Breakout

December 1941. They had only six Swordfish, seven pilots, six observers and six air-gunners. Only two of the pilots and four of the observers had had operational experience. The air-gunners alone were fully trained and operational. One of them, Leading Airman A. L. 'Ginger' Johnson, had won the Distinguished Service Medal for the Bismarck attack.

The leader of the half-squadron of six Swordfish was Eugene Esmonde, a 32-year-old Irishman from Drominagh, Tipperary. Before the war he had been a pilot with Imperial Airways, a forerunner of BOAC. In April 1939 he joined the Fleet Air Arm with the rank of Lieutenant-Commander and was posted to Lee-on-Solent, the Fleet Air Arm's base near Portsmouth, to take command of a Swordfish training squadron.

He was a short man — only five feet six — who was one of the Navy's most experienced and successful pilots. He also had the quality of firm leadership. He never barked brusque words of command, keeping his orders to a minimum and giving them in a quiet voice. If his aircrews were not actually on duty, he did not care what they did — they could creep up to London for a few hours if they wished when they were not wanted. This made the aircrews — most of them at least ten years younger than he was — feel that, however hazardous the operation he asked them to do, they could not let Esmonde down.

He was, of course, a much more experienced pilot than any of them. One of the troubles was keeping up with him. He could fly flat out in a Swordfish loaded with a torpedo, whereas none of them would dare in case they overturned it.

These single-engined biplanes — the Royal Navy's only torpedo bombers — were designed like First World War aircraft. They had a fabric fuselage stretched across light metal struts and open cockpits. They carried a crew of three — a pilot, and observer, and a rear-gunner manning a Vickers machine-gun on a swivel mounting.

^Swordfish

Yet these old planes could absorb tremendous punishment. Anti-aircraft shells passed through the fabric instead of exploding against it, as they did with more modern metal fuselages. But the 'Stringbags' — as the Navy affectionately called them — had a top speed of only ninety knots, which made them sitting ducks in daylight.

During January, Esmonde was trying to bring his new aircrews up to operational standards, carrying a rigorous training programme in mock torpedo attacks at Lee-on-Solent. It seemed inconceivable that the Admiralty would allow 825 Squadron to remain at half-strength. He waited daily to hear news of another six Swordfish and more aircrew arriving. None came.

In the first week in February, as part of Operation Fuller, the six aircraft were transferred to Manston in Kent to lead the attack on the Brest ships if they tried to force the Straits of Dover at night.

The six Swordfish flew from Lee-on-Solent to Manston in a blizzard, and landed on an airfield covered with frozen snow. When he arrived Esmonde told Wing-Cdr. Tom Gleave, the station commander at Manston, 'I shall need a month to get my chaps trained.' Next morning the maintenance crews, commanded by Observer Edgar Lee, arrived in lorries from Lee-on-Solent.

Then Esmonde, with RAF squadron commanders, was ordered to a special briefing given by senior officers from the Admiralty and Air Staff. They were told, 'We believe that an enemy dash up the Channel is imminent. We believe also that he will attempt to run through the Straits of Dover under cover of darkness about two hours before dawn when tides and high-water levels will be most favourable. There is only one way we can prevent this and destroy him — by throwing in the greatest available torpedo fire-power by combined air and sea attacks. It is intended, therefore, that the Swordfish of the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Command Beaufort torpedo bombers should stand by to support light naval forces for this purpose.

'It will be pretty fierce when it starts. But with the protection of darkness the Swordfish should have a chance of delivering their attacks and getting away. We want the big chaps crippled so that heavier forces can sink them at will.'

Later a signal arrived for Esmonde saying, 'The squadron commander to operate only those crews which he considers would contribute to the achievement of the object.' He received this message with a wry grin, for he had barely enough fully trained aircrew to fly his planes, and half of them had never seen action.

As the Admiralty never considered the German battleships would ever try to pass the Straits in daylight, Esmonde continued to prepare for a night attack. In conjunction with Wing-Cdr. Tom Gleave, he worked out a tough training programme for low-level torpedo attacks. His inexperienced aircrews needed as much practice as they could get.

Apart from the six Swordfish, the only effective air weapon which could sink or cripple the battleships were Beaufort torpedo bombers. They were a much more formidable aircraft, being able to fly twice as fast as the Swordfish.

Three squadrons were available under the command of Sir Philip Joubert, Chief of Coastal Command. One of them was No. 43 Squadron of fourteen Beauforts, stationed at Leuchars in Scotland, whose main task was to help the naval operation against the German battleship Tirpitz in the Norwegian fiord.

Following the Coastal Command appreciation, Joubert ordered these Beauforts from Leuchars south to Coltishall near Norwich. The decision was correct but bad luck intervened. For three days heavy snowfalls prevented them flying. There were also the usual 'administrative delays' — in other words, ground inefficiency. Although Joubert ordered the Leuchars squadron south to meet the urgent threat, he made no effort to plan for his torpedo bombers to attack together.

Twelve aircraft of No. 86 Beaufort squadron, reinforced by three Beauforts of 217 Squadron, were at St Eval in Cornwall. Their role was to deal with a break-out from Brest into the Atlantic. The seven remaining aircraft of 217 Squadron were at Thorney Island, near Portsmouth, ready for action in the Channel.

They were much nearer the Germans' course, and could have attacked before the Swordfish at Manston. But the main burden of the immediate attack was left to the six Swordfish, because senior officers were convinced the dash through the Straits would be made at night — and the Swordfish were certainly the ideal planes for such an attack. Under these conditions they had destroyed the Italian fleet in Taranto harbour in 1940.

The Admiralty made one other disposition. They alerted six 20-year-old destroyers, drawn from the 21st Flotilla, based on Sheerness, and the 16th Flotilla at Harwich. With these six old destroyers were four smaller Hunt Class destroyers, which were not armed with torpedoes. The Admiralty decided that if the Germans were to sail through the Channel, these destroyers would attack.

The combined flotilla was commanded by 42-year-old Captain Mark Pizey aboard HMS Campbell. He was ordered to sail for Harwich in Campbell, accompanied by Vivacious, to join Captain Wright commanding the 16th Destroyer Flotilla in Mackay, with Worcester, Whitshed and Walpole. Both these flotillas were normally out day and night escorting convoys along the east coast, to protect them against German E-boats.

Late in the afternoon of 4 February, Captain Pizey sailed into Harwich and went straight to the Commodore's office, where he talked on the green scrambler telephone with Dover. They gave him the Admiralty's view of the possible Schamhorst and Gneisenau break-out, saying if they came through the Channel his six torpedo-carrying destroyers must attack them. To be ready for the attack, they were to remain in Harwich harbour at short notice for eight days, the period that favourable tides lasted.

Captain Pizey was also handed a teleprinter signal from the Admiralty, timed 20:09 February 3, which read: 'To Captain D 21 flotilla from Vice-Admiral Dover. If signal 'Proceed in execution of previous orders' is made, destroyers are to proceed forthwith at best speed to North-West Hinder Buoy, latitude 051 degrees 33 minutes North, longitude 002 degrees 36 minutes East, via 53 buoy. You will be kept informed of movement of enemy ships through Dover Straits and you should endeavour to intercept them in the approximate latitude 051 degrees 30 minutes North. MTBs will not operate north of latitude 051 degrees 23 minutes North. Acknowledge.'

He acknowledged the signal by teleprinter and went back aboard Campbell. A lamp signal ordered all the five destroyer Captains whose ships were secured to buoys in Harwich harbour, to come aboard his flagship for instructions. These were to be at five minutes' notice for steam from dusk to daylight, which meant that the Chief Engineer must be able to report 'Engine room ready to obey telegraph' within a maximum of five minutes. They were to be moored with cables through the ring of the mooring buoys, ready to be instantly slipped and hauled aboard. Everyone slept in their clothes and the signal office was on twenty-four hours duty ready to receive Admiralty radio orders. Each evening at five o'clock, Pizey invited the five Captains aboard Campbell to discuss battle-plans and any new tactics—'tatticks' as the Navy calls them.