many wanted - although it is worth remembering that in 1917 few had aspired to complete national independence - yet far more than was on offer from Whites, the Allies, the Germans, or Turks. At the same time, they exploited the weakness of nationalism to reintegrate the bulk
of the non-Russian territories into the Soviet Union. By 1922 the territory of the Soviet state was only 4% smaller than that of the tsarist empire. Moreover, the logic of this reincorporation was determined by many of the same geopolitical, security, and economic considerations that had governed the expansion of the tsarist state. A colossal territory unbroken by well-defined geographical or ethnic features, the unfavourable location of mineral resources, and above all, competition with rival states encouraged the reconstitution of a centralized quasi-imperial state. This did not mean that the Bolsheviks were simply old-style imperialists whose commitment to national self- determination was fraudulent. Despite the rampant racism of certain Bolsheviks on the ground, and the fact that the centre was never unequivocally in favour of granting national autonomy, policy in this period was generally animated by internationalism. It is not possible otherwise to explain why so much energy went into forging alliances with national ? movements or devising political frameworks for self-determination. g Prior to 1917 the Bolsheviks had opposed the concept of federalism, e preferring 'regional autonomy' within a unitary state. Yet, haphazardly, jg in response to forces that defied their control, they proceeded to
Party dictatorship
In December 1917 the Cheka was set up to 'liquidate all attempts and acts of counter-revolution and sabotage'. It quickly turned into one of the most powerful organs of state, involved not only in eliminating counter- revolutionaries - of whom there were not a few - but also in combating speculation, corruption, and crime. By autumn 1918 the Cheka was associated above all with the Red terror. The Bolsheviks
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initially insisted that terror was a legitimate method of defending the dictatorship of the proletariat, but they promised to use it only as a last resort. As early as January 1918, however, Lenin warned:'Until we use terror against speculators - shooting them on the spot - nothing will happen,' prompting the Left SR, I. N. Steinberg, to ask why in that case he should waste his time serving as Commissar of Justice. It was only with the near-fatal attack on Lenin by the anarchist F. Kaplan on 30 August 1918 that terror became elevated to official policy. In Petrograd the leading newspaper shrieked:'For the blood of Lenin ... let there be floods of blood of the bourgeoisie - more blood, as much as possible.'
My words to you, you bloodthirsty beast You intruded into the ranks of the revolution and did not allow the Constituent Assembly to meet. You said: 'Down with prisons, Down with shootings, Down with soldiering. Let wage workers be secure.' In a word you promised heaps of gold and a heavenly existence. The people felt the revolution, began to breathe easily. We were allowed to meet, to say what we liked, fearing nothing. And then you, Bloodsucker, appeared and took away freedom from the people. Instead of turning prisons into schools, they're full of innocent victims. Instead of forbidding shootings, you've organized a terror and thousands of the people are shot mercilessly every day; you've brought industry to a halt so that workers are starving, the people are without shoes or clothes. Letter from a Red Army soldier to Lenin, 25 December 1918
Between 1918 and February 1922, it has been estimated that 280,000 were killed by the Cheka and Internal Security Troops, about half in the course of operations to mop up peasant insurgents. This suggests that perhaps 140,000 were executed directly by the Cheka - a bloodcurdling number to be sure, but one that should be seen in the context of the 600,000 British and French troops who were sacrificed on the Somme
in 1916 in order to advance seven miles. The Red terror was both spectacular- designed to strike terror into the hearts of the populace -and 'bureaucratic' in character. According to Cheka statistics, 128,010 were arrested in the RSFSR (All-Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic) in 1918-19, of whom 42% were released; of the rest who were tried, nearly 8% were shotandthe rest incarcerated or sentenced to hard labour. By contrast, the White terror, which has received far less attention, was usually carried out when officers allowed their men to go on the rampage. In Ukraine at least 100,000 Jews perished at the hands of unruly soldiers of Denikin and the Ukrainian nationalist, S. V. Petliura. In leading Bolshevik circles concern was regularly expressed that the Cheka was out of control; yet periodic attempts to curb it never lasted long, mainly because Lenin refused to accept that institutional checks and balances were necessary to inhibit lawlessness and corruption.
? The socialist and anarchist parties proved unable to mount a concerted g challenge to the burgeoning one- party dictatorship. After Kolchak's e coup in November 1918, the SRs distanced themselves from the policy of jg overthrowing the regime by force. Most organizations agreed to make
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Bolsheviks and to establish a 'dictatorship of toilers'. By 1920, however, the die-hards were in a minority, most of this battered party rejecting armed struggle against the regime. Splits among the Mensheviks were less damaging, but they too suffered a severe decline in membership from around 150,000 in December 1917 to under 40,000 by late 1918. A few joined the anti-Bolshevik governments in summer 1918, but the centre and left factions -the bulk of the membership- rallied in support of the Red Army, whilst seeking to defend the integrity of the Soviets and trade unions. In a few Soviets such as that in Tula, and in a few trade unions, such as those of printers and chemical workers, they maintained their dominance in spite of prolonged harassment by the Cheka. By autumn 1921, however, only 4,000 retained their party cards.
The Bolsheviks viewed the opposition parties with contempt, as opportunists at best, counter-revolutionaries at worst. Since they believed that only one party - their own - could represent the proletariat, other socialists and anarchists were by definition representatives of the 'petty bourgeoisie'. The decision to ban the opposition parties outright, however, was not simply an expression of ideology, since the Bolsheviks made tactical concessions to them at various junctures, even if not of a substantial or lasting kind. The Bolsheviks believed they were fighting to defend an embryonic socialist state from the forces of world imperialism. Those, like the SRs, who reserved the option of taking up arms against them, or those, like Mensheviks, who professed support for the Red Army yet reserved the right to lambast the regime, were giving succour to the enemy. As civil war intensified, Bolshevik attitudes hardened, so that what began as a pragmatic restriction hardened into a determination to be rid of the opposition parties once and for all. Yet if responsibility forthe creation of one-party dictatorship lies with the Bolsheviks, that does not acquit the opposition of a measure of responsibility for its own fate. After October the
