full bare … in Brittany behind the sea’, coming to rescue his golden-haired bride from her lecherous uncle Richard III – a story Lady Margaret had bought into with her commission from Caxton of the romance of
The prince, moreover, had his own damsel-in-distress at hand. Although he and Catherine spent little time in each other’s company, she seems to have exercised a strong hold on his imagination. During the gift-giving on New Year’s Day 1508 at Richmond, the prince bestowed presents on those closest to him, including Lord Mountjoy and Sir Henry Marney. To Catherine he gave a ‘fair rose of rubies set in a rose white and green’. As a token of his esteem, its significance was unmistakeable: it was a gift that symbolized himself, a jewelled Tudor rose.
There was another connection, too. During Philip of Burgundy’s enforced stay in England, Mountjoy – who evidently had some knowledge of Spanish customs – had been deputed to look after Juana and her household after they had been abandoned by her husband and his entourage. After that, he had become a regular presence in Durham House; soon, he was wooing one of Catherine’s gentlewomen, Inez de Venegas. Mountjoy, then, was perfectly placed to advise the prince on the courtship of the princess that he still believed to be his betrothed, and to act as a line of communication between them. When the mood took him, the prince was more than capable of well-turned expressions of courtly love in his excellent French, as he had already proved. As he would later show in his passionate correspondence with another woman, Anne Boleyn, he tended to express himself most eloquently when the object of his desire was long distant or unattainable. And Catherine, at the time, was most certainly out of reach.
In December 1507, Richard Fox returned from Calais bearing the new treaty of ‘perpetual peace’ with the Emperor Maximilian. Ratifying the Anglo-Habsburg mutual defence pact signed at Windsor almost two years previously, the treaty had at its heart the marriage contract between Maximilian’s grandson Charles of Castile, now nine years old, and Princess Mary, whose proxy marriage was now slated to take place the following Easter. Up to his neck in debt, Maximilian could not process the paperwork fast enough. As he admitted to his daughter Margaret of Savoy, in whose care he had placed his grandson – and who he was still trying to persuade to accept Henry’s own offer of marriage – the main reason that he had agreed to betroth Charles to Mary was to get a ‘good sum of money’ from Henry, his prospective in-law. Maximilian’s investment would soon start to yield returns. In mid- January 1508, Henry transferred to him another huge sum of money, ?38,000, probably via della Fava and the Frescobaldi bank, ‘upon a loan’ – which, as both kings knew from long experience, was non- returnable.8 Years before, Henry had castigated Maximilian for his unreliability; now, it seemed, they were the best of friends, the futures of their dynasties intertwined.
At Richmond that Christmas, Henry’s ‘high contentment’ infused the festivities. In towns as far away as Dover and Shrewsbury, bells were rung and bonfires lit in celebration; in London, Henry ordered an official celebration – at the city’s expense, naturally. Nine large bonfires were constructed in the streets, and hogsheads of wine laid on, ‘free for all men to fetch and drink of, while it lasted’, the better to make ‘evidently known what gladness and rejoicing is generally taken and made’ by the announcement of the betrothal, as Henry explained in a letter to London’s officials. With the new treaty, he boasted, he had built a ‘wall of brass’ around his kingdom. Invoking God’s words to Jeremiah following the unpopular prophet’s persecution, Henry may have intended them to have a similar resonance: his subjects may not have liked him, but he had made the country safe. At Guildhall, the king’s letter probably prompted thin smiles among the city’s merchant-politicians – after all, it was their brass Henry was using.
Henry’s aims were, as usual, far more ambitious and complex than mere defence. As his colossal payments to Philip of Burgundy had been, this most recent loan was for a specific purpose: Maximilian’s ‘business towards Rome at his voyage’, as the chamber treasurer John Heron noted neatly in his account book. The ‘business’ in question was Maximilian’s coronation as Holy Roman Emperor, a title which, although emperor-elect since 1493, he had been unable to use for the last fifteen years because he couldn’t foot the bill for a trip to Rome to be crowned by the pope. Now, Europe’s biggest summit meeting could finally take place – thanks to the financial backing of Henry, the most solvent king in Christendom. With it, he evidently hoped, would come not only influence with Maximilian, but a more direct line to papal policy.9
This was Henry the diplomatic puppet-master, as he saw himself, able to pull the strings of international affairs, of ambassadors and princes through huge transfers of capital. As a foreign policy, however, it had assumed a baroque complexity – and its outcomes were often unpredictable. In spring 1508, Maximilian would go to Italy. But he would do so at the head of a large army, across the Alps and down into the plains of the Veneto. On the pretext of picking up his imperial crown, Maximilian would invade Venice’s territories, with Pope Julius’s blessing – and with an army funded by the extortions of Henry’s counsellors.
In London, the information-gathering and persecution, the arrests and financial penalties continued unabated. As Polydore Vergil noted grimly, daily, in the halls of Empson and Dudley’s houses, you could see ‘a host of convicted persons awaiting sentence’. In response to their requests for a fair trial, defendants were given ‘wretchedly evasive replies’ by the counsellors and their colleagues. People were, he reported, so intimidated, so ‘exhausted by the duration of their anxiety’, that they voluntarily gave up their money. ‘For many preferred to do this, rather than remain longer in that sort of agony.’10
Vergil would have seen the queues himself, people summoned by privy seal or letter, or waiting to pay instalments of their fines, as he went down past Candlewick Street towards the Thames from his house in St Paul’s Churchyard, to catch a boat towards one of the royal palaces; or as he rode out over the Fleet bridge towards Westminster, past Empson’s ‘Le Parsonage’ and the duchy of Lancaster’s offices. The cases were legion: Thomas Baynard, a king’s commissioner, imprisoned on unspecified charges before ‘agreeing with the king’s grace’ for ?120; the London mercer Christopher Hawes, who died of ‘an unkind thought’ – stress, perhaps, or a heart attack – brought on by prolonged harassment from Dudley’s promoters; another, Sir George Talboys, paid ?500 to avoid being declared a certified lunatic and having his lands confiscated as a ward of the crown. No stone went unturned. As the London chronicler put it, ‘By one mean and other almost no-one that anything had was without trouble in these days.’11
While England’s merchants went in fear and trembling, Candlewick Street grew grander. In September 1507, Dudley had written a suave letter to London’s council, asking for permission to run a private ‘current of water’ off the Standard, the conduit in Cheapside, to his own house – permission which the council had of course readily granted. Emulating the Italian palazzi he so admired, with their hot-and-cold running water, Dudley had decided to install a mains supply himself, off one of the city’s public water supplies. That autumn, workmen dug up city streets, piles of lead piping lying by, turning his house into the lap of continental luxury. He and his fellow financial counsellors, it seemed, could do what they liked.12
In October 1507 de Puebla had written to Ferdinand with his latest thoughts on how to establish some sort of line of influence to Henry. Ten years previously, diplomats had identified a small cluster of people – Morton, Bray, Lovell, Fox – who had the king’s ear. Now, according to de Puebla, the king had ‘no confidential advisers’ at all, nobody whose opinion he trusted or who was privy to his innermost thoughts.
Henry, of course, still had people about him, the small clusters of counsellors through whom he ran things. But it was the nature of Henry’s relationship with his advisers, de Puebla was saying, that had changed. A decade before, ambassadors had noted how Henry had wanted to ‘throw off’ his council: now, it seems, he had done so. Implicit in de Puebla’s observation was the sense that counsellors no longer performed their traditional roles: even those few men formerly intimate with the king, to whom he had occasionally opened his mind, were shut out. Francis Bacon, Henry’s first biographer, summed it up: nobody, he wrote, was permitted ‘any near or full approach, either to his power or to his secrets.’13
Even the king’s relationship with his oldest and closest supporters was measured not in trust but money. Richard Fox paid ?2,000 for a pardon for retaining offences; Archbishop William Warham appeared in Dudley’s book, bound for ?1,600 for prisoners escaped from episcopal gaols; so too did the king’s mother herself, paying her son 700 marks for an abbey and benefice.14 The sense of bewildered, aggrieved alienation was summed up by Giles lord Daubeney, Henry’s chamberlain, over whom a cloud had hung for the past two years. When, in May 1508, Daubeney died at his manor of Hampton Court, he made extensive provision in his will for the paying-off of his debts to the king. Even though it had ‘pleased the king’s highness’ to charge him a recognisance of ?2,000 and to confiscate his French pension he had, he protested, been the king’s true servant ‘these xxvi years and above’.15
