The Eleventh Day

Tenet on oath/“like a grand”:

Shenon, 256–;

4

“We just didn’t believe”/outraged:

New Yorker

, 11/8/04.

5

NSA identified/?Hada/?“hub”:

Bamford,

Shadow Factory

, 7–, FBI report, “PENTTBOM, Summary of Captioned Investigation,” 11/5/01, authors’ collection, transcript,

Nova: The Spy Factory

, 2/3/09,

www.pbs.org

, Wright, 275–;

6

NSA did not share:

Report, JI, 145,

Atlantic

, 12/04, Bamford,

Shadow Factory

, 16, 26–, & see Scheuer,

Marching Toward Hell

, 91–.

7

Hada phone/FBI/1998 attack/OBL phone/link:

Report, JI, 129, 145, Wright, 277–, 343, Testimony of [unnamed] CIA Officer [accepted as Wilshire], 9/20/02, JI. Bin Laden stopped using his satellite phone in September 1998, apparently because he knew or guessed it was being intercepted (WP, 12/22/05, Report, JI, 69).

8

1999 intercept/?“Khalid”/?“Nawaf”/?Malaysia:

The intercepted conversation also included

a reference to “Salem” as making the trip, too—evidently Hazmi’s brother Salem, who was also to be one of the hijackers. Although the NSA had access to information indicating that the three first names were all linked to the surnames Hazmi and Mihdhar, they did not pass those names to the CIA and FBI—thus making the CIA’s task more difficult than it need have been (CR, 181, JI Report, 145–, 155–, Staff Statement 2, CO, Bamford,

Shadow Factory

, 16–).

9

“something more”:

CR, 181;

10 “operational”/“operatives”: ibid., Report, JI, 144;

11 passport photographed: The Dubai stopover and the copying of Mihdhar’s passport was briefly mentioned earlier in Ch. 27, p. 319. “This is as good”: Mayer, 18;

12 Mihdhar tracked/?photographed/?pay phones/computers: CR, 181–, Staff Statement 2, CO, Die Zeit, 10/2/02, FBI IG;

13 directors/?Berger/?Clarke: Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 181.

14 Bangkok: Staff Statement 2, CO. It would later be established that two suspects who had already, on January 6, made short trips out of Malaysia—for only a matter of hours—had also been Attash and Hazmi (Staff Statement 2, CO, CR, 159).

15 according CIA trail lost/Thai authorities responded/Jan. 15 to LA/cables: CR, 181–, FBI IG, Staff Statement 2, CO, Tenet, 196–. The two terrorists flew in aboard UA 002, arriving at 1:27 P.M. Bin Laden aide Attash had reportedly headed back to Afghanistan via Karachi to report to bin Laden (UA 002: “Hijackers Timeline [redacted],” 11/14/03, INTELWIRE; Attash: CR, 159);

16 “OBL associates”: Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;

17 “Action Required”: Report, JI, 147;

18 “The threat”: CR, 176, 501n17;

19 “It is important”: ibid., CTC Watchlisting Guidance, cited at Report, JI, 1;

20 CIA did not alert State/FBI: Report, JI, 40–, 144–, Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05, FBI IG, Graham with Nussbaum, 7–, CR, 355;

21 “promised to let”: Staff Statement 2, CO;

22 “Michelle”/“to the FBI”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05;

23 “James”/“as soon as”/“in the event”: Statement of Eleanor Hill, 9/20/02, JI, Report, JI, 81, FBI IG;

24 refused interview: FBI IG;

25 “Michelle” prevaricated: FBI IG;

26 Wilshire/“did not know”: ibid. In the transcript of a hearing before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, the former deputy chief’s name is rendered not as “Wilshire” but as “Wilshere.” The authors have used “Wilshire,” the spelling most commonly used. (“The Global Reach of al Qaeda,” Hearings, Subcommittee on International Operations & Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 12/18/01, 7–);

27 Wilshire deliberately/draft cable/Miller CIR/“pls hold”: FBI IG, & see Executive Summary, Report on CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks, Office of the Inspector General, CIA, 6/05.

28 “Doug came”/“Is this a no go”: Bamford, Shadow Factory, 18–. In a detailed note for his book Disconnecting the Dots, due for publication in 2011, author Kevin Fenton would note that Rossini was to resign from the FBI in 2008 after breaching regulations. He had, according to an FBI press release, used Bureau computers to find out information for personal purposes. Fenton argues cogently, however, that the lapse does not detract from Rossini’s credibility on the matter of the blocked CIR. The fact of its blocking, and that the agent saw relevant cables in 2000, is well documented (Fenton, proof copy kindly shared with the authors, 2011, 44n26).

29 “unable to locate”: FBI IG;

30 Wilshire int. redacted: corr. Kristen Wilhelm, 2011.

31 Wilshire proposed: FBI IG. Wilshire’s actions in July 2001 were reportedly spurred by his review of the CIA cable and email traffic recording Mihdhar’s movements in January the previous year—including the information that Mihdhar had a valid U.S. multiple-entry visa. For reasons unknown, but perhaps because he feared discovery of the fact that he had been in the United States the previous year, Mihdhar had meanwhile obtained a new passport and a new visa in June 2001. He used this new visa when he reentered the United States on July 4. There is no evidence that Wilshire or anyone else at CIA was aware of the new passport and visa at the time the search for Mihdhar was renewed in July 2001 (Wilshire spurred: CR, 267–, FBI IG; new passport/visa: Staff Report, 9/11 & Terrorist Travel, CO, 33–.)

32 Following a series: FBI IG, CR, 267–, & re discovered/search see Chs. 27, 28, & 29. Aside from the events described here, the CIA and the FBI disputed each other’s versions of events about the identification of Tawfiq bin Attash (referred to in the Commission Report as “Khallad”) in the Malaysia surveillance photos. The identification was made by a source the FBI and the CIA shared—a circumstance that led