Minneapolis, concerned that there was insufficient probable cause for a criminal warrant, favored the FISA option —only to be confronted by legalistic hurdles thrown up by headquarters. The go-ahead was given only on September 11, after the two strikes on the World Trade Center. Evidence and detainee statements were eventually to link Moussaoui to KSM and Binalshibh, and he is now serving a life sentence for conspiracy to commit acts of terror and air piracy. As of this writing, the only other person convicted—of being an accessory to the murder of the people aboard the planes on 9/11—is Mounir Motassadeq, who is serving fifteen years in Germany. Motassadeq, an associate of the Hamburg-based hijackers, was accused of helping the hijackers prepare for the 9/11 operation. In a lengthy prison interview, Motassadeq told the authors that—while he had certainly been an associate and friend of the future hijackers in Hamburg—he had had no knowledge whatsoever of what they were plotting. The authors came away from the interview doubting that he was guilty as charged (warrant options: e.g., Graham with Nussbaum, 51; go-ahead: FBI IG; evidence/sentence: Indictment,
93 second development/New information/Wilshire reconsidered/?“Something bad”: CR, 266–,FBI IG. In the 9/11 Commission Report, and in a 2004 review of the FBI’s handling of pre-9/11 intelligence information issued by the Justice Department’s inspector general, relevant CIA and FBI personnel are referred to by pseudonyms. True names of many of the individuals were revealed in evidence prepared in 2006 for Moussaoui’s trial. Others have been asserted by independent writers, notably Lawrence Wright and Kevin Fenton, and the authors have used these identifications in the text. The CIA officer named here as Tom Wilshire is “John” in the official reports. The FBI analyst Margarette Gillespie is “Mary” in reports, while the FBI analyst Dina Corsi appears to be identical with “Jane” in the Commission Report and with “Donna” in the inspector general’s review. Steve Bongardt is “Steve B.” in the Commission Report and “Scott” in the review. Robert Fuller is “Robert F.” in the Commission Report and “Richard” in the review (CR 267–, & 537n63 et seq., FBI IG, McNulty to Troccoli 3/1/06,
94 Wilshire suggested to Gillespie: Lawrence Wright’s
95 “It all clicked”/“watchlist”: CR, 266–, FBI IG;
96 not in U.S./FAA not informed: Report, JI, 15, Staff Report, “9/11 & Terrorist Travel,” CO, 42, Staff Statement 2, CO;
97 Corsi sent email/red tape/misinterpretation: FBI IG;
98 “Disneyland”: Wright, 353–;
99 “Someday”/Fuller: FBI IG;
100 “assigned no”: CR, 538n77.
101 Tenet fishing: Breitweiser, 193;
102 Tenet directed: Tenet, 159;
103 Tenet briefed/Aug. 23: ibid., CR, 275;
104 seriously/“If this guy”: Tenet, 202–;
105 “brow furrowed”/“no one ever”: Ben-Veniste, 301;
106 “I didn’t see”/lied: Testimony of George Tenet, 4/14/04, CO, Shenon, 361–.
107 Harlow re Aug. 17 & 31:
108 “to make sure”: Tenet, 159;
109 “not recall”: CR, 262.
110 “The question”:
111 “I do not believe”: Testimony of Condoleezza Rice, 4/8/04, CO;
112 “an appalling”:
113 “There was no”: Ben-Veniste, 307– & see 265.
CHAPTER 28
1
Hello Jenny:
With a few minor changes to ensure verbatim translation from the German, the “Dear Jenny” message is as reported by Al Jazeera reporter Yosri Fouda, drawing on his encounter with Binalshibh in Karachi in 2002 (see pp. 243–45). Binalshibh dated the message as having been sent on or about August 21, 2001. According to Fouda, Binalshibh produced the message “on a floppy disk” and showed it to him “on screen.” The 9/11 Commission Report does not reproduce the “Dear Jenny” message, but refers to coded August “communications” between Atta and Binalshibh that were recovered when KSM was captured. These messages included a discussion of targets dated as having occurred on August 3. In a related note, the Commission quotes Binalshibh as claiming that the words “law” and “politics” were both used to refer only to the Capitol—though the reference was surely in fact to two separate targets (Fouda & Fielding, 138–,
, 9/9/02,
[London], 9/802, CR 248–, 531n 165/166).
2
August 29 call/Atta riddle:
Reporter Fouda, who learned of the puzzle in 2002 from Binalshibh, rendered it as reproduced in the text. The Commission Report referred to it as “two branches, a slash, and a lollipop.” A factor in choosing the date September 11, according to a note found on KSM’s computer following his capture, was that the U.S. Congress would be in session in the Capitol by that time (Fouda & Fielding, 140, CR, 249, Staff Statement 16, CO).
3
Binalshibh passed on:
The Commission Report, drawing on reports of the interrogations of KSM and Binalshibh, states that KSM was informed of the date by Zacaria Essabar, an associate Binalshibh used to carry the message from Germany to KSM in Pakistan. KSM said Essabar brought him the date in a letter, while Binalshibh has said he entrusted Essabar only with a verbal message. Binalshibh has also claimed that he called KSM on the subject. The fact that information was extracted from the prisoners under torture may account for the seeming contradictions. As of this writing, Essabar’s whereabouts are unknown (CR249, 531n173, KSM SUBST, Wanted Notice, Bundeskriminalamt Wiesbaden, 2008).
4
inspector doubts/Kahtani/“He started”:
MFR 04016447, 11/12/03, CF, CR, 12, 248, 564n33;
5
“round out”:
KSM SUBST;
6
“like a soldier”:
MFR 04016447, 11/12/02, CF.
