief, holding that he was answerable only to the tsar, refused. Thinking that Port Arthur had supplies enough to withstand a long siege, Kuropatkin had no intention of deviating from his plan. Before this dispute could be resolved, the Japanese forced Kuropatkin’s hand by defeating the Russians in the hotly contested Battle of Nanshan in April.
With Port Arthur’s supply lines cut after Nan-shan, Kuropatkin no longer had the luxury of waiting until an overwhelming force was assembled. The major battles of the war followed: Va Fan Gou (May), Liao Yang (August), and the river Sha Ho (October), effectively concluding with Mukden in February 1905. The Russians were soundly defeated in each of these battles by an enemy that first out-thought and then outmaneuvered them. Having concentrated three armies under the overall command of Marshal Iwao Oyama, the Japanese were able to fight the war on their own terms. Ironically, by the Battle of Mukden, Kuropatkin had finally achieved numerical superiority just as the Japanese reached the end of their material and human resources, but he, his staff, and the Russian intelligence services never became aware of this advantage and were intimidated by the Japanese army’s maneuverability. Further aggravating the Russian predicament was the inexplicable capitulation of Port Arthur on January 2, 1905. The situation was best described by the numerous military observers representing most of the world’s nations, who noted how unmotivated Russia’s army seemed in comparison to the patriotic Japanese soldiers with their strong sense of national mission.
A final event that captured the attention of the world was the saga of Russia’s Baltic Fleet. By the autumn of 1904, Russia’s Pacific Fleet lay in ruins, and to regain control of the sea, Nicholas II ordered the Baltic fleet to the Far East. Under the command of Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky, the Baltic Fleet sortied on October 15, 1904. Its round-the-world
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Allegory on Russo-Japanese peace treaty, concluded in Portsmouth, NH. © THE ART ARCHIVE/DOMENICA DEL CORRIERE/DAGLI ORTI (A)
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voyage attracted the interest of the international press, which reported its attack on British fishing vessels on
