The Eleventh Day

27 “primary target”: MFR 04016798, 9/22/03, “Aeronautical Information Manual,” 2/11/10, www.faa.gov;

28 “coast mode”/coastline: Avionics, 6/1/05, Farmer, 135, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD, NEADS Transcripts Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, MFR 04016774, 10/27/03;

29 not know NORAD: MFR 04017316, 10/2/03;

30 units different training: MFR 04020720, 3/11/04;

31 unable to communicate/?frequencies/?none worked: MFR 040176171, 10/2/03;

32 Transcripts/In that book, etc.: Farmer, 215–;

33 “Washington [Center] has no clue”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR- NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Transcripts Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF;

34 “It’s chaos”/“The challenge”/Kara: Miles Kara, “Chaos Theory and 9–11, Some Preliminary Thoughts,” 6/12/09, www.oredigger61.org, & see Archives, 911 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, Kara Career Summary, 12/12/02, “Commission Meeting 4/10/03, Tab 7,” B1, Front Office files, CF.

35 evidence of tapes and logs: In writing this account of the FAA/military response to the attacks, the authors relied—as did the 9/11 Commission—on the tapes and transcripts of conversations between the various FAA and NORAD sites. As the Commission’s Miles Kara wrote in 2009, the “complete set of information needed to attempt any analysis of the events [of that morning] includes the radar files and the software to run them, time-stamped tapes, and any transcripts that were made” (Commission account: Miles Kara, “Archive for the NEADS files category,” www.oredigger61.org; NORAD audio files are available at the National Archives, B82 & B110, GSA Files, CF, but—for ready availability—at http://911depository.info).

36 nerve center: Vanity Fair, 9/06, Spencer, 2.

37 Marr/hijacking/Vigilant Guardian: Vanity Fair, 9/06, CR, 458n116. The military exercise scheduled for September 11, and several others that took place earlier in the year, have been the source of speculation. Some thought aspects of the exercises indicated U.S. government foreknowledge of the manner and timing of the 9/11 attacks. Others suggested that September’s Vigilant Guardian exercise had a negative effect on NORAD’s ability to react to the attacks. The 9/11 Commission found that the timing of the drill may have had a positive impact, because more personnel were on duty that day. The tapes and transcripts, though, reflect temporary confusion within NORAD as to whether the attacks were part of the war game or were real-world (Miles Kara, “9–11 Training, Exercises, and War Games, Some Collected Thoughts,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, “Exclusive Report: Did Military Exercises Facilitate the 9/11 Pentagon Attack?,” by Mathew Everett, 7/06, www.911truth.org, Aviation Weeks & Space Technology, 6/3/02, “NORAD Exercises Summary,” Team 8 files, posted on www.scribd.com, CR, 458n116).

38 “on the shitter”: NEADS audiotape, DRM1, CH2, www.oredigger61.org;

39 Arnold in FL: MFR 04016749, 2/3/04;

40 Dooley et al.: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF;

41 “Real World Unknown”: Memorandum for CC et al. from NEADS Sector/CVX, 8/23/01, “RDOD 03013146, Entire Contents, Vigilant Guardian,” B116, GSA files, CF.

42 Cooper call: MFR 04016791 & 04016790, 9/22/03, CR, 20. Disregarding the official FAA/military protocol, Boston Center had made two earlier attempts to contact the military on a “freelance” basis. The first such call, which went to the New Jersey Air National Guard’s 177th Fighter Wing at Atlantic City, got nowhere because the wing was not on alert status. Boston’s second early attempt to reach the military—through the FAA’s Cape Cod facility—did eventually lead to an alert being passed to NEADS, but only after the call made by the FAA’s Cooper. These calls were made at the initiative of Boston Center’s traffic management supervisor, Dan Bueno. Bueno—who was aware of the protocols in place—told the Commission that his actions were based on the “urgency of the situation.” Cooper’s use of “F-16” was a misspeak for “F-15” (CR, 20, Position 15, pts. 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcription,” B1, T8, CF, Bergen Record [N.J.], 12/5/03, MFR 04016791, 9/22/03, MFR 04016790, 9/22/03, MFR 03012969, 9/30/03, CF, Spencer, 22–).

43 “Cool”/all business/Boston could say: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS- CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF, Vanity Fair, 9/06;

44 8:41 battle stations: CR, 20, Farmer, 123;

45 conferred Arnold/ordered: “Conversation with Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold,” www.codeonemagazine.com, 1/02, CR, 20;

46 without direction/assigned: CR, 20;

47 “Oh, God”: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 4,” B3, NYC files, CF;

48 Mulligan: Full Transcript: Command Center; NOM Operational Position, Sept. 11, 2001, 10/14/03, “NOM Operation Position (5),” B1, NYC files, CF, CR 22.

49 Air Force knew nothing: Some skeptics have seized on an early NORAD chronology that appeared to suggest that the FAA notified the military of the hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43 A.M., claiming that this was evidence that U.S. forces failed to react promptly—even “stood down”—as the attacks unfolded. The contention is spurious—the 8:43 notification time in the NORAD chronology was simply incorrect. Although 8:43 A.M. does approximate the time the plane was hijacked, that fact was not at the time known to the FAA (critics: Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor Revisited, 8–; 8:43 notification: Chronology of the September 11 Attacks & Subsequent Events Through Oct. 24, 2001, “Timelines, 1 of 2,” B20, T7, CF, “FAA Believed Second 9/11 Plane Heading Towards New York for Emergency Landing,” & linked FAA document 4, 9/5/05; time incorrect: www.gwu.edu, Miles Kara, “Chaos Theory & 9/11,” 9/11 Revisited, www.oredigger61.org, corr. Miles Kara, 2010).

50 Otis pilots holding: Cape Cod News, 8/21/02, BG, 9/11/05, Vanity Fair, 9/06. The speed at which the fighters traveled and their exact route to New York has been the subject of some debate. Available tapes, and Commission interviews with the pilots and the mission commander, make clear that when they were first launched the flights headed for military-controlled airspace where they stayed in a holding pattern until after NEADS learned the second tower had been hit. The fighters then proceeded to New York, where they established a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the city at 9:25. The F-15 fighter, when new and stripped of its armament, is capable of doing a speed of Mach 2.5—some 1,650 miles per hour. Pilot Nash told the Commission that he and Duffy never exceeded Mach 1.1 (727 mph) as they flew toward New York. Duffy estimated that the fighters had reached between Mach 1.1 and 1.3, but said the pair “throttled back” on learning of the second strike—to conserve fuel. While it is possible that the Otis fighters went supersonic on the final leg of the journey to New York, radar data showed that the pair averaged a less-than-supersonic speed of Mach.86 (debate: see refs, “Complete 9/11 Timeline,” www.historycommons.org; record scanty: CR, 459n120; available tapes/interviews: transcripts from Voice Recorder, 11/9/01 1227Z-1417Z, Channel 24, “Trip 2 of 3, NEADS Transcript Color Coded,” B20, T8, CF, 9/11 ATCSCC Tape Transcription, “NEADS- CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 5,” B3, NYC files, CF, MFR 04016778, 1/22 & 1/23/04, MFR 03012972, 10/14/03, MFR 04016756, CF, CR, 21–, 23–, corr. Kris Wilhelm, Miles Kara, 2010).

51 Long Island: Full Transcript: Command Center; NOM Operational Position, Sept. 11, 2001, 10/14/03, “NOM Operation Position (5),” B1, NYC files, CF, CR 22;

52 Five minutes after: CR, 23–;

53 “I thought”: Cape Cod Times, 8/21/02;

54 “We don’t know”/“We need”/urged/Marr at first: 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 2,” B3, NYC files, CF & re Boston, authors’ check of audiotape, CR, 460n137;

55 “Listen”: Position 15, Parts 2 & 3, “ATCSCC Tape Transcript, Position 15,” B1, T8, CF.

56 9:21 call/?Scoggins/checked D.C./“First I heard”/Scoggins insisted: MFR 04016798, 9/22/03, 9/11 NEADS Tape Transcription, “NEADS-CONR-NORAD Transcripts, NEADS Channel 7,” B3, NYC files, CF. Scoggins has said he is “99% certain the person who made that call on the Telcon [about Flight 11 still being airborne] was Dave Cannoles.” The FAA’s Cannoles told 9/11 Commission staff that he did not recall doubt as to whether Flight 11 had crashed into the Trade Center. Another staff member, Doug Davis, thought the chief of staff