Russian foreign policy had been undergoing important changes in the decades that followed the Congress of Berlin. The most significant developments were the final rupture with Austria-Hungary and Germany and the alliance with France. Although the Three Emperors' League had foundered in the Balkan crisis, a new Alliance of the Three Emperors was concluded in June 1881 for three years and renewed in 1884 for another three years. Its most essential provision declared that if one of the contracting powers - Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Russia - engaged in war with a fourth power, except Turkey, the other two were to maintain friendly neutrality.
But, because of their conflicting interests in the Balkans, it proved impossible for Russia and Austria-Hungary to stay in the same alliance. The next major crisis occurred over Bulgaria where - as Charles Jelavich and other specialists have demonstrated - Russia destroyed a great amount of popularity and goodwill by an overbearing and stupid policy. The Russian quarrel with the Bulgarian ruler, Alexander of Battenberg, and the Russian refusal to sanction the unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in 1885 failed to stop the unification but resulted in the abdication of Alexander of Battenberg and the election by the Bulgarian Assembly of the pro-Austrian Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg to the Bulgarian throne. Bulgaria abandoned the Russian sphere of influence and entered the Austrian, leaving the empire of the tsars virtually without Balkan allies. At the same time tension in relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary increased almost to the breaking point. However, Germany, by contrast with Austria-Hungary and despite the fact that in 1879 it had become a close partner of the Hapsburg state, tried at first to retain the Russian connection. Thus when the Alliance of the Three Emperors expired in 1887, Germany and Russia concluded in secret the so-called Reinsurance Treaty, Bismarck's 'wire to St. Petersburg' and a veritable
The Russian rupture with the Germanic powers and the general isolation of Russia appeared all the more ominous because of Anglo-Russian tension over the expansion of the Russian Empire in Central Asia, which, the British felt, threatened India. That tension attained its high point in 1885 when the Russians, having reached as far south as the vague Afghan border, clashed with the soldiers of the amir. Although an Anglo-Russian war was avoided and the boundary settled by compromise, Great Britain and Russia remained hostile to each other well past the turn of the century as they competed for influence and control in vast lands south of Russia, especially in Iran.
Political realities pointed to a Franco-Russian alliance - Bismarck's nightmare and the reason behind the Reinsurance Treaty - for France was as isolated as Russia and more threatened. Alexander III, his cautious foreign minister Nicholas Giers, and other tsarist high officials reached that conclusion reluctantly, because they had no liking for the Third Republic and no confidence in it, and because the traditional German orientation in Russian foreign policy died hard. Yet France remained the only possible
partner, and it had much to offer. In particular, Paris alone provided a great market for Russian state loans - the Berlin financial market, it might be added, was closed to Russia in 1887 - and thus the main source of foreign financial support much needed by the imperial government. In fact, Frenchmen proved remarkably eager to subscribe to these loans as well as to invest directly in the Russian economy. Economics thus joined politics, although it would be fair to say that politics led the way. The alliance was consolidated in several stages, beginning with the diplomatic understanding of 1891 and ending with the military convention of December 1893-January 1894. B. Nolde, Langer, and other scholars have indicated how through the drawn-out negotiations the French pressed for an ever firmer and more binding agreement, gradually forcing the hand of the hesitant Russians. In its final form the alliance provided that if France were attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia would employ all available forces against Germany; and if Russia were attacked by Germany, or by Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, France would employ all available forces against Germany. Additional articles dealt with mobilization, the number of troops to be contributed, and other specific military plans. The Franco-Russian agreement was to remain in force for the duration of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.
Nicholas II approved Alexander Ill's foreign policy on the whole and wanted to continue it. However, as we shall see, the new emperor proved to be less steady and more erratic than his father in international relations as in domestic affairs. Also, while Alexander III relied on the careful and experienced Giers throughout his rule, Nicholas II had several foreign ministers whose differences and personal preferences affected imperial diplomacy. In addition, the reign of the last tsar witnessed more than its share of court cliques and cabals which on occasion exercised a strong and at the same time irresponsible influence on the conduct of Russian foreign policy.
Nicholas II appeared prominently on the international scene in 1899, when he called together the first Hague Peace Conference attended by representatives of twenty-six states. Although instigated by Russian financial stringency and in particular by the difficulty of keeping up with Austrian armaments, this initiative was in accord with the emperor's generally peaceful views. While the Conference failed to agree on disarmament or compulsory arbitration of disputes, it did pass certain 'laws of war' - later often disregarded in practice, as in the case of the temporary injunction against the use of 'projectiles thrown from balloons' - and set up a permanent court of arbitration, the International Court of Justice at the Hague. More important, it became the first of a long series of international conferences on disarmament and peace, on which the hopes of mankind ride today. The Second Hague Peace Conference, in 1907, was also attended
by Russian representatives, but again it could not reach agreement on the major issues under discussion.
Nicholas II's own policy, however, did not always contribute to peace. Aggressiveness and adventurous involvement characterized Russian behavior in the Far East around the turn of the century, which culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad between 1891 and 1903, entirely justified in terms of the needs of Siberia, served also to link Russia to Manchuria, China, Korea, and even, indirectly, to Japan. Japan had just gone through a remarkable modernization and in 1894-95 it fought and defeated China, obtaining by the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Chinese territories of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula, together with other gains, including the recognition of full independence for Korea. Before Japan could profit from the Liaotung Peninsula, Russia, France, and Germany forced her to give it up. Next Russia concluded a secret agreement with China, whereby in return for guaranteeing Chinese territory against outside aggression, it obtained the right to construct a railroad through Manchuria to the coast. Although the new railroad, the East China Railway, belonged nominally to a private company with a large Chinese participation, it marked in effect the establishment of a Russian sphere of influence in northern Manchuria, an influence centered in Harbin and extending along railroad tracks and properties guarded by a special Russian railroad guard.
While Russia had legitimate commercial and other interests in Asia - for one thing, selling the products of its factories in the East when they could not compete in the West - and while up to that point Russian imperialism in the Far East had limited itself to peaceful penetration, the situation became increasingly tense. Moreover, Russia responded to new opportunities more and more aggressively. Thus, when the murder of two German missionaries in November 1897 led to the German acquisition of Kiao-chow through a ninety-nine year lease, Nicholas II demanded and obtained a twenty-five year lease of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula with Port Arthur - in spite of Witte's opposition to that move and in flagrant disregard of the Russian treaty with China. Witte in turn proceeded to make the most of the situation and rapidly develop Russian interests in southern Manchuria. Following the so- called Boxer rebellion of the exasperated Chinese against foreigners in 1900-1901, which Russian forces helped to suppress, tsarist troops remained in Manchuria on the pretext that local conditions represented a threat to the railroad. In addition, a group of adventurers with strong connections at the Russian court began to promote a scheme of timber concessions on the Yalu River meant to serve
as a vehicle for Russian penetration into Korea. Witte, who objected energetically to the dangerous new scheme, had to leave the Ministry of Finance; the Foreign Office failed to restrain or control Russian policy in the
