UFOs

We do know a great deal, however, about what happened in 1976 over Tehran, and about the 1980 incident in Peru, partly because of U.S. government interest in both cases, which led to the filing of American reports with intelligence agencies. One can assume that the cases of Jafari and Santa Maria must have been of particular interest not only because the pilots took military action against the UFOs, but also because they actually interacted with them. In both instances, there was an interplay of actions and response over an extended period of time, a type of communication, between a vulnerable man in a small plane and an unknown, highly technological flying machine. Neither pilot knew where it was from, or why it was there. But during this lengthy engagement, both were able to observe the objects at very close range.

The national security aspect is obvious—or perhaps global security would be a more apt phrase. In their attempts to shoot down the UFO, neither pilot was successful, but for different reasons. Santa Maria penetrated the object the first time with a barrage of shells, which had absolutely no effect, but in subsequent attempts the object shot up vertically extremely fast and avoided additional fire. In Jafari’s case, missile firing mechanisms were rendered inert several times at the moment he was about to launch his missiles. Both UFOs demonstrated an uncanny, astonishing trait: They repeatedly evaded attack at the very last moment, just when the pilots locked on to the target and were ready to fire, as if they somehow “knew,” or registered in some way, when the pilots were about to push the button. These last-minute evasions seem too perfectly timed, and were repeated too many times, to be coincidental. Both cases are among the best illustrations on record of some kind of intelligent control by a UFO. Despite the distance between them, the objects appeared to be highly cued in to the actions of the aircraft with which they were engaged. And neither UFO retaliated or harmed the jets, despite their aggressive maneuvers. One would surmise that our government would clearly have been interested in such remarkable events, despite claims to the contrary. And it was. The fascinating FOIA documents tell the real story.

The 1976 Iranian incident was a major news event in Tehran, and even American television was on the scene. As General Jafari described earlier, U.S. Air Force officer Lieutenant Colonel Olin Mooy had attended the debriefing the day after the incident. It was Mooy who penned a three-page U.S. government memorandum titled “UFO Sighting,” which was classified and distributed as a teletype from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency to the secretary of state, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the White House, and the Air Force, Army, and Navy. This highly unusual report[108] spells out in detail the information presented at the briefing that Jafari attended, including a description of the primary object and the secondary, smaller objects; the loss of on-board instrumentation in conjunction with attempts to fire; and an apparent landing of one object.

Most significant was the incredible DIA evaluation of Mooy’s descriptive narrative, written by Air Force Major Colonel Roland Evans on October 12, 1976. It states:

An outstanding report: this case is a classic which meets all the criteria necessary for a valid study of UFO phenomena.

• The object was seen by multiple witnesses from different locations (i.e., Shemiran, Mehrebad and the dry lake bed) and viewpoints (both airborne and from the ground).

• The credibility of many of the witnesses was high (an Air Force General, qualified aircrews and experienced tower operators).

• Visual sightings were confirmed by radar.

• Similar electromagnetic effects (EME) were reported by three separate aircraft.

• There were physiological effects on some crew members (i.e., loss of night vision due to the brightness of the object).

• An inordinate amount of maneuverability was displayed by the UFOs. [109]

The evaluation indicates that the reliability of the information was “confirmed by other sources” and its value was High (defined as “unique, timely and of major significance”). It was used, or planned for use, as “current intelligence.” This intelligence information of high value, of major significance, concerning an outstanding UFO report that justified further study of the phenomenon, was filed as such—even though U.S. government disinterest in UFOs, and outright dismissal of sightings, was the public pattern repeated in so many cases in America, and even though it had told the public in 1969 that UFOs were of no concern.

Four years later, our government also filed a report on the Peruvian incident involving Oscar Santa Maria. A Department of Defense (DoD)/Joint Chiefs of Staff “info report” was distributed to almost as many agencies as the Iran report. Titled “UFO Sighted in Peru,”[110] the June 1980 document was prepared by Colonel Norman H. Runge, who states that his source was an “officer in the Peruvian Air Force who observed the event… source has reported reliably in the past.” Santa Maria does not know the name of that officer, was not interviewed by any American, and clearly remembers that no U.S. officials were present during his briefing. “We were very careful about guarding our own sensitive operations and military procedures,” he explained in one of our telephone interviews from his home in Peru.

Unfortunately, the DoD report provides the wrong date for the Peruvian encounter: May 9, 1980, rather than April 11. Santa Maria believes that the information was distorted, and some of the data imprecise, because the report was not filed until two months after the incident. There were apparently delays as the communication made its way through various channels to the Americans.

The document reports that a UFO was observed over the base, and the Air Commander scrambled an SU-22. “The FAP [Peruvian Air Force] tried to intercept and destroy the UFO, but without success,” it states. The pilot “intercepted the vehicle and fired upon it at very close range without causing any apparent damage. The pilot tried to make a second pass on the vehicle, but the UFO out-ran the SU-22.”

I find it interesting that the term “vehicle” was used consistently and interchangeably with “UFO” throughout this U.S. government document; usually the term “object” is the official choice, leaving wider room for a range of possible explanations. A “vehicle” is something constructed for the purpose of transporting people or things. This one, which remains of unknown origin, was inexplicably unaffected by large shells fired at very close range. Assuming it was a vehicle of unknown origin, as stated, with a capacity that no man-made vehicle has, the concept of “vehicle” then becomes a provocative one, coming from an Air Force colonel. What was it transporting, and why? There seems to have been no problem with an official acknowledgment of the existence of an actual UFO, ten years after the close of Project Blue Book, as long as the document was classified. In this case, a U.S. Air Force colonel acknowledges the existence of an actual UFO—not what one would expect from a government agency that publicly scoffs at such a notion.

For some reason, in recent decades, there seems to be an official preference for looking into cases overseas, rather than those at home. Perhaps there is a particular interest in military cases, involving either the firing on a UFO or a chase by Air Force fighter jets, which drew the authorities to Iran, Peru, and Belgium. Or is it easier for our government to explore cases overseas without being noticed and drawing attention to a UFO event? If it were to do so openly, the Air Force conclusions issued at the time of Project Blue Book, and repeated ever since, would have to be rescinded. Obviously, the consequences of that would be something the Defense Department would prefer to avoid.

Yet while making these once-classified reports, our officials were well aware of the efforts of governments overseas—the host countries within which they probed for information—to properly investigate military UFO sightings. We benefited from their information, but we certainly did not follow their example.

Instead of contributing in any way, U.S. officials seem to enjoy tiptoeing around the world and checking out cases elsewhere, occasionally finding one that “is a classic which meets all the criteria necessary for a valid study of UFO phenomena,” as the DIA evaluation stated. Rather than assigning the U.S. Air Force to openly handle UFO events here, our government has stubbornly ignored unambiguous sightings affecting the lives of thousands of Americans. Simultaneously, it has in place a reporting system for UFO incidents “within the framework established for intelligence and surveillance operations,” which it doesn’t like to talk about. It all gets a bit confusing. But as far as all of us citizens are concerned, government agencies still provide untenable explanations for American UFO events, or ignore them altogether, even when close encounters raise issues of aviation safety and, yes, national security, and even though we know they are interested in cases overseas. For how long will the authorities continue