taste it, because the common formula was: 'Qorban (or Qonam) that I eat or drink, or do such a thing,' and the omission of the votive word did not invalidate a vow, if it were otherwise regularly expressed, [b Jer. Nedar. 36 d, line 20 from top.]
It is in explaining this strange provision, intended both to uphold the solemnity of vows, and to discourage the rash use of words, that the Talmud [c u. s.] makes use of the word 'hand' in a connection which we have supposed might, by association of ideas, have suggested to Christ the contrast between what the Bible and what the Rabbis regarded as 'sanctified hands,' and hence between the commands of God and the traditions of the Elders. For the Talmud explains that, when a man simply says: 'That (or if) I eat or taste such a thing,' it is imputed as a vow, and he may not eat or taste of it, 'because the hand is on the Qorban' [d (Jer. Nedar. 36 d, line 22).], the mere touch of Qorban had sanctified it, and put it beyond his reach, just as if it had been laid on the altar itself. Here, then, was a contrast. According to the Rabbis, the touch of'a common' hand defiled God's good gift of meat, while the touch of'a sanctified' hand in rash or wicked words might render it impossible to give anything to a parent, and so involve the grossest breach of the Fifth Commandment! Such, according to Rabbinic Law, was the 'common' and such the 'sanctifying' touch of the hands, and did such traditionalism not truly 'make void the Word of God'?
A few further particulars may serve to set this in clearer light. It must not be thought that the pronunciation of the votive word 'Qorban,' although meaning 'a gift,' or 'given to God,' necessarily dedicated a thing to the Temple. The meaning might simply be, and generally was, that it was to be regarded like Qorban, that is, that in regard to the person or persons named, the thing termed was to be considered as if it were Qorban, laid on the altar, and put entirely out of their reach. For, although included under the one name, there were really two kinds of vows: those of consecration
to God, and those of personal obligation [See Maimonides, Yad haChas., Hilkh. Nedar. i. 1, 2.], and the latter were the most frequent.
To continue. The legal distinction between a vow, an oath, and 'the ban,' are clearly marked both in reason and in Jewish Law. The oath was an absolute, the vow a conditional undertaking, their difference being marked even by this, that the language of a vow ran thus: 'That' or 'if 'I or another do such a thing,' 'if I eat;' [a.] while that of the oath was a simple affirmation or negation, [b.] 'I shall not eat.' [c Jer. Ned. u. s.] On the other hand, the 'ban' might refer to one of three things: those dedicated for the use of the priesthood, those dedicated to God, or else to a sentence pronounced by the Sanhedrin. [d Tos. Arach. iv.] In any case it was not lawful to 'ban' the whole of one's property, nor even one class of one's property (such as all one's sheep), nor yet what could not, in the fullest sense, be called one's property, such as a child, a Hebrew slave, or a purchased field, which had to be restored in the Year of Jubilee; while an inherited field, if banned, would go in perpetuity for the use of the priesthood. Similarly, the Law limited vows. Those intended to incite to an act (as on the part of one who sold a thing), or by way of exaggeration, or in cases of mistake, and, lastly, vows which circumstances rendered impossible, were declared null. To these four classes the Mishnah added those made to escape murder, robbery, and the exactions of the publican. If a vow was regarded as rash or wrong, attempts were made [e they open a door.'] to open a door for repentance, [f Nedar. ix. passim.] Absolutions from a vow might be obtained before a 'sage,' or, in his absence, before three laymen, [Maimonides u. s. Hilk. Shebh. v. 1.] when all obligations became null and void. At the same time the Mishnah [g Chag. i. 8.] admits, that this power of absolving from vows was a tradition hanging, as it were, in the air, [This is altogether a very curious Mishnah. It adds to the remark quoted in the text this other significant adminission, that the laws about the Sabbath, festive offerings, and the malversation of things devoted to God 'are like mountains hanging by one hair,' since Scripture is scant on these subjects, while the traditional Laws are many.] since it received little (or, as Maimonides puts it, no) support from Scripture. [On the subject of Vows see also 'The Temple and its Services,' pp. 322-326. The student should consult Siphre, Par. Mattoth, pp. 55 b to 58 b.]
There can be no doubt, that the words of Christ referred to such vows of personal obligation. By these a person might bind himself in regard to men or things, or else put that which was another's out of his own reach, or that which was his own out of the reach of another, and this as completely as if the thing or things had been Qorban, a gift given to God. Thus, by simply saying, 'Qorban,' or 'Qorban, that by which I might be profited by thee,' a person bound himself never to touch, taste, or have anything that belonged to the person so addressed. Similarly, by saying 'Qorban, that by which thou mightest be profited by me,' he would prevent the person so addressed from ever deriving any benefit from that which belonged to him. And so stringent was the ordinance that (almost in the words of Christ) it is expressly stated that such a vow was binding, even if what was vowed involved a breach of the Law. [a Nedar. ii. 2.] It cannot be denied that such vows, in regard to parents, would be binding, and that they were actually made. [I can only express surprise, that Wunsche should throw doubt upon it. It is fully admitted by Levy, Targ. Worterb. sub.] Indeed, the question is discussed in the Mishnah in so many words, whether 'honour of father and mother' [b.] constituted a ground for invalidating a vow, and decided in the negative against a solitary dissenting voice, [c Ned. ix. 1.] And if doubt should still exist, a case is related in the Mishnah, [d Nedar. v.] in which a father was thus shut out by the vow of his son from anything by which he might be profited by him ()[In this case the son, desirous that his father
should share in the festivities at his marriage, proposed to give to a friend the court in which the banquet was to be held and the banquet itself, but only for the purpose that his father might eat and drink with him. The proposal was refused as involving sin, and the point afterwards discussed and confirmed, implying, that in no circumstances could a parent partake of anything belonging to his son, if he had pronounced such a vow, the only relaxation being that in case of actual starvation ('if he have not what to eat') the son might make a present to a third person, when the father might in turn receive of it.] Thus the charge brought by Christ is in fullest accordance with the facts of the case. More than this, the manner in which it is put by St. Mark shows the most intimate knowledge of Jewish customs and law. For, the seemingly inappropriate addition to our Lord's mention of the Fifth Commandment of the words: 'He that revileth father or mother, he shall (let him) surely die,' [e Ex. xxi. 17.] is not only explained but vindicated by the common usage of the Rabbis, [Comp. Wunsche, ad loc] to mention along with a command the penalty attaching to its breach, so as to indicate the importance which Scripture attached to it. On the other hand, the words of St. Mark: 'Qorban (that is to say, gift (viz., to God)) that by which thou mightest be profited by me,' are a most exact transcription into Greek of the common formula of vowing, as given in the Mishnah and Talmud (). [Other translations have been proposed, but the above is taken from Nedar. viii. 7, with the change only of Qonam into Qorban.]
But Christ did not merely show the hypocrisy of the system of traditionalism in conjoining in the name of religion the greatest outward punctiliousness with the grossest breach of real duty. Never, alas! was that aspect of prophecy, which in the present saw the future, more clearly vindicated than as the words of Isaiah to Israel now appeared in their final fulfilment: 'This people honoureth Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me. Howbeit, in vain do they worship Me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.' [The quotation is a 'Targum,' which in the last clause follows almost entirely the LXX.] But in thus setting forth for the first time the real character of traditionalism, and setting Himself in open opposition to its fundamental principles, the Christ enunciated also for the first time the fundamental principle of His own interpretation of the Law. That Law was not a system of externalism, in which outward things affected the inner man. It was moral and addressed itself to man as a moral being, to his heart and conscience. As the spring of all moral action was within, so the mode of affecting it would be inward. Not from without inwards, but from within outwards: such was the principle of the new Kingdom, as setting forth the Law in its fulness and fulfilling it. 'There is nothing from without the [2 Mark the definite article.] man, that, entering into him, can defile him; but the things which proceed out of the man, those are they that defile the man.' [3 The words in St. Mark vii. 16 are of very doubtful authenticity.] Not only negatively, but positively, was this the fundamental principle of Christian practice in direct contrast to that of Pharisaic Judaism. It is in this essential contrariety of principle, rather than in any details, that the unspeakable difference between Christ and all contemporary teachers appears. Nor is even this all. For, the principle laid down by Christ concerning that which entereth from without and that which cometh from within, covers, in its full application, not only the principle of Christian liberty in regard to the Mosaic Law, but touches far deeper and permanent questions, affecting not only the Jew, but all men and to all times.
As we read it, the discussion, to which such full reference has been made, had taken place between the Scribes and the Lord, while the multitude perhaps stood aside. But when enunciating the grand principle of what constituted real defilement, 'He called to Him the multitude.' [a St. Matt. xv. 10; St. Mark vii. 14.] It was probably while pursuing their way to Capernaum, when this
conversation had taken place, that His disciples afterwards reported, that the Pharisees had been offended by
