scissors; hence the term Scissors Crisis.
The observed price movements in the Soviet Union during the 1920s can be explained by the relatively quicker recovery of the agricultural sector (the relative prices of agricultural products falling) vis-?-vis the apparently slower recovery of the industrial sector (the relative prices of industrial goods increasing). This recovery occurred after the collapse of the Soviet economy during the tumultuous era of war communism (1917-1921). Such a pattern of recovery following collapse is not unusual. Moreover, the observed changes in relative prices would be expected in a market economy
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
where the degree of decline and the subsequent rate of recovery differ by sector of the economy.
The underlying issues of the Scissors Crisis are important to the understanding of Soviet economic policy in the 1920s, especially the response of the Soviet state to these price changes. Soviet agriculture during the NEP was based largely on a private peasant economy. The development of modern agriculture was a major focus, cast within the framework of socialist economic thought. Although industry was recovering after war communism, it was hampered by substantial state ownership and the concentration of industry in the form of trusts, allowing for the exercising of monopoly power. In light of Josef Stalin’s dramatic economic changes beginning in the late 1920s (full nationalization, collectivization of agriculture, and the replacement of markets by the administrative command system), the issues and discussions of the 1920s assume great importance in one’s understanding of Soviet economic history.
First, if agriculture is a major component of total output in the economy, and agricultural output is to be both a source of food and a source of financing to promote the process of industrialization, the terms of agricultural production (amount, source, and means of distribution) have a major impact on the size and the distribution of the share dedicated to the financing of industrialization.
Second, the nature of property rights and the organizational arrangements in the agricultural sector were both matters of contention during the Soviet pre-plan era. Specifically, during the 1920s, experimentation with different forms of cooperative farm organizations was intended to change production arrangements as well as state access to the agricultural product; these changes could limit or eliminate market forces.
Third, Stalin argued, as a major justification for collectivization (beginning in 1929), that in fact the pace of industrialization would be limited by the ability of peasants under private property arrangements to withhold production in part to manipulate (increase) prices. According to Stalin, this would affect the terms of trade between the city and the countryside and thus reduce the pace at which industrialization could be pursued.
Fourth, the policies chosen for addressing the Scissors Crisis form an important component of the assessment of the NEP economy of the 1920s. Specifically, it was argued that there was a significant element of monopoly in Soviet industry at
1355
this time. State policy focused on this issue, threatening good intervention or the introduction of competing imports to force a reduction of industrial prices. In addition, threats were made to limit the access of industry to capital and thus change the behavior of the industrial sector.
Although the behavior of agricultural and industrial prices in the Soviet Union during the 1920s can be explained by the underlying market forces of supply and demand, nevertheless within the context of events of the 1920s and subsequent behavior by Stalin, the events of the Scissors Crisis have assumed major importance for understanding the NEP period. Moreover, the issues involved are fundamental components of contemporary theorizing about the process of economic development. See also: NEW ECONOMIC POLICY
Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Nove, Alec. (1982). An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. New York: Penguin. Sah, R. K., and Stiglitz, J. E. (1984). “The Economics of Price Scissors.” The American Economic Review 74(1): 125-138.
ROBERT C. STUART
The Scythians were a large confederation of Iranian-speaking (or headed by an Iranian-speaking military- political elite) tribal unions, known in classical sources since around the eighth century B.C.E. or about the time they migrated to the North Pontic steppe zone where they supplanted and apparently absorbed some of the Cimmerians who occupied the region. As with their predecessors, it is not clear from where the Scythians migrated, but their most likely homeland was Central Asia from where they moved under pressure of other nomadic peoples. Organized in supra-tribal confederations, the Scythians made raids and full-blown invasions from the northern Caucasus into Media and Assyria in northern Mesopotamia, reaching as far as Palestine and Egypt throughout the period of 670- 610 B.C.E. After suffering major defeats towards the end of the seventh century, they transferred their locus of power to the North Pontic
1356
region. By the third century B.C.E., the Scythians came under pressure of the nomadic Sarmatians who destroyed and absorbed most of them into their loosely-organized tribal structure.
Nomadic in origins, the Scythian peoples and the “Scythian” culture also included agriculturalists and hunter- gatherers who paid tribute to their nomadic lords with grain and other goods that the nomads could not produce themselves. In turn, these items were traded with the Greek colonial cities of the northern Black Sea region for wine, precious metals, and other goods.
While Scythia proper, as it was known in Greco-Roman sources, was located to the north of the Black Sea region (from the Danube to the lower Don and Volga), “Scythic” culture occupied a much greater territory of Eurasia, stretching as far east as southwestern Siberia and eastern Kazakhstan. Elements of this culture can be summarized as follows: the use of (1) iron; (2) short swords; (3) conservative artistic motifs (especially the animal style, e.g., the stag and the animal combat); (4) nomadic lifestyle organized around a patriarchal, little centralized social structure; (5) improved compound bows; (6) bronze cauldrons; (7) making of deer-stones; and, (8) complex horse harness. All of these components were shared across a huge area not only by Iranian-speakers, but also by Turkic and Mongolian nomads of steppelands of Inner Eurasia. See also: CENTRAL ASIA; CIMMERIANS; SARMATIANS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Christian, David. (1998). A History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia Vol. 1: Inner Asia from Prehistory to the Mongol Empire. Oxford, UK/Malden, MA: Blackwell. Golden, Peter B. (1990). “The Peoples of the South Russian Steppe.” In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia. ed. Denis Sinor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Talbot-Rice, Tamara (1957). The Scythians [Ancient Peoples and Places, vol. 2], ed. G. Daniel. London: Thames and Hudson.
The second economy of the USSR included economic activities that supplemented the command, or first, economy. As defined by Gregory GrossENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY
man, the second economy consisted of all production and exchange undertaken directly for private gain, knowingly illegal in some substantial way, or both. This definition encompassed both legal and illegal activities, but most studies focus on the illegal part, also referred to as underground, unofficial, or shadow economy, or the black market.
The legal second economy was made up mainly of private agriculture, small-scale construction services, extraction of precious metals, hunting of valuable wild animals, and certain professional services, such as those provided by physicians, dentists, and tutors.
The illegal economy was significantly larger than the legal part of the second economy. Legal private
