general from 1768 to 1772 he was instrumental in defeating the Polish Confederation of Bar. During Catherine II’s First Turkish War (1768-1774)
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he won ringing victories at Turtukai and Kozludji (both 1773). Suvorov subsequently (1776-1779, 1782-1784) campaigned in the Crimea and the Kuban, where he imposed greater Russian control and where he refined unconventional tactics appropriate to circumstance and enemy. During Catherine’s Second Turkish War (1787- 1792), he defended Kinburn (1787), fought at Ochakov (1788), won battles of near-annihilation at Fokshani and Rymnik (1789), and successfully stormed Izmail (1790). After service against the Swedes in 1791, he returned to the southwest, where in 1794 and 1795 he subjugated rebellious Polish patriots.
Though briefly banished under Paul I (1796-1801), Suvorov served in the war of the Second Coalition against revolutionary France. In Italy during 1799, he led Austro-Russian armies to dazzling victories on the Adda and the Trebbia and at Novi. After disagreement with the Austrians, Suvorov in September 1799 successfully extricated Russian forces from northern Italy over the Swiss Alps in a campaign that probably exceeded the achievements of Hannibal two millennia before.
Suvorov left three important legacies to his military heirs. First, he insisted on progressive, realistic training tailored to the characteristics of the peasant soldier. Second, he left in his Art of Victory (1795-1796) a set of prescriptions for battlefield success. He saw the primary objective in war as the enemy’s main force. He counseled commanders in pursuit of victory to observe his triad of “speed, assessment, and attack.” Speed was all-important: “One minute decides the outcome of battle, one hour the success of a campaign, one day the fate of empires ... I operate not by hours but by minutes” (Menning, 1986, pp. 82-83). Third, Suvorov’s record in the field inspired emulation from subsequent generations of Russian military officers. However, many would-be inheritors forgot his admonitions about flexibility, and sought slavish imitation rather than flexible adaptation. See also: MILITARY ART; MILITARY, IMPERIAL ERA; RUSSO-TURKISH WARS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Longworth, Philip. (1965). The Art of Victory. The Life and Achievements of Field-Marshal Suvorov, 1729- 1800. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Menning, Bruce W. (1986). “Train Hard, Fight Easy: The Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and His ‘Art of Victory.’” Air University Review 38(1):79-88.
Svans call themselves Mushw?n (plural Shwan?r). Nominally Georgian Orthodox, they preserve many pagan beliefs and practices. They inhabit a high mountainous area in northwestern Georgia beneath the main Caucasus chain, in the upper reaches of the rivers Ingur (Upper Svanetia) and Tskhenis-Tsqali (Lower Svanetia). Svan was first to split from the Common Kartvelian that also produced Georgian, Mingrelian, and Laz. The four main (and divergent) dialects are: Upper and Lower Bal (Upper Svanetia); and Lent’ekh and Lashkh (Lower Svanetia), although linguistic particularities characterize virtually each hamlet. The language is not taught, and all Svans educated in Svanetia since the introduction of universal schooling by the early Soviets have received instruction in Georgian. The largely mono-ethnic population of Svanetia is usually estimated at 50,000, although the disastrous winter of 1986- 1987 caused many to abandon the region, especially Upper Svanetia. In the 1926 Soviet census, 13,218 declared Svan nationality, although thereafter all Kartvelian speakers became classified as Georgians. Annual heavy snowfalls meant that Svans were historically excluded from the outside world for months, penned up with their livestock inside appropriately compartmentalized stone dwellings, alongside which stood the unique, twelfth-century, square towers for which Svanetia, especially Upper Svanetia, is famous. While rich in forests and minerals, the limited arable areas produce little apart from grass and hay, potatoes, and barley, the source of the local hard liquor (har? q’). Goiters were frequent through iodine deficiency; the difficulties associated with providing another staple were depicted in the silent film Salt for Svanetia. Ibex, chamois, and bears have long been hunted. Svan men often served as migrant laborers in Mingrelia during the winter months.
During the early nineteenth century, Lower Svanetia became part of Dadiani’s Mingrelia. In 1833 the Dadishkelian princes of western Upper Svanetia accepted Russian protection, governing their own affairs until the princedom was abolished in 1857. The eastern part of Upper Svanetia acknowledged no overlord, thus becoming known as “Free Svanetia.” Later in the century, Russia took control of the area through military action, completely destroying the village of Khalde, as described in a moving short story by Sergo Kldiashvili. See also: CAUCASUS; GEORGIA AND GEORGIANS; MINGRE-LIANS
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Freshfield, Douglas. (1896). The Exploration of the Caucasus. 2 vols. London: E. Arnold. Hewitt, George. (1996). A Georgian Reader: with Texts, Translation, and Vocabulary. London: SOAS. Palmaitis, Letas, and Gudjedjiani, Chato. (1985). Svan-English Dictionary. New York: Caravan Books. Phillipps-Wolley, Sir Clive. (1883). Savage Svanetia. 2 vols. London: R. Bentley and Son.
See also: MILITARY ART; MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY, SOVIET AND POST-SOVIET; TUKHACHEVSKY, MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEVICH
Naveh, Shimon. (1997). In Pursuit of Military Excellence. London: Frank Cass. Schneider, James J. (1994). The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State. Novato, CA: Presidio. Svechin, A. A. (1992). Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee; introductory essays by Andrei A. Kokoshin, et. al. Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications.
SVECHIN, ALEXANDER ANDREYEVICH
(1878-1938), military theorist and intellectual.
Alexander Svechin was one of the key intellectual leaders of the Red Army during the golden age of Soviet military theory (1918-1937). Svechin, an artilleryman, was a crucial figure in establishing a new and revolutionary understanding of modern war. Drawing on military thinkers of the nineteenth and late eighteenth century and his own intense study of the imperial Russian military experience, Svechin reformulated the meaning of the term strategy. Classically, strategy meant the art of conducting military campaigns. With the coming of the Industrial Revolution, war became thoroughly mechanized and industrialized-and total. Svechin was one the earliest theorists to recognize that the material and creative challenges of total war would revolutionize the very concept of strategy.
Svechin published his views in print under the title Strategy. The work was published in two editions in 1926 and 1927. Here he defined strategy as “the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal for the armed forces set by the war.” Through much of his professional career Svechin carried on a lengthy debate with another important Soviet theorist, Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky. Svechin’s work in Strategy and elsewhere informed his view that modern war would be characterized by attrition (izmor). Tukhachevsky argued a contrary view, that with the help of technology, states could still fight swift decisive wars of annihilation (sokrushenie). In the end, history decided the argument in Svechin’s favor.
A prolific writer, Svechin was also a brilliant teacher who educated a generation of Soviet military leaders who helped win World War II. He was executed as an enemy of the state on July 29, 1938.
SVYATOPOLK I
(c. 980-1019), grand prince of Kiev, replacing Vladimir Svyatoslavich, the Christianizer of Rus.
The identity of Svyatopolk’s father is uncertain. Around 980, after Vladimir had his half-brother Yaropolk killed, he slept with Yaropolk’s Greek wife, a former nun, and she gave birth to Svyatopolk. Because he was born of adultery, the chronicler explains, Svyatopolk (“the Cursed,” by which appellation he came to be known) was
