Armada

fared better if Medina Sidonia had showed greater resourcefulness but it must be realized that at all times his options were limited by Philip’s inflexible orders. His courage was beyond doubt and the San Martin was at the heart of nearly every action in the campaign.

What proved to be one of the greatest weaknesses in the Spanish plan was the inability of Medina Sidonia and Parma to communicate effectively. At every stage in his advance Medina Sidonia dispatched updates to Parma to inform him of his progress. He never once received a reply or even an acknowledgement that his letters had been delivered. Crucially Medina Sidonia seemed to believe that Parma would sally out to meet him and they would rendezvous at sea, while Parma was firmly of the mind that any such sortie would result in annihilation of his transport fleet by the Dutch flyboats and so the Armada would have to come to him. The King’s command was simply that they ‘join hands’. No precise instructions had been given for how this would be achieved and with no deep water port in Spanish possession, the main purpose of the Armada remained shrouded in confusion until it reached Calais.

At the time of the Armada Lord High Admiral Charles Howard, Earl of Nottingham, was at the pinnacle of his long career. He was fifty-two years old and came from a distinguished line of naval officers. But despite his naval background he, like Medina Sidonia, had never experienced war at sea and relied heavily on his subordinates. Chief amongst those was Sir Francis Drake. A daring privateer, Drake’s raid on Cadiz in 1587 delayed the sailing of the Armada. He successfully predicted that the Spanish plan would involve a link up between Parma and the Armada and therefore advocated stationing the bulk of the English fleet at Plymouth, as far to windward of the narrow seas around Dover as possible. He contended that, ‘the advantage of time and place in all martial actions is half a victory,’ and his plan successfully ensured that the English fleet had the weather gauge when the Armada entered the Channel.

At the core of the English fleet were ‘race built’ galleons, a new breed of ship that saw accelerated development during the Tudor reign. Fast and nimble they carried a high proportion of armament in relation to their overall tonnage, upwards of ten per cent which was more than double that of their Spanish counterparts. Their heaviest guns were mounted in the bows and their method of attack was as described in the book. The galleon would swoop in from windward and fire in turn their bow chasers, lee broadside, stern chasers and second broadside before tacking away to reload. The English had high expectations of the damage these guns would inflict on the Spanish ships and were forced to rapidly alter their tactics after the first encounters proved they were not as effective at longer ranges.

The ‘race built’ galleons were warships designed for a primary purpose, to defend the coast of England, and so had little need of the massive holds of the Spanish galleons which were required for transoceanic trading. This gave them the option of carrying heavier guns closer to the water-line, a factor which had a significant impact in the Battle of Gravelines. The main weakness of these new English galleons was their scarcity and the vast majority of the remaining ships in the English fleet were of little value in heavy fighting.

The Retribution and Santa Clara are fictional galleons but both are based on typical ships of their class. The Retribution would have been one of the premier ships of the English fleet, while the Santa Clara would have been second to the larger galleons of the squadron of Portugal. The lead ships of the other Spanish squadrons, in the most part heavily armed merchantmen, and the Neapolitan galleasses, made up the rest of the ‘troubleshooting’ warships of the Armada.

There are a multitude of books written on the Spanish Armada, with many and various contradictory conclusions as to why the English triumphed over it. The source documents for more recent books are mostly contemporary, particularly on the Spanish side, where volumes exist on the meticulous preparations for the campaign. These, along with more recent findings, in particular the discovery and exploration of Spanish wrecks along the coastline of Ireland from the 1960s onwards, have led to many challenges to the assertions of earlier historians who laboured under misconceptions regarding the size of Spanish ships versus English, and the ordnance carried by both sides.

The Spanish had four times as many ships over 500 tons as the English, but the majority of these were armed merchantmen, while all the English ships of this size were galleon warships. The Spanish merchantmen in the main did not take part in the battle, but rather sailed in the centre of the Armada’s formation. Where ships of comparable size did clash, the Spanish galleons or merchantmen flagships were no match for their English counterparts.

Many of the ships in the Spanish Armada were heavily armed, with some carrying upwards of fifty guns. But most of these weapons were of smaller calibre and some of the largest guns listed on the manifest for the fleet were actually siege pieces that had been stowed below decks for the voyage to England. The latest research claims that the Spanish had 138 guns of 16 pound calibre or above while the English had 251 such pieces.

The English were far superior to the Spanish in artillery skills. Estimates of their rate of fire are between one and three rounds-per-gun-per-hour. On the Spanish side it is closer to one round-per-gun-per- day. Also much of the Spanish fire came from their lighter, more easily serviced guns. When Medina Sidonia sent a dispatch to Parma requesting supplies he asked for 4, 5 and 10 pound shot only. The larger guns were barely fired at all and both the manifests of the ships that returned to Spain, and that wrecks explored off Ireland reveal that they expended only a small fraction of their heavier shot in battle.

Ultimately, the Spanish were defeated by a number of factors. Their plan of campaign as imposed by Philip was fatally flawed, they were out-sailed and out-gunned by the English and the weather conditions were rarely in their favour. Neither side lacked bravery and conviction. It is possible that had the Armada reached home safely and in good order they might have restocked and made a second attempt to link up with Parma. The casualties suffered on the Irish coast however turned defeat into disaster. At least forty ships were lost and those that did return were badly battered by the unseasonably harsh weather.

The English fleet too suffered their greatest casualties after the battle. Disease quickly spread amongst the crews and in some ships over fifty per cent of the men were lost. Elizabeth and her Privy Council did little to help with Burghley hoping that, ‘by death, by discharging of sick men, and such like … there may be spared something in the general pay.’ Howard remarked that it ‘would grieve any man’s heart to see them that have served so valiantly die so miserably.’

The English triumphed over the Spanish Armada and although victory was achieved by a very narrow margin, it was enough to embolden both the English and the Dutch to continue their wars against the dominant empire in Europe. Further campaigns were launched by both sides in subsequent years. The English, hoping to build on their victory of 1588, sent a fleet into Spanish waters in 1589. Led by Drake the venture ended in disaster and irreparably damaged his reputation. The Spanish dispatched two more Armadas, in 1596 and 1597, only to have both driven back by storms. A peace was finally concluded in 1604, after the deaths of Elizabeth I and Philip II.

Note: The dates referred to throughout the book are based on the Gregorian calender.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to my agent, Bill Hamilton, for his unswerving support and advice, and all the team at AM Heath, in particular Jennifer Custer, Kate Rizzo Munson, Vickie Dillon and Charlie Brotherstone.

Thanks to HarperCollinsPublishers; my editor Katie Espiner, who seeks the heart of every chapter and the soul of every character, and to Louise Swannell, Kiera Godfrey and Louisa Joyner.

Thanks to all who support me in Cork; Ann Luttrell, Ben Cuddihy, Tony Sheehan of the Triskel Arts Centre, Joe McNamee, Martin MacAree, and I greatly acknowledge the support of Cork County Council in the writing of this book.

Thanks to my Mum and Dad, Gerard and Catherine, whose unfailing support I hope I never take for granted, and to my Mum- and Dad-in-law; John and Frances Moran, for their endless generosity.

A special thanks to Pam Moran, who watches over our children and ensures they have all their hearts’ desire, and to my brother, Colm, who has given me both time and space to write this book. Thanks to all in my family; Karen, Pam, Paul, Fiona and Doreen.

Lastly, thank you to Adrienne, for sharing this journey with me through uncharted waters, for your courage, fortitude and love, and to my children, Zoe, Andrew and Amy.