who, while related to Escobar, were not themselves considered criminals. In the timeless hammerlike prose of the police teletype, DEA agent Javier Pena explained in a cable to headquarters in Washington that a new, homegrown resistance had emerged:
'The CNP believe these bombings were committed by a new group of individuals known as 'Los PEPES' (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar/ People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar). This group, which has only recently surfaced in the Medellin area, has vowed to retaliate against Escobar, his family, and his associates, each and every time Escobar commits a terrorist act which injures innocent people.'
The Colombian police, Pena wrote, had determined that the targets of three attacks attributed to Los Pepes were Escobar's wife, mother and aunt. And while the police and Colombian government had officially denounced the attacks, he wrote, 'they may secretly applaud these retaliatory acts.'
In the cable, Pena outlined Escobar's likely response:
'He will either slow his terrorist campaign in order to protect his family and property, or he will escalate his attacks to demonstrate his power and lack of respect and fear of his enemies.'
Officially, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota was silent on the sudden emergence in early 1993 of Los Pepes (People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), a vigilante group apparently dedicated to violent retribution against the fugitive drug lord.
The gang in the steel vault on the fifth floor of the embassy - Ambassador Morris Busby, CIA Station Chief Bill Wagner, and the Drug Enforcement Administration country chief, Joe Toft - was not displeased. Nor were the DEA agents, Delta Force operators and Centra Spike electronic surveillance experts at the Search Bloc headquarters outside Medellin.
And why would they be? What could be better than a homegrown vigilante movement against Public Enemy No. 1? All along, Escobar's official pursuers in the Search Bloc had fought at a disadvantage. The unit's Colombian commander, Police Col. Hugo Martinez, was suspected of employing vicious tactics in his hunt. But compared with Escobar, who kidnapped and murdered the sons and daughters of his enemies, who set off bombs in public places filled with children, the Search Bloc had been a model of decorum.
The Search Bloc was, of course, limited to seeking out wanted criminals, while Escobar routinely targeted innocents. The unit had to take a judge along on every raid, and if the judge did not like the way the Bloc members conducted themselves, he could file human-rights abuse charges - certain to be encouraged by Escobar's many well-paid allies in the Bogota bureaucracy.
When things got too hot for Escobar or his associates, they had always been able to wriggle out by arranging to surrender and, sheltered by a small army of lawyers, work a deal. In short, Escobar had long hidden behind the law and his 'rights.'
In an interview he gave while hiding the previous September, Escobar had said: 'In jail or on the street, they have to respect my rights.' To his pursuers, of course, this afforded him an enormous advantage, which made the sudden appearance of Los Pepes tremendously satisfying to the Search Bloc.
The governments of Colombia and the United States might deplore terrorism, but there was no doubt about its effectiveness. Terror was Escobar's strongest weapon. Why not turn it against him?
The drug boss certainly didn't lack for bitter enemies, but his foes had little in common. They ranged from some of the wealthiest and most powerful families in Bogota to rival street thugs in Medellin and Cali. What if someone were to give them a push - some organization, some money, some useful intelligence, some training, planning and leadership?
Los Pepes were so perfect they were . . . well, too perfect.
One of the men involved with Los Pepes, a Medellin drug trafficker and pilot who used the code name 'Rubin,' said he was recruited as an informant by DEA agent Javier Pena.
'I met with Javier in October 1992 in Medellin,' said Rubin, who asked that his real name not be used. 'He explained that the idea was to expand the informants net for the Search Bloc, and wanted me to help.'
Pena said he remembered Rubin's working closely with the Search Bloc as an informant, but he did not recruit him or offer to get him a visa to the United States - as Rubin had claimed.
'He was wanted in the United States,' the agent said.
Rubin said that in Medellin he met with a man who was known as Don Berna, a former hit man for the Galeano family. The Galeanos had been major drug traffickers in Escobar's organization until the drug boss murdered the two brothers who led the family.
Rubin said Don Berna was one of the leaders of Los Pepes, which he said consisted of 12 men 'and three jeeps' who worked with Col. Martinez's men. In the fall of 1992, this group began to make associates and family members of Escobar's an offer they dared not refuse.
'We would offer people money, supplied by the DEA, in return for their cooperation,' Rubin said. 'They could accept the money and help us, or Los Pepes would return and kill them. It was that simple. Either help us or you will become a target. That's how we developed the information that led us to Pablo.'
Pena said that DEA money was offered to the Search Bloc to pay informants, and that the money might have been distributed through Rubin and the others, who were identified as 'informants.'
The activities of Rubin, Don Berna, and others in their group were known to Delta operators and DEA agents who worked in Medellin, all of whom ultimately reported to Wagner, the CIA station chief, at the embassy in Bogota. In an interview for this story, Wagner said he did not remember Los Pepes.
One of Wagner's goals in Colombia was to establish a link between cocaine trafficking and Colombia's dominant guerrilla group, FARC - links that would justify pushing antidrug work from the realm of law enforcement into the realm of war. That would unleash against men like Pablo Escobar the kinds of forces and resources typically directed against communist insurgencies and outlaw states. He had top-level allies in this effort. Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he was advised by President George Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney that combating drugs would be 'a No. 1 priority' of their administration.
This was the bigger picture Wagner had in mind when he arrived in Colombia in January 1991, and Escobar's escape a year later had hastened the transition. Now the CIA station chief had the kinds of resources in Colombia needed to wage war against the narcos, and for him the hunt had become very nearly a full-time job.
After the frustrations of the first six months, there was a strategy shift. If Escobar stood atop an
