The model showed the rough curved-tail, tadpole shape of the
'It isn't my job,' Sitnikov said, 'to worry about the geostrategic endgame. That's your problem. Mine—half of mine, anyway—has been to design the defense of this island and the closure of the Transitway.'
Sitnikov walked to a corner and picked up a very long pointer. When he returned, he set the edge of the pointer on the gap between the naval minefields and the island. 'These minefields, as long as they're not cleared, close the Transitway. Note we left gaps within artillery range so that
'The mines can conceivably be cleared, of course. No obstacle is worth much unless covered by observation and fire.' The pointer began to touch on various turreted fixtures, all around the perimeter of the model. 'These are to be taken from the turrets of the Suvarov Class cruisers you never restored.'
'Those are only six inch guns,' Carrera objected. 'They won't range the extremes of the minefields and any fortifications to cover those extremes, being landbound or close to land, are vulnerable.'
Sitnikov gave an evil grin. 'They don't have to cover them. The things won't even be manned, except for skeleton crews to traverse the turrets and
'Those guns will only unmask, though, for a major push. For individual mineclearers, we'll put in some fixed torpedo firing installations, spaced around the island.' The evil grim returned. 'Mineclearers are notoriously slow.'
Carrera nodded his head up and down, slowly. 'And so to clear the Transitway the enemy would have to clear the mines. To clear the mines he needs to get rid of our guns and torpedoes. To do that he has to clear the island . . .'
'And to do that,' Sitnikov finished, 'he must land. If he lands, he bleeds. He bleeds
Carrera noticed several other ship models around the island. 'What are those for?' he asked.
'Those are derelicts,' Sitnikov answered. 'We'll take older freighters and outfit them for fighting positions. Then we'll anchor them, unmanned, around the island, in shallow water, at all the best beaches. We'll make them look as if they're carrying supplies for the defense. Maybe, even, they will. An enemy, if he attacks them will sink them, but in shallow water. If he doesn't attack them,
Carrera had a sudden image of infantry, wading through the water to get to a beach while an unseen machine gun
'Well, of
'Have you worked up a table of organization and equipment for the defense?' Carrera asked.
'Yes. In broad terms it will take a standard infantry legion—new form, not the old hexagonal counter guerilla organization—reinforced with another infantry
'Doable,' was Carrera's judgment. He thought for a while, then said, 'Leave me here and go round up the commander of the Training Legion. Bring him to me.'
'Any particular reason you want him?'
'Two of them,' Carrera answered. 'It's a good news-bad news kind of thing. First, I'm going to promote him to Legate III. Then, we're going to show him this model, you're going to brief him, I'm going to brief him on how to turn the Eighth Training Legion into the Eighth Infantry Legion, quickly, at need. And then I'm going to send you back to the cadets and stick
'And Sitnikov? Hurry, please. I have to meet Siegel after dinner at the Casa. After that, later this evening, I am meeting with select committees from the new Senate and from the Legislative Assembly.'
Chapter Five
The military mind, and the force those minds create, is innately rapacious, security obsessed, and covetous of power. That said, the civilian political mind is likewise rapacious and covetous of power, and may well be security obsessed. All this can be more or less tolerable. Woe to the state and people, however, that fall under the sway of civilians who are security indifferent . . .
The military mind is rapacious, but that rapacity has limits. It may force life to subordinate itself to the practical needs of war; it will rarely or never, on its own, force life to subordinate itself to mere fantasy or high sounding theory . . .
The need for civilian control over the military is not, in any case, based on any presumption that the civilian mind is, on average, wiser or more creative or more moral than the military mind. Indeed, human history provides no unambiguous evidence to support any such proposition. Rather, the moral imperative of civilian control is based on two related factors. One is that, will they, nil they, civilians