because he meddled in the affairs of distant Kiev.
Yuri’s father Vladimir Vsevolodovich “Mono-makh” gave him Suzdalia as his patrimony. In
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(1189-1238), grand prince of Vladimir on the Klyazma, in northeast Russia, when it was attacked by the Tatars.
In 1211 Yuri’s father Vsevolod Yurevich “Big Nest” had him marry Agafia, daughter of Vsevolod
Svyatoslavich “the Red,” grand prince of Kiev and member of the Olgovich dynasty. The alliance would serve both dynasties well. Before his death in 1212, Vsevolod designated Yuri, the second son in seniority, as his successor to Vladimir. Yuri’s elder brother Konstantin challenged his succession and defeated Yuri and his brother Yaroslav at the river Lipitsa in 1216. Konstantin ruled as grand prince until his death in 1218, at which time Yuri reclaimed Vladimir. After 1221 he sent his lieutenants to Novgorod, but the townspeople rejected them. Three years later he attempted to appease the Novgorodians by inviting his brother-in-law Mikhail Vsevolodovich, senior prince of the Olgovich dynasty in Chernigov, to act as his mediator with them. They accepted his offer but his brother Yaroslav objected. Yuri therefore washed his hands of Novgorod affairs in 1226 and turned them over to Yaroslav. Although Yuri was less powerful than his father had been, he took effective military action to stop the Volga Bulgars from attacking Suz-dalia. In 1221 he concluded peace with them. After that, he organized campaigns against the Mordva tribes and, in 1232, subdued them. Moreover, to secure his eastern frontier he built the outpost of Nizhny Novgorod. In February 1238, when the Tatars devastated Vladimir, his wife and sons perished. Later the invaders confronted Yuri and his troops at the river Sit, where he was waiting in vain for Yaroslav to bring reinforcements. On March 4 of that year he fell in battle. See also: GOLDEN HORDE; GRAND PRINCE; NOVGOROD THE GREAT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dimnik, Martin. (1987). “Yurii (Georgii) Vsevolodovich.” The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, ed. Joseph L. Wieczynski. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press. Fennell, John. (1983). The Crisis of Medieval Russia 1200-1304. London: Longman.
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Zadonshchina (roughly, The Battle Beyond the Don) is the conventional title for a medieval literary work about the historically important Battle of Kulikovo Field (1380). Written some years after the historical event, in the late fourteenth or possibly the beginning of the fifteenth century, it is attributed in one of the surviving copies to a Sofonia of Ryazan about whom nothing is known. The text is preserved in a longer and a shorter redaction, giving rise to the usual arguments in these cases over which was the “original.” Primacy is important to the crucial question of Zadonshchina’s relationship to the Lay of Igor’s Campaign. The short redaction appears to be an incomplete extract and not the author’s text.
There can be no doubt of a close association with the Lay in view of extensive similarities that go beyond any mutual dependence on some third source or tradition. Zadonshchina was almost certainly written as an imitation of the Lay and a response to it, treating the victory at Kulikovo as revenge for the defeat of Igor at the hands of a different steppe enemy. The writer sought to reverse circumstances of 1185 as described in the Lay, turning Igor’s unsuccessful campaign upside down, so to speak. In the process he distorted history: For example, by exaggerating the unity of the princes in 1380 in order to counterbalance the disunity of 1185. Most of his figures of speech are borrowed from the Lay and often ineptly combined and overused. For these reasons, Zadonshchina is considered derivative and inferior. See also: FOLKLORE; LAY OF IGOR’S CAMPAIGN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jakobson, Roman, and Worth, Dean S., eds. (1963). Sofonija’s Tale of the Russian-Tatar Battle on the Kulikovo Field. The Hague: Mouton. Zenkovsky, Serge A., tr. and ed. (1974). Medieval Russia’s Epics, Chronicles, and Tales, 2d ed. rev. New York: Dutton.
State agricultural procurement.
The term zagotovka refers to the process through which agricultural products (e.g., grain) were pro1719
cured by the Soviet state, usually from collective farms (kolkhozes) in the form of compulsory deliveries (obyazatelnye postavki) at low prices set by the state. The procurement process was important in that the underpinning of the Soviet strategy of industrialization was the extraction of grain and other agricultural products from the countryside for use as a source of domestic food and as a means to finance industrialization through export. Moreover, beginning under Lenin during the period of War Communism, when forced requisitioning (pro- drazverstka) was introduced, the role of the state in the production, acquisition, and distribution of agricultural products increased, especially after the collectivization of agriculture in the late 1920s.
In addition to the earlier use of forced requisitioning and the subsequent introduction of compulsory deliveries extracted from collective farms, deliveries were also made by state farms (sdacha sovkhozov), payments in kind (naturoplata) were required for the services of the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS), and taxes in kind (prodnalog) were levied.
The mechanisms of procurement introduced by the Soviet state served, in part, to eliminate the market of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s in order to organize the interaction between the agricultural and the industrial (urban) sector. Moreover, as state controls replaced the NEP market, the terms of trade between the countryside and the urban industrial sector could increasingly be dictated by the state. See also: AGRICULTURE; ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOVIET
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Volin, Lazar. (1970). A Century of Russian Agriculture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
ROBERT C. STUART ZASEKA See FRONTIER FORTIFICATIONS. 1950 and became a member of the Communist Party in 1954. She completed a doctoral thesis for the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, Department of Agriculture, where she worked until 1963. In that year, Zaslavskaya moved to the Novosibirsk Institute of Industrial Economics to work with Abel Aganbegyan. She subsequently became head of the Institute’s Sociology Department, in 1968. At the same time, Zaslavskaya became a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, becoming a full member in 1981. From the late 1960s she headed the Social Problems department of the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where she remained until the mid-1980s. During this period, Zaslavskaya developed a model capable of predicting trends in Soviet agriculture.
Zaslavskaya came to prominence in early 1980s, when her Novosibirsk report was leaked to the public. Later on, when Mikhail Gorbachev was introducing his policies of glasnost and perestroika, Zaslavskaya became a key player and senior government adviser in the field of socioeconomic and agricultural reform, from 1985 to 1987. She was elected to the Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 as Russian Academy of Sciences representative. In 1986 Zaslavskaya was elected President of the Soviet Sociological Association, before moving on to head to the new Institute of Sociology in 1987 and the Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (VTs-IOM) in 1988. In 1990 Boris Yeltsin elected Zaslavskaya to his consultative council. Since then Zaslavskaya has gone on to become head of the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. See also: ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; NOVOSIBIRSK REPORT; PERESTROIKA
