days' of the war.' So he decided to take Wing-Cdr. Finlay Boyd with him to do a two-man sweep 'just to keep things moving.'

At 10:10 a.m. they climbed into their Spitfires. Flying over the Channel twenty minutes later, they saw two Messerschmitts and climbed up to attack them. They had stumbled into the outer guard of Galland's air umbrella protecting the German battleships.

The Spitfires had discovered the ships at their most vulnerable moment. They were nearing the square on the chart in which there had been the new mine alarm during the night. The First Mine-Sweeping Flotilla under Lt.-Cdr. Bergelt, with only four boats, was still-trying to clear them. As the big ships hove into view, they had just managed to produce a very narrow channel free of mines. Between 10:26 a.m. and 10:47 a.m., Bergelt's mine-sweepers with their gear out went ahead, while the ships followed them through the channel at only ten knots. During these twenty-one terrifying minutes they saw the Spitfires overhead.

At 10:30 a.m., Jarvis at Fighter Command became seriously worried about the heavy jamming, which he now decided might be deliberate. Were the Germans doing it to hide something coming up the Channel? When he suggested to Number 11 Group that they send off a special reconnaissance plane, they pointed out that twenty minutes before the 'Jim Crow' flight consisting of two Spitfires had taken off from Hawkinge. They did not know about Victor Beamish's trip over the Channel.

As the German ships were sailing slowly through the narrow swept channel, Oxspring and Beaumont flew between 1,200 and 1,800 feet in rain showers just below the heavy clouds, ready to nip into them if they encountered German fighters. Visibility was so poor it was hard to distinguish between cloud and sea.

At 10:40 a.m., Kidd from Swingate finally succeeded in telephoning his first warning to Dover by routing his call through Portsmouth. He was ordered to come to Dover Castle at once.

At the same moment, Oxspring and Beaumont dived through the clouds fifteen miles west of Le Touquet. They quickly nipped back into cloud as flak shells began to burst round them, and a dozen Messerschmitts raced towards them. They had arrived over the E-boat screen. As they dodged the fighters, they sighted three big ships sailing close together. Oxspring and Beaumont thought they were British vessels, even though the ships kept firing at them as they seemed to be pointing straight at Dover. In the BAF view, the Royal Navy was notoriously trigger- happy after Dunkirk.

As Oxspring and Beaumont swung over the German convoy, with rain beating at their cockpit perspex and dimming their vision, they suddenly sighted two fighters beneath the clouds. They turned to attack them but as they closed to 500 yards on their tails, Oxspring saw to his astonishment red, white and blue roundels on their wings. He hastily called over the intercom to Beaumont, 'Don't fire, they're Spitfires!'

It was Group Captain Victor Beamish and Wing-Cdr. Finlay Boyd. They had also seen three large warships steaming towards Dover. As they went down to have a better look, neither Beamish nor Boyd noticed the two other Spitfires above them, because flak began to burst around them as well and German fighters roared on to their tails. Oxspring and Beaumont watched their two Spitfires turn and dive down on the ships.

E-boats and destroyers threw up a tremendous screen of flak and more German fighters plummeted down towards Beamish and Boyd. To escape the pursuing Messerschmitts, they dived straight through the flak, and the German pilots did not try to follow them.

As they came lower, they saw two large ships with trident masts. Flying down to sea level to get a better look, they could see the bow waves curling over the foredecks of the battleships and their long lines of escorts.

On the bridge of the Scharnhorst, Admiral Ciliax watched the wave-hopping planes and said to Captain Hoffmann, 'This is the start of it. We are now discovered. The attack will come at any minute.'

As they were now out of the narrow mine-free lane, he ordered the battleships to increase speed to thirty knots. Mist and low cloud came drifting down over the Channel. It was bitterly cold and driving rain began to fall as the German gunners waited for the British attack. Why did it not come?

It should have, for this was the first piece of luck for the British. By coincidence, four Spitfires had arrived together over the ships. Three of the pilots were experienced, high-ranking RAF officers and if they all identified them there could be no doubt.

Yet nothing happened. The main reason was that Beamish never thought to disobey the radio silence order. This was the supreme moment, when he should have ignored all the regulations and warned the British forces that the German ships were just about to begin their dash through the Straits of Dover. All he had to do was to switch on his radio and repeat the word 'Fuller' — and the whole of the British defences would have been alerted. But regulations said that radio silence should be observed on all operational flights. So with a wave to Boyd to follow him, he led the way back to Kenley preserving radio silence on the way.

His junior officer, Sq. Ldr. Oxspring, was much more enterprising. Watching the other two Spitfires courageously dive into the thick flak, Oxspring instantly realized that such a large number of ships sailing so close to England must be protecting German battleships. As his job was reconnaissance, not fighting, he decided this was the moment to disobey orders, and break radio silence to warn the Biggin Hill controller. It was one of the most sensible decisions made that day. He did not know the code-word, as his senior officer Beamish did, but he flicked over his switch and gave his recognition phrase, 'Barman Blue Leader. Three large German ships, probably battle- cruisers, escorted by twenty-plus craft sailing off Le Touquet heading towards Dover.'

He then called to Beaumont, 'Get back to base,' and both planes headed for Hawkinge. The time was 10:35 a.m.

The Germans heard him. The German B-Dienst listening service picked up his message, and informed Col. Adolf Galland at Le Touquet, that 'A British radio message reports a large German naval formation consisting of three capital ships and about twenty warships is steaming towards the Straits of Dover.'

At last the secret was out. The decision for giving the order to drop all attempts at disguising the operation lay with Galland. But he refused to be driven to rash measures by this alarming message. He continued to observe radio silence to keep the operation hidden from the British.

For he suspected that the RAF would not believe one lone message. The wisdom of his decision was proved by the fact that the first counter-measures were not taken by the British command for another hour. Galland says, 'It appears the British gave no credence to the reports. They simply sent up another reconnaissance plane and ordered a full alert. An hour later, the second aircraft brought confirmation of the feat which had been regarded as impossible.'

Meanwhile Oxspring and Beaumont were racing back to base. It only took them eight minutes to return to Hawkinge from over the German fleet. When Beaumont climbed out of his cockpit, he said thoughtfully to Oxspring, 'You know, before I became a pilot I used to be in the RAF marine craft section on the Solent. I am certain one of those ships is the Scharnhorst, I saw her at a pre-war review. I recognize her superstructure.'

Oxspring was immediately called to the phone in the briefing hut, where Controller Bill Igoe asked, 'What's all this, Bobby?' He told him the story — not the least puzzling feature being the presence of two other unknown Spitfires, which no one could account for.

Igoe, who had been convinced for hours the German battleships were coming up the Channel, but no one had taken any notice, suggested Oxspring get on the phone to tell 11 Group at once. He said he would listen-in so as not to waste time repeating his information. While Oxspring was telephoning 11 Group, the Intelligence Officer sent for a book of silhouettes of German ships. The man sent on his bicycle to bring the silhouette, book stopped at the NAAFI for a cup of tea on his way back, wasting another precious fifteen minutes. When he did arrive Beaumont leafed through the recognition book until he came to Scharnhorst.

'That's the ship I saw,' he said emphatically. He was certain that his memory of the tripod mast and superstructure of the Scharnhorst was correct. The only doubt was that as visibility had been obscured by rain, he did not have a very clear view. In spite of the fact his identification was almost certain most people, except Igoe, tended to discount Beaumont's theory.

When Oxspring and Igoe tried to speak personally to the Air officer commanding 11 Group, Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, they discovered he was at Northolt reviewing Belgian air force units, and his staff officers would not interrupt him. The attitude of 11 Group was, 'We are not going to bother the AOC. You saw some fishing boats. Send out another recce.'

More and more convinced that it was the Scharnhorst, both Igoe and Oxspring

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