and by very numerous cultural and personal ties, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Russian relations with the Baltic states to the west and northern Kazakhstan to the east, which, while not 'Russian' in the same sense as Ukraine and Belarus, or even Slavic, contained a very large percentage of Russians in their populations. In fact, some thirty million ethnic Russians found themselves outside the Russian Federation, perhaps twenty million in Ukraine and ten million in other new republics, where sometimes, as in such small countries as Estonia and Latvia, they formed a third or more of the population. Russian-Ukranian relations have been most significant and problematic. Whereas much of eastern Ukraine is ethnically Russian and Russians constitute the largest ethnicity also in the Crimea, transferred to Ukraine by Soviet authorities as recently as 1954, western Ukraine is not only solidly Ukrainian, but also, in part, ardently nationalist, and, again in part, even different in religion, professing Uniate Catholicism rather than Orthodoxy. Under the circumstances, and pressed hard by their respective nationalists, the two governments did well to settle their mutual affairs peacefully, as reflected in the treaty of friendship of May 30-31, 1997, signed by Yeltsin and Leonid Kuchma, confirming the boundary between the two countries and agreeing that Russia lease from Ukraine for twenty years the great Crimean naval base of Sevastopel (so prominent in the Crimean War of 1853-56). The Russian need for peace followed readily from everything discussed previously; as to Ukraine, it was probably worse off economically than Russia, on which it depended for fuel and other imports and to which it was heavily in debt.
White Russia, or Belarus, has been very different from Ukraine. Behind Ukraine in developing a sense of identity or nationalism of any kind (the Lithuanian-Russian state is one of its main historical assets), Belarus has also exhibited little or no hostility towards Russia, a feeling that has been one of the inspirations of Ukranian nationalism. Poor, its economy unreformed, and dependent on Russia for fuel and other needs, Belarus seemed to be in many ways an ideal junior partner for its giant neighbor. And indeed Belarus and Russia signed on April 2, 1997, a Treaty of Union. Although Yeltsin presented that treaty as a major success, it was not clear what it meant or where it would lead. In fact, economists in particular asked, what could Russia gain from Belarus? In addition, the crude, dictatorial head of Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko, kept arousing opposition at home and even in the world (as when he was
forcing foreign diplomatie representatives to vacate their domiciles in Minsk), and, albeit in his own way pro-Russian, was regarded with much suspicion by the Russians.
In the cases of the Baltic countries, Kazakhstan and most other successor states, the Russian government was not concerned with their historical past or their ethnic and cultural closeness to the Russians, but only with how these obviously foreign entities treated their ethnically Russian subjects. Yet tensions were raised by the possibility that a change in the Russians' approach might lead to their claiming on ethnic grounds territories all the way from a strip along the Estonian border to the entire northern Kazakhstan. Nor is the issue of 'the treatment' of Russians in the succession republics an easy one. It pivots on requirements for citizenship and especially on how quickly and how well Russian inhabitants must learn the official language of their republic to qualify for citizenship, although sometimes when the candidates for citizenship or their families moved into the area also matter. And the languages in question range from difficult to very difficult. Still, some adjustments and compromises have been made, and the attitude of the Russian government on this entire issue deserves to be considered on the whole reasonable, unless one is to assume that it has no right at all to be concerned with the fate of Russians outside Russia.
The Soviet government and the Red Army also gave up Eastern Europe, including East Germany, and in fact evacuated it, in general, in a remarkably precipitous and total way. During the years that followed, the countries in that area underwent different experiences, some of them like and others unlike those of Russia, ranging from the absorption of East Germany into a larger Germany, and Vaclav Havel's liberal regime in Czechoslovakia to strong residual communism and neo-communism in such states as Rumania, Bulgaria, and even to some extent Poland. Yet throughout Eastern Europe the period preceding the collapse of 1989 was regarded as that of Russian, as well as communist, oppression, and, once the oppression ended, the inhabitants of the area were at best indifferent to the Russians and their fate. In fact, as debates about the expansion of N.A.T.O. and other evidence indicated, East European countries could be considered as much enemies as friends of Russia. A greater sympathy awaited new Russia in central and western Europe and in the United States. Following Gorbachev's example, Yeltsin maintained excellent personal relation with Western leaders, such as Chancellor Kohl and President Clinton. In January 1996 Russia was admitted to membership in the Council of Europe. In general Clinton and West European leaders and states, including Germany, strongly supported Yeltsin and his limping program of democracy and modernization, although, to be sure, no Marshall Plan was established for Russia, and although Russians felt deceived in their expectations of a much larger sponsorship. The Russian Federation also tried to maintain good relations with other neighbors as well as more distant countries, in spite of such serious hindrances as its inability to settle the issue of the sovereignty of certain of the Kurile islands with Japan.
Some significant conroversies and conflicts did arise. Perhaps especially important in that regard was the official invitation issued by N.A.T.O. on July 8, 1997, to Poland, the Czech Republic (Slovakia had Seceded from Czechoslovakia), and Hungary to join the alliance by 1999. (The three countries became members of N.A.T.O. on March 19, 1999). Judged, with some reason - especially with a view to a still further future expansion of N.A.T.O. - to be anti-Russian as well as unnecessary by the Russians, this move produced a strong negative reaction in Russia, mitigated to some extent by certain 'special arrangements' instituted between the Russian Federation and N.A.T.O. Russia disagreed with the United States and other Western countries on many issues. This, however, no longer represented the dreaded confrontation of the communist and the free worlds. Indeed, in numerous matters, whether related to Bosnia or to Iraq, France, for example, often stood closer to Russia than to the United States.
The Kosovo tragedy, however, and in particular the aerial assault on Yugoslavia, beginning on the twenty- fourth of March, by the United States and other members of N.A.T.O., came as a tremendous shock to the Russians who were outraged by that unexpected attack on a sovereign, Orthodox and Slavic state. The liberals, who had put their trust in the West, were probably even more upset than the nationalists, the conservatives and the communists. A notable exception were the people of Islamic background inhabiting the Russian federation, such as the Tartars, who came out strongly in support of the victimized Moslem Albanians of Kosovo. In line with the popular outcry, the Russian government denounced the N.A.T.O. aggression and highlighted its opposition by such gestures as Primakov's turning back in the air on the way to a conference in Washington, once N.A.T.O. bombs began to fall, and a refusal of Russia to attend as a guest the celebration by N.A.T.O. of its fiftieth anniversary. Still, Yeltsin and his government maintained essential ties with the West, and indeed tried to borrow as much more money as they could from the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, continuous aerial bombardment as well as quite possibly Russian efforts at negotiation made Milosevic finally give in to N.A.T.O., and peace was established in Kosovo in the second half of June. Russia went on to participate - not without new tensions - in the occupation and the restoration of the devastated area. On the whole its international position improved because of its role in the Kosovo tragedy, with, in particular, promises of more Western financial help. And it had a new government, headed by another veteran of the establishment, Sergei Stepashin. Many observers believed that Yeltsin dismissed Primakov because he found the prime minister too popular and too independent.
The years of Yeltsin's presidential rule, so obviously transitional in economics and politics, were no less fluid and even chaotic in social terms. Some of the
major changes that then occurred are probably irreversible. Thus, in direct contrast to the former command economy, some 80 per cent of industry and business became privatized. Privatization, aptly stigmatized by the Russians as
