of October, 1961, confirmed on the whole Khrushchev's dominant position. As expected, it gave ready approval to the new leader's twenty-year program of 'building communism' and denounced his enemies at home and abroad. Another old leader, Voroshilov, was linked to the 'anti-Party group.' In a much more unexpected development, however, Khrushchev and the Congress returned to the grizzly issue of Stalinism, detailing and documenting many of its atrocities. The removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum in Red Square, the renaming of the cities named after Stalin, with Stalingrad becoming Volgograd, and the publicity given for the first time to certain aspects of the great purge must have had a powerful impact on many Soviet minds.
Yet, although Khrushchev managed to assert his will at the Twenty-second Party Congress and even evict Stalin from the mausoleum, it can be seen in retrospect that by 1961 his fortunes were on the decline. In fact, 1958 probably marked Khrushchev's zenith. The year followed the new leader's decisive victory over the 'anti-Party group,' and the sensational Soviet inauguration of the space age the preceding autumn. It was blessed with a bounteous harvest. In spite of serious problems, industrial production continued to grow at a high rate. The ebullient Khrushchev could readily believe that all roads led to a communism that was bound to bury capitalism in the not-too-distant future.
Disillusionments followed in rapid succession. Economic development went sour; Khrushchev's exhortations, and his economic, administrative, and party reorganizations, together with his hectic campaigns to remedy particular deficiencies - all to be discussed later in this chapter - were increasingly ineffective in resolving the crisis. In his last years and months in office Khrushchev saw the rate of industrial growth decline sharply while he had to resort to an unprecedented purchase of Canadian wheat to forestall hunger at home. De-Stalinization or, more broadly, a certain 'liberalization' of Soviet life seemed to produce as many problems as it resolved. It led in effect to soul-searching and instability rather than to any outburst of creative communist energy. The world situation - also to be discussed later - deteriorated even more sharply from the Soviet point of view. In 1960 the conflict with China, which dated back at least to Khrushchev's original de-Stalinization of 1956, burst into the open, and from about 1963 the break between the former allies seemed irreparable. In the relations with the West, Khrushchev's aggressive enthusiasm, spurred by the successes of Soviet space technology, received repeated checks in Germany and finally suffered a smashing defeat in October 1962 in the crucial confrontation with the United States over the Soviet missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev's survival of the catastrophe of his apparently largely personal foreign policy might be considered a tribute to Soviet totalitarianism. Yet totalitarianism too was deteriorating in the Soviet Union. Ob-
servers noted that although the Twenty-second Party Congress confirmed and extended Khrushchev's victory over the 'anti-Party group' these enemies of the leader were not even expelled from the Party. New fissures and problems appeared in the ensuing months and years. It would seem that during this time Khrushchev made the mistake of acting in an increasingly autocratic and arbitrary manner even though his power was not nearly as great as Stalin's had been.
On October 15, 1964, it was announced in Moscow that Nikita Ser-geevich Khrushchev had been 'released' from both his Party and his government positions, because of 'advanced age and deterioration of his health.'
The ten years or so of Khrushchev's rule of the Soviet Union have often been described as a transitional period, but they also marked a culmination. When Khrushchev assumed power in the Kremlin he became both the head of the U.S.S.R. and the leader of an essentially united, ever-victorious, and ever-expanding world communism. He could still believe in the identity of interests of the state and the movement. Indeed he delighted in counting the years, twenty or fifteen, at the end of which the Soviet Union would enter full communism, and additional years, perhaps to the time of 'our grandchildren,' which would establish communism all over the globe. Khrushchev's own rags-to-riches story was about to be repeated on a universal scale. By the time the enthusiastic leader 'retired,' communism was hopelessly split between the antagonistic centers of Moscow and Peking, while the Cuban confrontation and defeat spelled out to the Soviet leaders in an unforgettable manner the realities of the atomic age, of which Marx and Engels and even Lenin had had no inkling. At home de-Stalinization kept releasing new furies, and the economic situation called for emergency measures to improve productivity, distribution, and services rather than for blueprints of a communist Utopia. All these, and many other problems, fell upon the shoulders of Khrushchev's successors, and in particular on Leonid Brezhnev, who obtained the top position in the Party, and Alexis Kosygin, who as prime minister became the effective head of the government.
The new leaders had the usual record of Party and government service, and their views could not be easily distinguished from those of Khrushchev. In fact, Khrushchev apparently had thought of Brezhnev as his eventual successor. The Chinese and certain others who expected Soviet policy to be transformed by the fall of Khrushchev were quickly disappointed. Instead of challenging Khrushchev on fundamentals, the new leadership assailed his personal performance and style of work, accusing him of 'subjectivism,' authoritarianism, ignorance, 'hare-brained schemes,' and 'mad
improvisations.' Khrushchev's sweeping reorganizational reforms were repealed, some promptly and some after a period of time. It was a certain businesslike, low-key quality of the new administration that presented a striking contrast to the flamboyancy and bombast of the deposed leader. The overturn of October 1964 could also be considered a reassertion of collective leadership, eliminating as it did the latest cult of personality.
Although the fall of Khrushchev strengthened the forces opposed to de-Stalinization, they proved unable to gain the upper hand. Instead the leadership resorted to compromise which found its characteristic expression in the mammoth Twenty-third Party Congress held in the spring of 1966. There were 4,942 delegates and additional representatives of 86 foreign communist parties and sympathizing organizations - the number announced was 86, but there were actually somewhat fewer. The Congress avoided mention of such crucial issues as China, Stalin, or, for that matter, Khrushchev. With the Vietnam war in full swing, it adopted doctrinaire, anti-imperialistic planks in foreign policy and expounded a hard line in matters of ideology and culture. On the other hand, it upheld a certain economic 'liberalization' and took a more realistic view of the economic and social development and potentialities of the Soviet Union than had been customary under Khrushchev. In the words of critical commentators, the Soviet authorities opted for economic development without its consequences. It was by the decision of the Twenty-third Congress that the Presidium became again, as in the days of Stalin, the Politburo, and the first secretary of the Party became again the general secretary.
Brezhnev was also the central figure and delivered the main address at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in March and April 1971, the Twenty-fifth Party Congress in late February 1976, and the Twenty-sixth Party Congress in February and March 1981. His authority grew with the years, and one could speak even of a cult of Brezhnev, especially after the general secretary of the Party also became, in 1976, a Marshal of the Soviet Union and his autobiographical writings were given tremendous prominence. Yet he continued, apparently, to work closely with other leaders of the Politburo; besides, Brezhnev, born in 1906, was becoming increasingly an old and sick man. His name and efforts came to be associated with the policy of detente, which the Soviet propaganda machine preferred to call 'irreversible,' with the great strengthening of the Soviet military might vis-a-vis the United States, and also with economic policies emphasizing such crucial sectors as agriculture and energy. Living standards rose markedly, and some commentators began to write of a Soviet version of consumer attitudes and a consumer society. The Party and government elite in particular came to enjoy high living, although, not surprisingly, it has remained touchy on that subject. In the anecdotal words of Brezhnev's uneducated mother, at the sight of her son's splendid collection of motor
cars: 'That is fine, my dear son, but what if the Bolsheviks return?' Yet, as the Soviet economic situation became more difficult in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Brezhnev government attempted essentially palliatives rather than fundamental reform: 'the decision has been made 'to settle for short-run solutions to long- term problems.' ' Certain observers concluded that, although Brezhnev did not have complete control of the Soviet Union, he had full veto power of any reforms and that, therefore, no real change could be expected as long as he remained at the helm.
When Brezhnev died, finally, on November 10, 1982, at the age of seventy-five, he had outlived such near- peers as Kosygin, by about two years, and the chief Party ideologist, Michael Suslov, by less than a year; Nicholas Podgorny had been ousted from the leadership in 1977; Brezhnev's long-time lieutenant, Andrew Kirilenko, slightly
