Stalin: A Biography

worst renegades. Indeed by 1932 he told Kaganovich to get Pravda to ‘curse crudely and sharply’ not only Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries but also Right Deviationists and Trotskyists as being advocates of the restoration of capitalism.¹⁹ The intention was evident. Stalin and the Kremlin gang were to regard themselves as the sole repository of political wisdom and socialist commitment. The people of the USSR should be led to believe that only the ascendant party leadership would truly try to supply society with material and social welfare and that anti-Stalinists would drag the country down and back to the bad old days of greedy factory owners, bankers and landlords. Vilification of opponents should therefore be taken to the point of the fantasy that Bukharin and Trotski were in league with the capitalist West.

Stalin turned all criticism of himself into a drama. Slight divergence from his wishes was treated as personal betrayal and political treason. He transmitted this attitude to his followers and got them to gang up on those whom he wished to topple. On vacation in September 1929, he sent a furious note to Politburo members Molotov, Voroshilov and Ordzhonikidze:²⁰

Have you read Rykov’s speech? In my opinion it represents the speech of a non-party Soviet bureaucrat disguised by the tone of someone ‘loyal’ and ‘sympathetic’ to the Soviets. Not a word about the party! Not a word about the Right Deviation! Not a word about the party’s achievements which Rykov dirtily accredits to himself but which in fact were made through struggle with the Rightists, including Rykov himself… I have discovered that Rykov is continuing to act as [Politburo] chairman for you on Mondays and Thursdays. Is this true? If it’s true, why are you permitting such a comedy? Who needs it and for what purpose?

Molotov instantly obeyed: ‘It’s obvious to me… that St[alin] is right. My only disagreement is that we’re “sheltering” Rykov. We must, however, correct the matter as proposed by St[alin].’²¹

It was easy for Stalin, the Soviet political counterpart of Al Capone, to find new gang members.²² As his previous supporters were found wanting in zeal or efficiency, he promoted others. Some were among the most unappealing figures in Soviet public life. Andrei Vyshinski, a former Menshevik, became Chief Prosecutor in 1935. His basic proposition that confession (which could be obtained by torture) was the queen of the modalities of judicial proof was music to Stalin’s ears. Lavrenti Beria, First Party Secretary of the Transcaucasian Federation until his promotion in 1938 to the leadership of the NKVD (which incorporated the OGPU from 1934), had a penchant for beating his prisoners personally. Nikolai Yezhov, promiscuous bisexual and alcoholic, was even quicker to jump to the worst conclusions about individuals than Stalin was. Stalin was to make him NKVD chief in 1936. Others such as Nikita Khrushchev, who headed the Moscow City Party Committee from 1935, had a decent side; but this did not stop him from doing his share of killing in the Great Terror.

Stalin did not overlook the Comintern. Bukharin had supervised its Executive Committee on the Politburo’s behalf since Zinoviev’s demise. With the falling out between Stalin and Bukharin in 1928, this body became an area of contention, and Bukharin was ejected from the Executive Committee in April 1929. For some time Stalin relied upon Dmitri Manuilski and Osip Pyatnitski to run the show for him in the Comintern. They held the main European communist parties to account. A tight hierarchy controlled what went on in German, Italian and French communism. The system of command was reinforced by the presence in Moscow of leading and trusted leaders on secondment from their native countries. Among them were Ernst Meyer, Palmiro Togliatti and Maurice Thorez. But the Comintern did not limit itself to long-distance control. Agents were sent on lengthy missions. Thus the Hungarian Eugen Fried was dispatched to Paris and kept in regular contact with the Politburo of the French Communist Party; and communists in France attempted little without prior sanction being obtained from him.²³ The Comintern had been strictly controlled since its foundation in 1919; but the degree of interference rose in the 1930s as Stalin sought to ensure that nothing done by communists abroad would damage the interests of what he was attempting in the USSR.

It did not come easily to Stalin to offer a reasoned critique. In fact it did not come to him at all. He was a political streetfighter: no holds were barred. He believed this was what the situation required. Although he confected a risible image of his enemies, his worries about the position of himself and his associates were not entirely unrealistic. They had jerked the rudder of policies away from the NEP and set a course for rapid and violent economic transformation. The gang had to take responsibility for the consequences. They could expect no mercy unless they could guarantee an increase in economic and military capacity. It made sense to blackguard the critics in case things went wrong. Citing Lenin’s words at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, Stalin told Kaganovich that factional dissent from the ascendant leadership’s line would result in the emergence of ‘White Guard’ tendencies and ‘the defence of capitalism’.²⁴ Lenin had said no such thing. But this did not matter to Stalin: he wanted to sharpen the siege mentality already experienced by his fellow Politburo members and the repetition of outlandish accusations suited this desire.

While rehabilitating several repentant members of the United Opposition, Stalin showed no indulgence to the unapologetic Trotski. In January 1929 the Politburo discussed what to do with the man who was capable of causing them most trouble. From exile in Alma-Ata, Trotski was producing ripples in Moscow. His remaining supporters tended his memory in hope that his restoration to power would not long be postponed. Even members of Stalin’s entourage urged him to bring Trotski back since the basic official economic orientation was what Trotski had long recommended (and Aaron Solts said to Ordzhonikidze that Trotski would bring greater intelligence to the policies).²⁵ Trotski offered no word of compromise to Stalin, who for his part feared that until he got rid of his old enemy there would always be a danger that Trotski would exploit whatever difficulties arose in the First Five-Year Plan.

Yet Stalin did not yet call for his physical liquidation. No veteran Bolshevik had been executed for political dissent. The alternative to Alma-Ata was deportation from the USSR. Already in summer 1927 Stalin had considered sending him to Japan.²⁶ The Politburo came to its decision on 10 January 1929 and Trotski was expelled for ‘anti-Soviet work’.²⁷ Turkey was the destination chosen. Trotski and his family set sail across the Black Sea on the steamship Ilich. The Politburo calculated that he would be shunned by the parties of the Comintern (as he was) and ignored by the world’s capitalist powers (as he was). But Trotski was not finished. He started to publish a regular Bulletin of the Opposition from abroad. Expelled from party and country, he had nothing to lose. What was disconcerting to Stalin was that Trotski’s contact with the USSR remained unbroken. The Bulletin reported on controversies in the central party leadership. Trotski knew the Moscow political gossip; he also dredged his memory for instances of Stalin’s stupidity and nastiness and described them in his autobiography²⁸ — and he knew that Stalin hated being ridiculed or criticised. Distribution of the Bulletin was clandestine, but this had also been the case with the Bolshevik faction before 1917. Deportation was not the cure for the ills of Trotskyism.

Stalin did not repeat the gaffe of letting an oppositionist leader out of his clutches. In summer 1929 he learned that Vissarion Lominadze and a few other second-rank Bolsheviks were criticising the style and policies of his leadership. In the following year there was further trouble. Lominadze had been talking also to the Chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom, Sergei Syrtsov. Stalin drew the worst possible conclusion, writing to Molotov:²⁹

I’m sending you the two communications of [the interrogated informer] Reznikov about the anti-party — and essentially Right-Deviationist — factional Syrtsov–Lominadze grouping. Inconceivable vileness. All the details point to Reznikov’s communications corresponding to reality. They were toying with a coup d’etat, they were playing at being the Politburo, and they’ve ended up in a complete collapse.

Stalin’s suspicions were too fantastic even for Molotov, and Lominadze and Syrtsov were simply dismissed from the Central Committee.

The atmosphere of a political witch-hunt was thickening. Nikolai Bauman was sacked from the Central Committee Secretariat for being mildly conciliatory to the former members of the United Opposition. Stalin, Molotov and Kaganovich were edgy. Their policies involved a huge gamble. In seeking to consolidate the regime and to deepen the Revolution they were attacking a wide front of enemies in politics, the economy and society. This required the vigorous deployment of party, armed forces and the OGPU. The leaders of these institutions had to be trustworthy. Each institution had to be strengthened in personnel and material resources to carry out its tasks. But,