security risk?
A. In a great number of cases I have seen Dr. Oppenheimer act — I understood that Dr. Oppenheimer acted — in a way which for me was exceedingly hard to understand. I thoroughly disagreed with him in numerous issues and his actions frankly appeared to me confused and complicated. To this extent I feel that I would like to see the vital interests of this country in hands which I understand better, and therefore trust more. In this very limited sense I would like to express a feeling that I would feel personally more secure if public matters would rest in other hands.
In that distinction between loyalty and security, evidently, was the bargain struck.
For the next two hours, Robb elicited from Teller what Harold Green has called a “tame” version of “what [Teller] told the FBI off the record.” The allegations that Robert Oppenheimer delayed and subverted the H-bomb program were central among the AEC's charges. Most of the “government” witnesses were called to testify to the substance of those allegations. The allegations originated in Teller's FBI interviews. Yet Robb consistently allowed Teller implicitly to qualify and even to disavow his earlier statements. For Green, Robb's and the security board's handling of the Teller FBI interviews was mysterious:
Inexplicably, Robb was willing to accept this watering down of his case. If he were interested in establishing the truth, however that might cut, as was his obligation under both the AEC's procedures and [the Eisenhower administration's] Executive Order 10450, he should have attempted to impeach Teller's credibility. Alternatively, if his objective was to make the case against Oppenheimer as effectively as possible, Robb should have pressed Teller to repeat under oath his earlier allegations.
More importantly, the Gray Board itself, which had before it Teller's statements to the FBI, was apparently not interested in ascertaining why Teller had so changed his opinions.
But the reason why Teller changed his opinions is self-evident: he was speaking in the presence of the accused. He barely mustered the bravado to challenge Oppenheimer even then. Gordon Gray, apparently dissatisfied with Teller's craven phrase “personally more secure,” decided in the final minutes of the physicist's testimony to force him to put himself more forth-rightly on the record:
Mr. Gray… I would then like to ask you this question: Do you feel that it would endanger the common defense and security to grant clearance to Dr. Oppenheimer?
The Witness. I believe, and that is merely a question of belief and there is no expertness, no real information behind it, that Dr. Oppenheimer's character is such that he would not knowingly and willingly do anything that is designed to endanger the safety of this country. To the extent, therefore, that your question is directed toward intent, I would say I do not see any reason to deny clearance.
If it is a question of wisdom and judgment, as demonstrated by actions since 1945, then I would say one would be wiser not to grant clearance.
Oppenheimer, listening to Teller testify, made cryptic notes on a yellow legal pad:
Teller — aggressive
had conscience
hysterical
two sides on H-bomb
Oppenheimer thought more about his Hungarian colleague later in the hearing, remembered Teller's valediction when he left Los Alamos for Liv-ermore and reminded himself to find out who had passed it along. “Since I cannot work with the appeasers,” Oppenheimer quoted it from memory, “I will work with the fascists.” Revealing though it was, the remark measured nothing of use to Robert Oppenheimer. It measured the extent to which Teller approached American politics with Hungarian values. Working with the fascists of Admiral Nicholas Horthy to overthrow the Communists was precisely what many prosperous, frightened Hungarian Jews had done when Teller was a boy in post-First World War Hungary, his own father among them.
Teller offered Oppenheimer his hand as he was leaving and Oppenheimer shook it, however reluctantly. “I'm sorry,” Teller told him. Oppenheimer, disbelieving, responded, “After what you've just said, I don't know what you mean.”
Other witnesses continued the testimony against Oppenheimer for six more days: Air Force scientist David Griggs, Luis Alvarez, Boris Pash. William Borden appeared as a surprise witness, shocking Garrison, who had heard only rumors of the young former executive director's letter. Garrison fought to have the document excluded. Gray wanted it read into the record and Borden read it. It was a Pandora's box; after a weekend of deliberation, the defense chose not to question Borden about it. He left the hearing room and disappeared into history.
The hearing ended May 6. On May 27, the security board majority — Gray and Morgan — found that the nation owed Oppenheimer “a great debt of gratitude for loyal and magnificent service,” that Oppenheimer was “a loyal citizen” and that “no man should be tried for the expression of his opinions,” but did not recommend reinstating his security clearance. His “continuing conduct and associations,” wrote the majority, had “reflected a serious disregard for the requirements of the security system”; he had “a susceptibility to influence which could have serious implications for the security interests of the country”; his “conduct in the hydrogen-bomb program” had been “sufficiently disturbing as to raise a doubt as to whether his future participation… would be clearly consistent with the best interests of security”; and he had been “less than candid in several instances in his testimony before this Board.” Ward Evans, the chemistry professor, had decided to dissent but had produced such an incoherent statement that Robb had to fix it up. It alleged double jeopardy on the grounds that most of the charges against Oppenheimer had been reviewed and cleared by the AEC in 1947. It was not even a stopgap in the flood.
Oppenheimer appealed the security board majority findings to the AEC commissioners. Nichols, in his recommendation to the commissioners on June 12, 1953, emphasized the felonious inconsistencies in the physicist's testimony about the Chevalier incident. In the meantime, Strauss learned from the FBI's phone taps that Oppenheimer and Garrison were worried that the confidential hearing transcript might be published and that publication would be damaging; Oppenheimer, the FBI reported to Strauss, wanted to leak excerpts from the transcript favorable to his case to James Reston of the
Oppenheimer's conflicting statements thus became public, but so did Edward Teller's testimony. Many of the Livermore physicist's scientific colleagues were appalled. Visiting Los Alamos later in June, Teller rose from lunch on the sunny eastern terrace of the main lodge to greet a former student, Robert Christy. Christy cut him, refusing to shake his hand. Shocked, Teller and his wife retreated to their guest room. When Alvarez heard of the incident, he called Strauss, who dictated a record:
[Alvarez] said that Dr. Teller was now in Los Alamos with his wife and was being given very rough treatment there — I called Dr. Teller and confirmed what I had heard… He besought me to do nothing… “I have made up my mind that I can take the gaff. I am no longer interested in anything except truth. I have complete confidence in the fact that my friends will eventually come to the conclusion that in telling what I believe to be the truth, I have done the cause of science in the service of my country the best that I could.”
A majority of the AEC commissioners, led by Lewis Strauss, found on June 29 that “Dr. Oppenheimer is not entitled to the continued confidence of the Government and of this Commission because of the proof of fundamental defects in his ‘character.’” (Since Oppenheimer's consultant contract with the AEC was due to expire on June 30, Strauss had to rush the decision through.) By then, Teller had returned to Livermore and had second thoughts. He drafted a brief conciliatory statement. His testimony had been misunderstood, he wrote; it was his duty to testify fully; he in no way meant to imply he believed the right to disagree should be limited; to the contrary, he believed
