equal before the law and receive the same treatment. Exceptions to the general system were the military and ecclesiastical courts, together with special courts for peasants who lived for the most part by customary law.
The reform of the judiciary, which was largely the work of the Minister of Justice Dmitrii Zamiatnin, his extremely important assistant Serge Za-rudny, and several other enlightened officials, proved to be the most successful of the 'great reforms.' Almost overnight it transformed the Russian judiciary from one of the worst to one of the best in the civilized world. Later the government tried on occasion to influence judges for political reasons; and, what is more important, in its struggle against radicalism and revolution it began to withdraw whole categories of legal cases from the normal procedure of 1864 and to subject them to various forms of the courts-martial. But, while the reform of the judiciary could be restricted in application, it could not be undone by the imperial government; and, as far as the reform extended, modern justice replaced arbitrariness and confusion. Russian legal reform followed Western, especially French, models, but, as Kucherov and others have demonstrated, these models were skillfully adapted to Russian needs. It might be added that the courts, as well as the zemstvo institutions, acquired political significance, for they served as centers of public interest and enjoyed a somewhat greater freedom of expression than was generally allowed in Russia.
A reorganization of the military service in 1874 and certain changes within the army have usually been grouped as the last 'great reform.' Inspired by military needs and technically complex, the reform nevertheless exercised an important general impact on Russian society and contributed to the modernization and democratization of the country. It was executed by Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin, Nicholas Miliutin's brother, who wanted to profit by the example of the victorious Prussian army. He introduced a variety of significant innovations, of which the most important was the change in military service. The obligation to serve was extended from the lower classes alone to all Russians, while at the same time the length of active service was drastically reduced - from twenty-five years in the beginning of Alexander II's reign to six after the reform of 1874 - and a military reserve was organized. Recruits were to be called up by lot; different exemptions were provided for hardship cases; and, in addition,
terms of enlistment were shortened for those with education, a not unwarranted provision in Russian conditions. Miliutin also reformed military law and legal procedure, abolished corporal punishment in the army, strove to improve the professional quality of the officer corps and to make it somewhat more democratic, established specialized military schools, and, a particularly important point, introduced elementary education for all draftees. Measures similar to Miliutin's were carried out in the navy by Grand Duke Constantine.
Other reforms under Alexander II included such financial innovations as Valery Tatarinov's establishment of a single state treasury, publication of the annual budget, and the creation in 1866 of the State Bank to centralize credit and finance, as well as generally liberalizing steps with regard to education and censorship.
The 'great reforms' went a long way toward transforming Russia. To be sure, the empire of the tsars remained an autocracy, but it changed in many other respects. Vastly important in themselves, the government's reforms also helped to bring about sweeping economic and social changes, which will be discussed in a later chapter. The growth of capitalism in Russia, the evolution of the peasantry, the decline of the gentry, the rise of the middle class, particularly the professional group, and also of the proletariat - all were affected by Alexander II's legislation. Indeed, Russia began to take long strides on the road to becoming a modern nation. Nor could the changes be undone: there was no return to serfdom or to pre-reform justice.
However, although the government could not return to the old ways, it could stop advancing on the new road and try to restrict and limit the effectiveness of the changes. And in fact it attempted to do so in the second half of Alexander II's reign, under Alexander III, and under Nicholas II until the Revolution of 1905. While the need for reforms had been apparent, the rationale of reaction proved less obvious and more complicated. For one thing, the reforms, as we know, had their determined opponents in official circles and among the Russian gentry, who did their best to reverse state policy. Special circumstances played their part, such as peasant uprisings, student disturbances, the unexplained fires of 1862, the Polish rebellion of 1863, and Dmitrii Karakozov's attempt to assassinate the emperor in 1866. More important was the fact that the government failed to resolve the fundamental dilemma of change: where to stop. The 'great reforms,' together with the general development of Russia and the intellectual climate of the time, led to pressure for further reform. Possibly the granting of a constitutional monarchy and certain other concessions would have satisfied most of the demand and provided stability for the
empire. But neither Alexander II nor certainly his successors were willing to go that far. Instead they turned against the proponents of more change and fought to preserve the established order. The 'great reforms' had come only after the Crimean War had demonstrated the total bankruptcy of the old system, and they owed little to any far-reaching liberalism or vision on the part of Alexander II and his immediate associates. The sequel showed how difficult it was for the imperial government to learn new ways.
After the political stillness and immobility of Nicholas I's reign, and stimulated by the 'great reforms,' the early 1860's in Russia were loud and active. Peasant riots occurred with great frequency and on a large scale. In 1861 and 1862 disturbances, provoked largely by the clumsy and authoritarian policies of the new minister of education, Count Admiral Evfimii Putiatin, swept Russian universities. In 1862 the provincial assembly of the Tver gentry, led by Alexis Unkovsky, renounced its gentry privileges and demanded the convocation of a constituent assembly representing the entire people to establish a new order in Russia. And in the same year of 1862 a series of mysterious fires broke out in St. Petersburg and in a number of towns along the Volga. Also, in 1861 and 1862 leaflets urging revolution began to appear in different Russian cities. In 1863 Poland erupted in rebellion.
In Poland, too, Alexander II had instituted a liberal policy. Thus in 1862 much of the former Polish autonomy was restored. The change in the Russian attitude found favorable response among Polish moderates, led by Marquis Alexander Wielopolski, but failed to satisfy the nationalists, who wanted complete independence and the historic 'greater Poland.' Recent successes of Italian unification, the sympathy of Napoleon III and influential French circles, and the general nationalistic spirit of the age encouraged Polish extremists. Following a series of disorders, the government took steps to draft the unruly element, students in particular, into the army. A rebellion followed in January 1863. Although this time, in contrast to the situation in 1831, the Poles possessed no regular army and had to fight for the most part as guerrilla bands, the insurrection spread to Lithuanian and White Russian lands and was not finally suppressed until May 1864. Great Britain, France, and Austria tried to aid the Polish cause by diplomatic interventions, but were rebuffed by Russia. As a result of the rebellion, Poland again lost its autonomous position and became fully subject to Russian administration. Nicholas Miliutin, Samarin, and Cherkassky were dispatched to conquered Poland to study the conditions there and propose appropriate measures. Of their recommendations, however, only those referring to the emancipation of the serfs and land settlement were adopted. Peasants in Poland obtained a more favorable arrangement than those in Russia, while the Polish landlords fared much worse than their Russian counterparts. Otherwise the government chose
to rely on centralization, police control, and Russification, with the Russian language made compulsory in Polish schools. A still more intense Russification developed in the western borderlands of Russia, where every effort was made to eradicate the Polish influence. A 10 per cent assessment was imposed there on Polish estates, the use of the Polish language was forbidden, and the property of the Catholic Church was confiscated. In 1875 the Uniates in Poland proper were forcibly reconverted to Orthodoxy.
In spite of the serious troubles of the early 1860's, Alexarider II and his associates continued to reform Russia, and the future course of state policy appeared to hang in the balance. For example, while the authorities penalized disaffected Russian students and punished severely - sometimes, as in the case of Nicholas Chernyshevsky, rather clearly on insufficient evidence - those connected with the revolutionary agitation, a considerably more liberal official, Alexander Golovnin, replaced Admiral Putiatin in 1862 as minister of education, and a new and much freer University Statute became law in 1863. Even the Polish rebellion, while it resulted in oppression of the Poles, did not seem to affect the course of reform in Russia. The decisive change away from reform came, in the opinion of many historians, in 1866, following an attempt by an emotionally unbalanced student, Dmitrii Karakozov, to assassinate the emperor. In that year the reactionary Count Dmitrii Tolstoy took charge as minister of education, and the government proceeded gradually to revamp schooling in Russia, intending that stricter controls and heavy emphasis on the classical languages would discipline students and keep their attention
