recent studies, in which she had put obese young men on eighteen-hundred-calorie diets with the protein content fixed at 460 calories (26 percent), but with varying proportions of fat and carbohydrates. Over the course of nine weeks, she reported, “weight loss, fat loss, and percent weight loss as fat appeared to be inversely related to the level of carbohydrate in the diets”—in other words, the fewer carbohydrates and the more fat in the diet, the greater the weight loss and the greater the fat loss. “No adequate explanation could be given for the differences in weight losses,” she said. All of the carbohydrate-restricted diets, she said, “gave excellent clinical results as measured by freedom from hunger, allaying of excessive fatigue, satisfactory weight loss, suitability for long term weight reduction and subsequent weight control.”
The last of these conferences to be held before the nutritional wisdom began to shift definitively was in London in December 1973, just two months after the NIH meeting. This one was organized by Yudkin, and many of those giving presentations had also attended the NIH conference. Their presentations were similar, but here there was more of a tendency to implicate carbohydrates specifically as the cause of obesity. Lester Salans and Edward Horton, both collaborators of Ethan Sims on his experimental obesity studies, discussed the effect of carbohydrates on hyperinsulinemia and the role of hyperinsulinemia in obesity. “It is clear that in both lean and obese subjects the carbohydrate content of the diet influences…insulin and glucose concentrations,” Horton reported. He added that it was probably hyperinsulinemia that induced both obesity and insulin resistance. Yudkin then gave the only talk on dietary therapy, entitled “The Low-Carbohydrate Diet,” noting that these diets are higher in vitamins and minerals than calorie-restricted diets, simply because the foods restricted—starches and sugars—have few or no vitamins and minerals. The diet will “reduce superfluous adiposity,” Yudkin said, “but it will not need to be changed when this has been done…. The diet is intended as anew but permanent pattern of eating and not simply as a cure for obesity, to be abandoned when an acceptable loss of weight is achieved.” Harry Keen, who was then at Guy’s Hospital Medical School and would become one of the most influential diabetologists in the U.K.,*122 said the critical issue wasn’t just obesity, but the chronic diseases that accompanied it. “With the chronically failed case of obesity we are dealing with the wreckage of the situation,” he said, so it was necessary to set “new patterns of body weight and body size, if we are going to make a serious attempt to reduce the frequency, for example, of atherosclerosis, of diabetes mellitus and of a number of other conditions.” Keen and his colleagues had tested the viability of this goal, he reported, on a group of “ostensibly normal men in whom obesity is represented no more frequently than in the population at large.” These men were instructed to restrict their carbohydrate intake to less than five hundred calories a day, but to continue eating protein and fat as desired. The result was an average weight loss of fourteen pounds, impressive because these individuals were not necessarily overweight to begin with. That weight loss had been maintained for almost five years. To those who might be pessimistic about the prevention of obesity and overweight in the public at large, Keen said, this result should be taken as “a word of reassurance and optimism.”
By 1972,
Two years later, when the nonprofit organization Consumer Guide published its first edition of
The shift in the nutritional wisdom was now taking place, driven by the contagious effect of Ancel Keys’s dietary-fat/heart-disease hypothesis on the closely related field of obesity. Any diet that allowed liberal fat consumption was to be considered unhealthy. Clinical investigators working on the problem of human obesity concurred.
Through the 1950s, the carbohydrate-restricted diet had challenged only the positive-caloric-balance hypothesis of obesity. Yudkin had managed to reconcile carbohydrate restriction with this conventional wisdom by insisting that low-carbohydrate diets were low-calorie diets in disguise. By doing so, Yudkin made the diets politically acceptable, although he also directed attention away from the underlying science. In the same 1960
As a result of Yudkin’s conciliatory efforts, the only carbohydrate-restricted diets that elicited a backlash from nutritionists were those promoted by clinicians whose interpretation of the science disagreed with Yudkin’s. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that it was these physicians, without university affiliations, who adopted the diet quickly and then wrote books for the lay public that sold exceptionally well. Because their claims sounded like quackery—
The small contingent of influential nutritionists from Fred Stare’s department at Harvard provide an example of how this process of entrenchment evolved. In 1952, when Alfred Pennington lectured at Harvard on the benefits of carbohydrate restriction and Keys was only beginning his crusade against dietary fat, Mark Hegsted had suggested, “Dr. Pennington may be on the right track in the practical treatment of obesity.” A decade later, and a year after the American Heart Association had officially sided with Keys, the Brooklyn obstetrician Herman Taller published his best-seller,
Meanwhile, these nutritionists would readily admit that they didn’t know what caused obesity (why some people ate too much and others didn’t) and that calorie restriction conspicuously failed to cure it. After nearly twenty years in the field, as Jean Mayer wrote in the introduction to his 1968 monograph,
