attitudes toward nuclear weapons in the 1950s, see Allan M. Winkler, Life under a Cloud: American Anxiety about the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 3.
17 Eisenhower’s philosophy led to a windfall: Statistics in this paragraph come from Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 67, and Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 676, 677, 681.
17 “SAC was still the big daddy”: Jerome Martin interview, August 26, 2005.
18 SAC hosted a classified briefing: Moore’s memo is in David Alan Rosenberg, “A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours’: Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954–1955,” International Security 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 25–28. The Sunday Punch is described in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon
&Schuster, 1983), p. 204, and Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 108.
18. The concept of alert time: Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 97–110.
19 LeMay had flown to Washington: Information on the 1956 “bomber gap” hearings comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 156–160; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 78–79; and The New York Times’ coverage of the hearings.
19 Worrisome intelligence had trickled in: Information on the 1955 Soviet airshow comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 156; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 78; and “Bison vs. B-52,” The New York Times, May 6, 1956, The Week in Review, p. 1.
20 The Soviets had only ten Bisons: Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p. 375.
20 The budget already included $16.9 billion: “On Arms and Aid,” The New York Times, Week in Review, May 13, 1956, p. 1.
21 “Curt LeMay thinks only of SAC”: “Defense under Fire,” Time, May 14, 1956.
21 To counter the threat: Henry M. Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program: A Brief History (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1988), pp. 1–4; Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 244–245; J. C. Hopkins and Sheldon A.
Goldberg, The Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1986), p. 65. An earlier alert operation occurred in February 1955, but the first true proof-of-concept test for ground alert was Operation TRY OUT, from November 1956 to March 1957. A description of life on ground alert can be found in “On Continuous Alert,” The New York Times Magazine, December 8, 1957, pp. 10–11.
21 the Soviets launched Sputnik: Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Berkley Books, 2001). The Johnson quote appears on p. 117. See also Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 135–136. An example of press reaction to ground alert in the wake of Sputnik is Richard Witkin, “S.A.C. Operating New Alert Program: Aims to Get Third of Bomber Force Airborne within 15 Minutes after Attack,” The New York Times, November 11, 1957, p. 12.
22 SAC began testing another program: Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986, p. 74.
22 “Any Soviet surprise attack”: Hanson W. Baldwin, “Ready or Not? President Upheld on Plan Not to Keep Bombers Constantly in Air on Alert,” The New York Times, March 8, 1959.
22 Airborne alert was ready to go: John D. Morris, “Soviet ICBM Held Able to Pinpoint 5,000-Mile Target,” The New York Times, January 31, 1959, p. 1; Power, quoted in Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 83.
22 “futile and disastrous”: Jack Raymond, “President Sees Dangers in Full Mobilization Now,” The New York Times, March 5, 1959, p. 1.
22 Eventually the two sides reached a compromise: “Some B-52’s in Air around the Clock: S.A.C. Begins Training for Possible Establishment of an Airborne Alert,” The New York Times, January 19, 1961, p. 12; Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 101; Narducci, Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program, pp. 46; “SAC’s Deadly Daily Dozen,” Time, March 17, 1961, p. 19.
22 the exact number remained classified: Airborne alert rates can now be found in Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, p. 681.
22 SAC named the program “Chrome Dome”: A map of the Chrome Dome routes in 1966 appears in Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 1993), p. 194. Despite many interviews with SAC airmen, the author never discovered a definitive genesis of the name.
22 Power refused to confirm or deny: “Some B-52’s in Air around the Clock,” The New York Times, January 19, 1961, p. 12; The Strategic Air Command Alert Force: History and Philosophy (Briefing) (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1988), p. 10.
23 LeMay had moved on: Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 666–667. Stats on SAC in 1957 come from ibid., pp. 676–677, 681.
23 Power carried the torch: A good overview of Power’s views can be found in “Power Airs SAC Deterrent Capability,” Aviation Week, April 20, 1959, pp. 66 ff.
23 But as missiles grew more sophisticated: Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, pp. 104–105. For further reading on McNamara’s relations with SAC, see Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), chaps. 6– 9.
23 “backbone of SAC’s deterrent strength”: The Mission of SAC: SAC Film Report no. 2 (U.S. Air Force, 1961).
CHAPTER 2: THE ACCIDENT 24 At midmorning on January 17, 1966: The account of the accident comes from two major sources: author’s interviews with Wendorf, Rooney, and Messinger; and Report of Major Aircraft Accident.
24 The lower compartment, where Rooney sat: The author toured a B-52 at Minot Air Force Base on August 23, 2005, and interviewed six airmen with B-52 experience: Mo Wiley, “Monty” Moncrief, Eric DePriest, Stephen Miracle, Harry Bender, and Glynn Breuer. Bender also demonstrated a midair refueling in a B-52 simulator. Additional details of B-52 culture came from retired airmen Max Kennedy and Donald Chase, interviewed by the author on August 25, 2005.
25 Messinger was about to attempt: Background on midair refueling comes from Mike May, “Gas Stations in the Sky,” Invention &Technology 19, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 10–19, and Dennis Casey and Bud Baker, Fuel Aloft: A Brief History of Aerial Refueling, undated (AFHRA). For additional information on the importance of midair refueling to SAC, see Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, pp. 104–108.
26 and they remain so today: In 2008, the Air Force awarded a contract for the next generation of aerial refueling tankers to the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) and the U.S.-based Northrop Grumman. Boeing and the U.S. Government Accountability Office challenged the decision, and the Pentagon decided to recompete the $35 billion contract. As of this writing, the KC-135 and its flying boom
