unclear. Perhaps he wanted to be able to go on arguing the case in the Central Committee (whereas Kamenev had undeniably breached confidentiality and jeopardised the party’s security).
This spat fell into the lap of Stalin as chief editor of
He recovered his poise only when his request was rejected. This seemed the end of the matter; nobody knew how deeply he resented any shock to his self-esteem — and Trotski in 1940 was to pay the ultimate personal price. In terms of Bolshevik political strategy it remains unclear why Stalin was indulgent to Kamenev and Zinoviev. He never explained his thinking. But it would be in accord with his usual attitude to regard Kamenev and Zinoviev as allies in the struggle to reduce Trotski’s influence to a minimum. Lenin’s growing penchant for Trotski was a threat to the authority of Central Committee veterans. Another possibility is that Stalin sensed that the opponents of insurrection would ultimately stay with the party. Milyutin quickly moved back into line with official policy. Perhaps Stalin believed that a disunited party could not carry through the necessary armed manoeuvres against the Provisional Government. At any rate it was on his best form that he returned to the Central Committee on 21 October. Stalin, not Trotski, drew up the agenda for the forthcoming Second Congress of Soviets. His scheme marked down Lenin to speak on ‘land, war and power’, Milyutin on workers’ control, Trotski on ‘the current situation’ and Stalin himself on the ‘national question’.15
At the same Central Committee meeting Stalin was included in the list of ten members deputed to reinforce the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. He was at the centre of political operations.16 Already he belonged to the Military-Revolutionary Committee. He also had a vibrant influence in the Party Central Committee and, despite the contretemps over Zinoviev, was among its most trusted leaders.
The Provisional Government was the first to act in the contest with the Bolsheviks. On the morning of 24 October, on Kerenski’s orders, troops arrived at the premises of
The existing government of landlords and capitalists must be replaced by a new government, a government of workers and peasants.
The existing pseudo-government which was not elected by the people and which is not accountable to the people must be replaced by a government recognised by the people, elected by representatives of the workers, soldiers and peasants and held accountable to their representatives.
The Kishkin–Konovalov government should be replaced by a government of soviets of workers’, soldiers’ and peasants’ deputies.
Kishkin was Minister of Internal Affairs, Konovalov the Minister of Industry. Stalin recommended readers to ‘organise your meetings and elect your delegations’, ending with the invocation: ‘If all of you act solidly and staunchly, nobody will dare to resist the will of the people.’18 The revolutionary intent was obvious even if Stalin pragmatically refrained from spelling it out.
Presumably it was his editorial duties that prevented him from attending the Central Committee on the same day. Trotski too was absent, but this did not inhibit him from denigrating Stalin as a man who avoided participation in the decisions and activities connected with the seizure of power.19 The story got around — and has kept its currency — that Stalin was ‘the man who missed the revolution’.20 Proof was thought to lie in the assignments given by the Central Committee to its own members. Here is the list of assignments:21
Bubnovv – railways
Dzierzynski – post and telegraph
Milyutin – food supplies
Podvoiski (changed to Sverdlov after objection by Podvoiski) – surveillance of Provisional Government
Kamenev and Vinter – negotiations with Left SRs [who were on the radical extreme of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries]
Lomov and Nogin – information to Moscow
Trotski thought this demonstrated the marginality of Joseph Stalin to the historic occasion being planned.
Yet if inclusion on the list was crucial, why were Trotski and Lenin omitted? And if commitment to the insurrection was a criterion, why did the Central Committee involve Kamenev? The point was that Lenin had to remain in hiding and Trotski was busy in the Military-Revolutionary Committee. Stalin as newspaper editor also had tasks which preoccupied him, and these tasks were not unimportant. As soon as he had the time, he returned to the Smolny Institute and rejoined his leading comrades. There he was instantly given a job, being sent with Trotski to brief the Bolshevik delegates who had arrived in the building for the Second Congress of Soviets. Stalin spoke about information coming into the Central Committee offices. He emphasised the support available for the insurrection from the armed forces as well as the disarray in the Provisional Government. Stalin and Trotski performed their task well. There was recognition in the Central Committee of the need for tactical finesse. A premature rising was to be avoided; and in order to gain the acquiescence of the Left SRs it was sensible to act as if every measure was merely an attempt to defend the interests of the Revolution against its militant enemies.22
The Petrograd situation was dangerously fluid. Troops were on their way from outside the capital to help the Military-Revolutionary Committee, which already controlled the central post office. Stalin was confident that facilities could be established to restore
Stalin went back to the Alliluevs’ apartment for the night. There was no time for jokes or story-telling. He was tired out. Yet he had carried out his duties more than satisfactorily. Anna Allilueva heard him saying: ‘Yes, everything’s ready. We take action tomorrow. We’ve got all the city districts in our hands. We shall seize power!’24 He lay down for the last few hours of undisturbed rest he would have for several days. He did not sleep very long. An emergency Central Committee meeting was called before dawn on 25 October and Stalin had to be present. Even the ‘strike-breakers’ Kamenev and Zinoviev attended. The minutes have not survived the October Revolution, but the agenda must surely have been devoted to the practical side of seizing power. The military planning was finalised and discussion took place about the new revolutionary government, its personnel and its decrees. Lenin was charged with drafting decrees on land and peace. When the moment came, the Council of People’s Commissars had to be able to make its purposes clear.25
The fact that Stalin was not asked to direct any armed activity has perpetuated a legend that he counted for nothing in the Central Committee. This is to ignore the broader scope of the meeting. The Military-Revolutionary Committee had already made its dispositions of the garrisons and Red Guards. Stalin’s functions had previously precluded him from involvement in such activity and it would have been folly to insert him at the last moment. Yet the meeting also deliberated on what was to happen when the Provisional Government was declared overthrown later in the day. Stalin took part in the deliberations as light began to dawn. Already he knew he would have immense tasks to discharge when daylight came.26 Expectancy intensified. He and his Central Committee comrades snatched food and drink as they talked. They went on consulting each other. They greeted messengers from all over Petrograd and sent others out on errands. Although their eyes were red with lack of sleep, their concentration was acute. This was the time of their lives. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat was about to be
