dark.'
Ciliax said, 'I must stress emphatically that a very strong destroyer and fighter protection must be provided on the day of the break-through itself from dawn to dusk.'
'I am aware of the decisive role to be played by the Air Force in this enterprise,' replied Hitler and turned to Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, Lt.-General Jeschonnek, who said, 'I do not believe I will be able to provide constant unfailing protection for the ships with the available 250 fighters which cannot possibly be reinforced.'
Even in the presence of the Fuhrer he was exhibiting the Luftwaffe's traditional reluctance to co-operate with the Navy. But with Hitler's cold eyes upon him, Jeschonnek hastily promised to draw on the existing night-fighter formation to provide dawn fighter protection.
Hitler then asked for opinions as to the possibility of using the northern route saying, 'I do not care which route is selected by the Navy, if only it is successful in getting those ships transferred to Norwegian waters.'
The four Admirals explained that the northern route was not suitable for several reasons. Baeder commented, 'The present disposition of enemy forces is against such a move; there are two or three battleships and two aircraft-carriers in the Home Fleet. Moreover, the German air forces would not be able to provide the necessary air cover.'
Commodore Buge, commanding the seaward defences of the occupied French coast, including the mine- sweeping and mine-laying forces, was asked to report. Buge was able to assure Hitler that the menace from mines, always regarded as the main danger to forcing a passage through the Channel, was not as bad as imagined.
Baeder, still unsure of the Luftwaffe's full support, repeated his demands to the Air Force for a very strong fighter cover. He also asked for attacks on enemy torpedo plane bases in the early morning of the day of the break- through, and possibly a few days earlier.
Lt.-General Jeschonnek replied stiffly, 'The constant air cover demanded will leave insufficient aircraft for the heavy air battles that are sure to develop on the day of the breakthrough. We may expect our fighter force to become very inferior in strength — at least during the afternoon. Also our own anti-aircraft personnel are susceptible to fatigue in the afternoon as experience has shown.'
Col. Galland, who was to command the Luftwaffe fighter cover, also offered his opinion, 'The strong Spitfire forces at the disposal of the British will render things difficult for the long-range fighters which we are going to employ.'
Raeder remarked that tide and daylight would determine the timing of the operation. That was the reason the date could not be changed. When he asked what should be done in case one or several ships were unable to move on the date set, Hitler decided, 'If two battleships are in a position to move, they are to undertake the operation, if necessary without the cruiser. If only one battleship and the cruiser can move, they must do likewise. But in no case should the
Then Hitler, cutting through both air and naval objections, said briskly, 'The ships must not leave port in the daytime as we are dependent on the element of surprise. This means that they will have to pass through the Dover Straits in the daytime. In view of past experience I do not believe the British capable of making and carrying out lightning decisions.
'This is why I do not think they will be as swift as is assumed by the Naval Staff and the Admiral Commanding Battleships in shifting their bomber and pursuit forces to the south-eastern part of England for an attack on our ships in the Dover Straits.
'Picture what would happen if the situation were reversed! — if a surprise report came in that British battleships have appeared in the Thames estuary and are heading for the Straits of Dover. In my opinion, even we would hardly be able to bring up air pursuit forces and bomber forces swiftly and mediodi-cally.'
He added dramatically, 'The situation of the Brest Group is comparable with that of a cancer patient, who is doomed unless he submits to an operation. An operation, even though it might be a drastic one, will offer at least some hope that the patient's life may yet be saved. The passage of our ships through the Channel would be such an operation. It must therefore be attempted.'
Finally Hitler said, 'Nothing can be gained by leaving the ships at Brest. Should the Brest Group manage to escape through the Channel, however, there is a chance that it might be employed to good advantage at a later date. If the ships remain at Brest their ability to tie up enemy air forces may not continue for long. As long as they are in battle-worthy condition they will constitute worthwhile targets, which the enemy will feel obliged to attack. But the moment they are seriously damaged — and this may happen any day — the enemy will discontinue his attacks. In view of all this and in accordance with the suggestion of the C-in-C Navy I decide that the operation is to be prepared as proposed.'
That was it. After the conference Hitler entertained his admirals and generals at dinner in the concrete shelter where he lived. He ate frugally as usual but was more genial than anyone had seen him for a long time. He said, almost jovially, 'You will find that this operation will turn out to be our most spectacular naval success of the war.'
He revealed his only doubt — would the Luftwaffe manage it? He realized that Galland with his fighters was the key figure in the operation. Saying good-bye to him he asked quietly, 'Do you think they will bring it off?' When Galland assured him he thought they would he dismissed him with a rare smile.
The decision was made. Far from dismantling the great ships the Germans were to fight them through the English Channel in daylight. An attempt like this had not been made by an enemy of England for over three centuries — since the Spanish Armada of 1588.
II
INVITATIONS TO A MASKED BALL
When Hitler made his decision on 12 January in Wolfs Lair there remained only a month to go before the operation, which was now code-named Cerberus.
The time most suitable for the break-out had already been worked out. Ideally it would be a night with low cloud cover, no moon, and worsening visibility and weather conditions. From the beginning of February darkness prevailed from 7:30 p.m. until 7:30 a.m. G.M.T. The new moon was on 15 February. The most favourable tides and currents were between 7 and 15 February. Therefore the operation must be carried out during this period. But the date depended upon the weather.
An exact forecast was extremely difficult as German meteorologists had only the scantiest weather data. Their sole information came from long-range reconnaissance planes over the Atlantic. So three U-boats were diverted from the Atlantic to Iceland — the area that determines the weather — for meteorological observation. Their reports enabled the Germans to make an accurate weather forecast, the meteorologists predicted favourable weather for 11 February, so it was decided the ships would sail from Brest that night.
Zero hour was fixed for 7:30 p.m. on 11 February. But a more critical zero hour was due at noon next day. This would be the time when the battleships would begin steaming through the Dover Straits.
The time schedule for the operation was: put to sea from Brest in the evening, pass the narrows of Dover- Calais by noon of the following day; navigate along the Dutch coast in the afternoon; enter the North Sea in the evening. A twenty-eight-knot cruising speed was planned.
The Germans now overwhelmingly agreed that a daylight passage was the only answer. Every officer in the secret appreciated that to force the Dover Straits in daylight was a practical if perilous plan. A night dash past Dover when the ships almost certainly had been detected in daylight seemed frighteningly difficult. For then the British defences would be alert and waiting for them. During a night voyage along the French coast there was just a possibility they might take the British by surprise.
But the first and greatest danger lay in the heavily mined narrow waters. The main burden of trying to ensure a mine-free lane fell to Commodore Friedrich Ruge, in command of all the mine-sweeping flotillas along the Channel coast.
Group West ordered him to throw every available minesweeper into clearing a channel for the battleships. A meeting at Group West attended by Giessler and the three captains showed the provisional route running through the series of numbered squares into which the Channel was divided. This route avoided mines laid by the RAF and Royal Navy leaving, if possible, only German mine fields to be dealt with.
