'(f) Coastal Command before as after the escape failed utterly to appreciate the situation. This failure may to no small extent be attributed to the lack of a precise plan of action common to the services and commands, but the fact remains that upon them greatly depended the chance of obtaining early warning of the departure of the ships, and also of an early attack upon them being executed. Yet it was 16 Group who complained that the attack was made by the Swordfish aircraft, 'without waiting for the Beauforts.' Battles are not won by procrastination, and the low speed of the Swordfish aircraft made it impracticable for them in the circumstances to carry out a joint attack with the Beauforts, which were over twice as fast. The Swordfish attacked when they did so that advantage could be taken of the accurate information of the position of the ships then available, and so that they might operate near their own coast and as close to their base as possible. The suggestion that the attack should be postponed is indicative of the failure to grasp the salient point that speed was an essential feature of the operation. Coastal Command, charged with the responsibility of keeping guard, let the Germans go and bungled the subsequent attack.
'(g) It was reported that pilots of Beauforts which landed at Manston to obtain more torpedoes were told supplies were not available. A number of Beaufort pilots ordered into action had never fired a torpedo. Such a state of affairs defies comment and only seems to lay stress on that need for forethought, the lack of which characterized the entire proceedings.
'(h) Owing to lack of co-operation between the Navy and Air Force, the naval light forces attacked without air support, a support which would have greatly facilitated their task.
'(i) Of the fighter squadrons — eleven in all — detailed to assist and protect the Swordfish only one squadron made the rendezvous and others did not even find the ships. The Swordfish, when actually making the attack, were almost unescorted and were subjected to the concentrated A.A. fire of every German gun that could be brought to bear.
'(j) It is quite untrue that bad weather enabled the German ships to escape; the weather, anyway until 2:45, four hours after the first plot had been received, was not such as should have affected our operations adversely to any appreciable extent. The weather reports which the Germans obtained were equally if not more readily available to us. If the enemy knew the weather favoured the attempt, we also should have appreciated that the conditions were such as would proffer the chance he needed, and we should have tightened our watch upon him and made our dispositions accordingly.
'(k) Again owing to the absence of a clear-cut plan, our forces were scattered and unprepared and their efforts were ineffective. At no time was their combined weight felt by the enemy. We dissipated our power in a series of costly and ill-conceived attacks against a powerful and fully expectant enemy. The enemy had as usual planned carefully ahead, we had not. Of over 250 bombers employed only 37 located the target and some of these are believed to have bombed our own ships. All this despite the fact that the most accurate information as to the position of the enemy was available at Dover. Of the fighters we sent out, the value of a high proportion was lost as they were not as efficiently controlled as they should have been. There were too many water-tight compartments, too many persons and units trying to act independently of one another, each relying on his or their own source instead of on the best source of information which should have been supplied by some central organization.
'(1) Thirty-three rounds was the Army's contribution to the battle, and they were only able to supply this after inquiring whether they would be hampering the sea or air attack. These inquiries at the last moment and while the enemy were literally at our gates show the pitiful absurdity of the whole situation and emphasize once again the pressing need to think ahead.
'(m) These battle-cruisers will sink many of our ships and will cost many of our sailors their lives. Our prestige at home and abroad has sunk to a new low level and the repercussions caused by such a calamity cannot yet be foreseen. Worst of all, perhaps, is the tragic loss of many irreplaceable airmen and sailors in an abortive action. Theirs was great and lasting gallantry called for and rendered fruitless by that reckless gamble in their lives, which was necessitated by the indolence of those in whom they trusted.
'This reverse, like many others that have occurred in this war, is attributable to lack of imagination, energy and intelligence on the part of the people who carry our burdens in great affairs. They are heavy burdens and we need great men to carry them.
'Our pressing need is for reform and reorganization. What we should have done in peacetime we must do now in the heat and fury of the battle.
'(a) There must be a properly representative Imperial War committee in the deliberations of which the heads of the services can participate. A long-term home and overseas strategy must be worked out and put into execution without delay. Above all, we must take the initiative in as many spheres of action as possible and not lose it. Sub- committees with full freedom of action must be appointed to take care of operations subsidiary to the general Imperial plans. One such sub-committee should have been charged with the job of taking care of the German battle-cruisers at Brest and should have constituted the nerve centre of the attacking organization. All information should have been received and collated by them and all orders emanated from them; thus would it have been with certainty established that one body had the whole picture that only now, long after the enemy has escaped, is being laboriously pieced together.
'(b) There must be much closer liaison between the services and by the commands and units which they comprise. The right hand must always know what the left hand is doing. Very numerous instances can be quoted illustrating the complete lack of understanding that exists between Commands, the operational areas of which overlap.
'(c) Coastal Command is to all intents and purposes subservient to the Admiralty. The Command should be abolished and most of its work carried on by a Royal Naval Air Force, the remainder becoming the responsibility of Fighter Command. The presence of Coastal Command is redundant and seems merely to increase delay and confusion.
The RAF were alone in treating the affair with light-hearted retrospective cynicism. In the forty-eight hours after the German battleships had sailed safely home, the nation grew steadily angrier.
The
'The reasons for the escape of the German warships are still being debated — in every home, in every club, in every inn throughout the land. That
'The incident is symptomatic. Public reaction to the many 'explanations' is one of weary resignation. And that too is symptomatic.
'It is symptomatic of the general feeling that there is something wrong with Britain's war direction and this feeling is crystallized in an almost universal demand for removal from high places of the tired and the incompetent.'
So Churchill, although totally out of sympathy with the public outcry, took an unprecedented step to protect his administration. On the following Monday — a wet, winter's day four days after the break-out — three men sat behind a long desk in Whitehall to perform a difficult task. They were to preside over the only judicial inquiry ever held into the conduct of a battle.
The three members of the Board were its president, Mr. Justice Bucknill, Air Chief-Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, Inspector-General of the Royal Air Force, and the Naval member, Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Binney.
Mr. Justice Bucknill said, 'The Board's terms of reference are to inquire into the circumstances in which the German battle-cruisers
It had no power to compel admirals to attend. Vice-Admiral Binney hoped to persuade the Admiral Commanding Submarines, Admiral Sir Max Horton, to give evidence before the Board on this question. For the Board was not satisfied that Sir Max had drawn enough submarines from other areas to deal with a possible break-out. Horton refused to appear, saying: 'If I can't find out what is wrong in my command without setting up a panel of
